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INTRODUCTION
The Rehnquist Court’s federalism revival advances a single core purpose: the
reduction of national power—at least power exercised by national actors other than the
Supreme Court—and the concomitant increase of state power. Though reflecting this
single idea, the revival has been worked out across several constitutional loci: the
Commerce Clause,1 Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,2 and the Tenth3 and
Eleventh Amendments.4 As is well known, the spending power remains the notable
exception, its exercise still governed by the extremely generous 1987 decision in South
Dakota v. Dole.5 Consequently, many commentators, writing in this Symposium and
elsewhere, have proposed that Congress should respond to the Rehnquist Court’s
states’ rights decisions by using the spending power to circumvent those limitations
on congressional power.6
We argue in this Article that the strategy urged by these commentators is a risky
one that might provoke the Court to abandon Dole in favor of something much less
hospitable to congressional power. Of course, that the Court could tighten its
spending doctrine will be news to no one. Accordingly, those who advocate strategic
recourse to the spending power might respond in either or both of two ways. First,
they may contend that any change in Dole, though possible, is unlikely. The Court’s
“Nationalist Four” (Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer), they might reason,
will stand by Dole, thereby requiring Chief Justice Rehnquist to abandon the test he
authored if there are to be five votes in favor of any change. Pride of authorship and
Rehnquist’s commitment to the “greater includes the lesser” argument at Dole’s core
might seem to make change doubtful.7 Second, they might argue, even if the Court
abandons or modifies Dole, so what? Those who favor relatively more expansive
national power can be no worse off for trying to exploit Dole, so long as it remains
good law.

1. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995).
2. See Morrison, 529 U.S. 598; Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356
(2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997).
3. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144 (1992). But see Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
4. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College
Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
5. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
6. See Mark Tushnet, Alarmism Versus Moderation in Responding to the Rehnquist Court,
78 IND . L.J. 47, 51-52 (2003).
7. See infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
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We think each of these contentions is mistaken. To be sure, a new spending
doctrine, even if only a tightening of the Dole test, is not inevitable. A majority of the
Court, including at least one of the “States’ Rights Five,” may well be prepared to live
with Dole. But this may depend upon what damage this majority (Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas) thinks the doctrine
does. We predict that not even Rehnquist’s pride of authorship would commit him to
Dole if that test permits—as it very probably would—an unvarnished circumvention
of one of the majority’s decisions limiting congressional power. And if Dole goes, it
is anybody’s guess what may replace it. The replacement, however, might prove fatal
to spending legislation that would have survived Dole, and might even prove fatal to
legislation that already has survived Dole. In short, we believe that those who would
urge Congress to exploit Dole to check the Rehnquist Court’s states’ rights revival
might benefit from being more sensitive to the context-dependence of the creation of
judicial doctrine. Put another way, we are urging a greater sensitivity to the need for
strategic thinking.8
Part I reviews South Dakota v. Dole and canvasses recent lower court decisions to
illustrate just how toothless the Dole test has been in practice. Part II shows why the
test is substantively and conceptually infirm. The upshot of this Part, of course, is that
Dole should be abandoned. The prevailing scholarly assumption, however, is that it
will not be. Indeed, it is precisely this assumption that drives recommendations that
Congress use Dole as a blueprint for circumventing the Court’s more restrictive
federalism cases. Part III scrutinizes the assumption of Dole’s durability, focusing in
particular on the possibility that the Court will soon review challenges to the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), an act that, among
other things, uses the spending power as a lever with which to extend the free exercise
rights of state prisoners. We conclude that RLUIPA is unlikely to prod the Court to
overturn or even modify Dole. Consequently, Part IV turns attention to the
circumventionist strategy, showing just how Congress could exploit the Dole test to
get around several of the Rehnquist Court federalism decisions explored in this
Symposium. Part V argues that the Court is unlikely to tolerate this move. It raises the
specter, therefore, of perverse consequences: a too-clever Congress could push a
partially reluctant Supreme Court to curb the most important congressional power that
the Rehnquist Court’s states’ rights revival has thus far left untouched.
I. THE DOLE TEST
The Court’s current spending doctrine derives from its 1987 decision in South
Dakota v. Dole, and is explicit that “objectives not thought to be within Article I’s
‘enumerated legislative fields[]’ . . . may nevertheless be attained through the use of
the spending power and the conditional grant of federal funds.”9 As applied to the
states, the Court’s early rationale for this view was that “the powers of the State are

8. For a general exploration of the strategic interactions among the Supreme Court and other
governmental actors, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court 1993
Term—Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994).
9. 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (citing United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936)).
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not invaded, since [such an offer] imposes no obligations but simply extends an option
which the State is free to accept or reject.”10 Moreover, “[i]f Congress enacted [such
a statute] with the ulterior purpose of tempting [the states] to yield, that purpose may
be effectively frustrated by the simple expedient of not yielding.”11
In 1936, the Court in United States v. Butler expressed concern that
[i]f, in lieu of compulsory regulation of subjects within the states’ reserved
jurisdiction, which is prohibited, the Congress could invoke the taxing and
spending power as a means to accomplish the same end, clause 1 of § 8 of article
I would become the instrument for total subversion of the governmental powers
reserved to the individual states.12

At the same time, however, the Butler Court embraced Alexander Hamilton’s view that
“the power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes
is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution.”13
Unfortunately for proponents of federalism, the latter view has survived in modern
spending clause doctrine,14 while the former concern of the Butler Court has gone
largely unheeded.
A. South Dakota v. Dole
At issue in Dole was a federal statute that withheld five percent of federal highway
funds from any state “‘in which the purchase or public possession . . . of any alcoholic
beverage by a person who is less than twenty-one years of age is lawful.’” 15 Observing
that “[h]ere, Congress has acted indirectly under its spending power to encourage
uniformity in the States’ drinking ages,” the Court went on to hold the legislation
“within constitutional bounds even if Congress may not regulate drinking ages
directly.”16

10. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 480 (1923); see also Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil
Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 143-44 (1947) (“We do not see any violation of the State’s
sovereignty . . . . Oklahoma adopted the ‘simple expedient’ of not yielding to what she urges is
federal coercion.”) (comparing Mellon, 262 U.S. at 482).
11. Mellon, 262 U.S. at 482.
12. 297 U.S. 1, 75 (1936); see also id. at 74 (“Congress has no power to enforce its
commands on the farmer to the ends sought by the Agricultural Adjustment Act. It must follow
that it may not indirectly accomplish those ends by taxing and spending to purchase
compliance.”).
13. Id. at 66.
14. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Butler, 297 U.S. at 66).
15. Id. at 205 (quoting 23 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. III 1982) (omission in original)); see also id.
at 211.
16. Id. at 206 (emphasis added). Even today it is uncertain whether Congress has the power
to regulate drinking ages directly in light of the 21st Amendment. See, e.g., id. at 206 (“the
bounds of [the 21st Amendment] have escaped precise definition”); 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy,
479 U.S. 335, 346 (1987) (observing that the Court “has rejected the view ‘that the Twentyfirst Amendment has somehow operated to “repeal” the Commerce Clause wherever regulation
of intoxicating liquors is concerned’”) (quoting Hostetter v. Idlewild Von Voyage Liquor Corp.,
377 U.S. 324, 331-32 (1964)); see also Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending after
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Because a state always has “the ‘simple expedient’ of not yielding to what she
[considers] federal coercion,”17 the Dole Court concluded that the “Tenth Amendment
limitation on congressional regulation of state affairs [does] not concomitantly limit the
range of conditions legitimately placed on federal grants.”18 Although the Court held
that “[t]he spending power is of course not unlimited . . . but is instead subject to
several general restrictions articulated in our cases,”19 none of the stated restrictions
was portrayed as having much bite.
Thus, the first restriction articulated in Dole, that “the exercise of the spending
power must be in pursuit of ‘the general welfare,’” 20 is subject to the caveat that
“courts should defer substantially to the judgment of Congress” when applying this
standard.21 Indeed, the Court acknowledged that the required level of deference is so
great that it has “questioned whether ‘general welfare’ is a judicially enforceable
restriction at all.”22 Second, the Court affirmed that Congress must state any conditions
on the states’ receipt of federal funds “unambiguously[,] . . . enabl[ing] the States to
exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their
participation.”23 But it could cite only one instance in which it had found that an
enactment did not meet this requirement.24
Third, the Dole Court noted that “conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate
if they are unrelated “to the federal interest in particular national projects or
programs,”25 but added that this restriction was merely “suggested (without significant
elaboration)” by prior cases.26 Indeed, the Court could cite no instance in which it had
invalidated a conditional grant of federal money to the states on this ground.27 Fourth,
the Court concluded that “other constitutional provisions may provide an independent
bar to the conditional grant of federal funds.”28 That is, Congress may not use its

Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1983-85 (1995) [hereinafter Conditional Federal Spending].
17. Dole, 483 U.S. at 210 (quoting Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S.
127, 143-44 (1947)).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 207.
20. Id. (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937); United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1, 65 (1936)).
21. Id. (citing Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640, 645).
22. Id. at 207 n.2 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-91 (1976) (per curiam)).
23. Id. at 207 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
24. Id. Moreover, the import of the Court’s holding in Pennhurst was not to require
Congress to continue providing funds to a state that had failed to comply with an ambiguously
worded condition on those funds, but to deny relief to a third-party beneficiary of the funds
who alleged that the state of Pennsylvania had failed to comply with the federal condition that
the Court ultimately found to be ambiguous. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 27-28.
25. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)
(plurality opinion)).
26. Id. at 207 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality
opinion)). For an elaboration on this prong, see infra Part V.B.1.
27. See id. at 207-08. The Dole Court cited Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444,
461 (1978) (plurality opinion), and Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295
(1958). But the Court had not invalidated a condition on federal funds in either case.
28. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208.
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powers under the Spending Clause “to induce the States to engage in activities that
would themselves be unconstitutional.”29 But again, the Court could cite no case in
which it had invalidated a conditional grant of federal money to the states on this
basis.30
In addition, the Dole Court read the Spending Clause to impose limits on
Congress’s ability to “coerce” the states in ways that it could not directly mandate
under its other Article I powers.31 “[I]n some circumstances,” the Court observed, “the
financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at
which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’” 32 The Court concluded that a threatened loss
to states of five percent of their otherwise obtainable allotment of federal highway
funds did not pass this critical point, but did not suggest what percentage of these (or
any other) funds might.33
B. Dole in Action
In the fifteen years that Dole has been the law of the land, the lower courts, quite
predictably, have found little use for three of the five elements of its test. The courts
(and thus most litigants) have consistently viewed the first, “general welfare,” prong
as a complete throw away, consistent with the Dole Court’s own description.34 The
second prong, requiring a clear statement of the conditions imposed on the federal

29. Id. at 210. Here the Court gave as an example “a grant of federal funds conditioned on
invidiously discriminatory state action or the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.” Id.
30. See id. at 208. The Court cited three cases, but in none of them had it invalidated a
conditional grant of federal money to the states on this ground. See Lawrence County v. LeadDeadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 269-70 (1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976)
(per curiam); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 & n.34 (1968).
31. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.
32. Id. (citing Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
33. See id. We explore the coercion prong in greater depth infra at Part V.B.2 and V.C.4.
34. Id. at 207 n.2. See also, e.g., West Virginia v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 132
F. Supp. 2d 437, 442 (S.D. W.Va. 2001) (concluding without further discussion that
“Congress’s exercise of the spending power in this regard is in the pursuit of the general
welfare”); Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 n.3 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding without further
discussion that “[w]e think it clear that the legislation is reasonably designed to serve the general
welfare”). Thus, litigants increasingly do not even raise claims under this prong of Dole. See,
e.g., Michigan Dep’t of State v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1228,
1233 (W.D. Mich. 2001) (observing that “Michigan concedes that the statute is in pursuit of
the general welfare”).
A rare exception is Stop H-3 Ass’n v. Dole, 870 F.2d 1419, 1427-29 (9th Cir. 1989), in
which the “general welfare” prong was a focus of litigation. Plaintiffs argued that the federal
spending legislation at issue was not consistent with the “general welfare” because the
“proposed highway is contained entirely within the state of Hawaii, and could only carry
vehicles from one point in Hawaii to another,” and therefore “is of ‘local’ and not ‘national’
interest.” Id. at 1427. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, stating that the highway “was intended to
serve the general welfare” and “is part of an interstate highway system which serves important
defense functions.” Id. at 1428. See also Hodges v. Shalala, 121 F. Supp. 2d 854, 873 (D.S.C.
2000) (challenging the constitutionality of federal spending condition on the ground that the
conditions “are not consistent with the nation’s welfare”).
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funds, has seemingly had bite on several occasions, but only in the very limited
context of conditional waivers of Eleventh Amendment immunity.35 But even within
that context, many courts have applied the clear-statement requirement with
extraordinary leniency. Outside of the Eleventh Amendment context, one federal
appeals court went so far as to hold a “postacceptance” or “retroactive” condition on
federal funds—”of which the states were unaware at the time they accepted the[]
funds”—to be constitutionally permissible under Dole’s second prong because the
condition was “unambiguous.”36
As one might expect, the “independent constitutional bar” prong of the Dole test
has rarely come into play. It did have bite, however, in one very recent case involving
the Children’s Internet Protection Act.37 The Act required public libraries to use
Internet filters as a condition for receipt of federal subsidies.38 The federal district court
held the relevant sections of the Act facially invalid under the First Amendment,
observing that “the proposition that Congress may not pay state actors to violate
citizens’ First Amendment rights is unexceptionable when stated in the abstract.”39
Because the legislation was found to “induce public libraries to violate the First
Amendment,” the First Amendment was held to provide an independent bar to the
Act’s conditional grant of federal funds, consistent with Dole’s fourth prong.40 The
Supreme Court will decide the fate of the Act during the October 2002 Term. 41
At the time Dole was decided, the potentially most promising provisions of its test
seemed to be its “relatedness” requirement and anti-“coercion” language. The former’s
promise stemmed in large part from O’Connor’s dissent in Dole, in which she claimed
that the majority misapplied their own relatedness test.42 She argued that a proper

35. This is an unusual context because many of the relevant courts have stated that the
challenged legislation was invalidated pursuant to the “clear declaration of waiver” requirement
of Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985)—a pre-Dole Eleventh Amendment
decision—and not pursuant to the second prong of the Dole test. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 680-81 (1999); Pugliese v. Ariz. Dept.
of Health and Human Serv., 147 F. Supp. 2d 985, 990-91 & n.8 (N.D. Cal. 2001). Indeed, lower
courts that have adjudicated challenges to federal grants conditioned on waiver of state sovereign
immunity have often viewed the clear-statement rule of Atascadero as the only constitutional
obstacle, failing even to acknowledge Dole’s other requirements as applicable. See Mitchell N.
Berman, R. Anthony Reese & Ernest A. Young, State Accountability for Violations of Intellectual
Property Rights: How To “Fix” Florida Prepaid (And How Not To), 79 T EX. L. REV. 1037,
1138-39 (2001).
36. Counsel v. Dow, 849 F.2d 731, 735-36 (2d Cir. 1988) (contending that “Pennhurst
cannot be read as broadly prohibiting amendments which add retroactive conditions to funding
statutes: at most, Pennhurst simply requires a clear indication of congressional intent to impose
such conditions.”).
37. Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 406-07 (E.D. Pa. 2002), prob.
juris. noted, 123 S. Ct. 551 (2002).
38. Id. at 406-07.
39. Id. at 451.
40. Id. at 450. The only real issue for the Court was “what exactly a litigant must establish
to facially invalidate an exercise of Congress’s spending power on this grounds.” Id.
41. See 123 S. Ct. 551 (2002) (noting probable jurisdiction over American Library
Association v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002)).
42. O’Connor explained that, “My disagreement with the Court is relatively narrow on the
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application of the test would lead to invalidation of the legislation at issue in Dole.43
The promise of the anti-”coercion” provision was apparent in the Dole majority’s
strong suggestion that a threatened loss to states of some significant (but unspecified)
portion of federal funds might well invalidate the relevant condition as being
impermissibly “coercive.”44 During the past fifteen years, however, the lower courts,
with few exceptions,45 have read these two most promising provisions of the Dole test
to be toothless, even nonjusticiable, en route to sustaining a wide range of conditional
federal spending legislation.
Although no court has denied the existence or justiciability of Dole’s “relatedness”
requirement, nearly all have given it only cursory attention. In most instances in which
the requirement has been a focus of litigation, the court has done little more than
assert, without analysis or elaboration, that the challenged condition is “reasonably
related to the federal interest in the national program.”46 Thus, the lower courts have
had little difficulty upholding a wide range of funding conditions without a clearly
explained relationship to the underlying legislation, including the condition that the
state develop and maintain an automated child support enforcement system in order
to receive federal funds under the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families program, 47
the condition that the state provide emergency medical services to illegal aliens in

spending power issue: it is a disagreement about the application of a principle rather than a
disagreement on the principle itself.” South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). She added that “the Court’s application of the requirement that the
condition imposed be reasonably related to the purpose for which the funds are expended is
cursory and unconvincing.” Id. at 213 (emphasis added).
43. “In my view, establishment of a minimum drinking age of 21 is not sufficiently related
to interstate highway construction to justify so conditioning funds appropriated for that
purpose.” Id. at 213-14.
44. Id. at 211 (citing Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
45. The few exceptions are Guillen v. Pierce County, 31 P.3d 628, 651 (Wash. 2001), rev’d
in part on other grounds, 123 S. Ct. 720 (2003); United States v. Sabri, 183 F. Supp. 2d 1145
(D. Minn. 2002); and Comm. of Va. Dep’t of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 1997)
(per curiam) (en banc).
46. Kansas v. United States, 24 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1198 (D. Kan. 1998). The Kansas court
added by way of “elaboration,” that “[t]he statutory requirements here at issue clearly
demonstrate sufficient relationship to the purpose of the federal funding so as to pass
constitutional muster.” Id. See also, e.g., Litman v. George Mason Univ., 5 F. Supp. 2d 366,
376 (E.D. Va. 1998), aff’d, 186 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1181 (2000)
(providing one sentence “analysis” of the application of the relatedness prong: “The Court finds
that [the statutory provisions at issue] easily satisfy this requirement, and Defendant does not
argue otherwise.”).
One lower federal court included the relatedness requirement when setting out the Dole test,
then completely ignored that requirement when applying Dole’s restrictions to the facts at issue.
United Seniors Ass’n v. Shalala, 2 F. Supp. 2d 39, 42 (D.D.C. 1998), aff’d 182 F.3d 965 (D.C.
Cir. 1999). See also, e.g., Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661, 666 (5th Cir. 1997) (limiting
“analysis” under Dole to observation that the “federal law requires states to provide emergency
medical care to undocumented aliens only if the states voluntarily choose to receive federal funds
from the Medicaid program”).
47. See Hodges v. Shalala, 121 F. Supp. 2d 854, 877 (D.S.C. 2000), aff’d sub nom., Hodges
v. Thompson, 311 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2002).
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order to receive Medicaid funds,48 and the condition that the state comply with a
heightened standard of free exercise of religion for prisoners and other individuals in
its institutions in order to receive federal funds for those institutions.49
To date, the most significant exception to this state of affairs is the Washington
Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in Pierce County v. Guillen,50 which involved a
challenge to federal legislation that, as the Washington Supreme Court construed it,
conditioned federal highway-safety improvement funds on a state’s making reports
and data involved in the preparation of applications for the federal funds privileged
and nondiscoverable. The United States Supreme Court decided Guillen in January
2003, reversing the Washington Supreme Court.51 The United States Supreme Court
upheld the challenged legislation on Commerce Clause grounds, and thus did not find
it necessary to reach the spending power issue.52 We discuss Guillen and what it
might signify for the near future of the Court’s spending jurisprudence in Part III.A
below.
The Dole test’s “coercion” provision has fulfilled even less of its apparent promise.
In finding the provision essentially nonjusticiable, the lower federal courts have
repeatedly pointed to the difficulties in drawing the line between “financial
inducement” and “coercion,”53 the failure of other courts to invalidate any funding

48. See, e.g., California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1092 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
522 U.S. 806 (1997); Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661, 666 (5th Cir. 1997); Padavan v.
United States, 82 F.3d 23, 29 (2d Cir. 1996).
49. See Mayweathers v. Terhune, No. CIVS961582LKKGGHP, 2001 WL 804140 (E.D. Cal.
July 2, 2001), aff’d sub nom., Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002)
(affirming lower court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss); Johnson v. Martin, 23 F.
Supp. 2d 820 (W.D. Mich., 2002) (denying state’s motion for summary judgment); Charles v.
Verhagen, 220 F. Supp. 2d 955 (W.D. Wis., 2002) (granting prisoner’s motion for injunctive
relief); Freedom Baptist Church v. Middletown, 204 F. Supp. 2d 857 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (denying
Township’s motion to dismiss); Gerhardt v. Lazaroff, 221 F. Supp. 2d 827 (S.D. Ohio 2002)
(denying defendants’ motion to dismiss).
50. 31 P.3d 628 (Wash. 2001), rev’d in part, 123 S.Ct. 720 (2003).
51. See Pierce County v. Guillen, 123 S.Ct. 720 (2003).
52. Id. at 732 n. 9.
53. See, e.g., West Virginia v. U.S. Dep’t. of Health and Human Servs., 289 F.3d 281, 288
(4th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he coercion theory is somewhat amorphous and cannot easily be reduced
to a neat set of black-letter rules of application.”); id. at 289 (“These oft-mentioned ‘endless
difficulties’ in applying the coercion theory have led some courts to conclude, in essence, that
the theory raises political questions that cannot be resolved by the courts.”); Kansas v. United
States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2000) (“The boundary between incentive and coercion
has never been made clear . . . .”), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1035 (2000); Nevada v. Skinner, 884
F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The difficulty if not the impropriety of making judicial
judgments regarding a state’s financial capabilities renders the coercion theory highly suspect
as a method of resolving disputes between federal and state governments.”), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1070 (1990); John Doe v. Nebraska, No. 4:CV95-3381, 2002 WL 225907, at *7 (D. Neb.
Feb. 14, 2002) (memorandum and order on defendants’ renewed motion for summary judgment)
(“I, too, question the viability of the coercion theory.”); Kansas v. United States, 24 F. Supp.
2d 1192, 1198 (D. Kan. 1998) (“The Supreme Court and other courts have recognized that the
judiciary should attempt to avoid becoming entangled in ascertaining the point at which federal
inducement to comply with a condition becomes compulsion. . . . These cases suggest that the
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condition on this ground,54 and the ability of a state to avoid the condition by simply
foregoing the federal funds.55 Indeed, the lower courts have consistently failed to find
impermissible coercion,56 even when a state has demonstrated that either the absolute

coercion test is ill-conceived and probably unworkable.”).
54. See, e.g., West Virginia, 289 F.3d at 289 (“[T]he Supreme Court since 1937 has not
struck down a Congressional exercise of its spending powers, and we are aware of no decision
from any court finding a conditional grant to be impermissibly coercive.”) (footnote omitted);
id. at 290 (“[M]ost courts faced with the question have effectively abandoned any real effort
to apply the coercion theory.”); Kansas, 214 F.3d at 1201-02 (“The Court has never employed
the [coercion] theory to invalidate a funding condition, and federal courts have been similarly
reluctant to use it.”); Skinner, 884 F.2d at 448 (“The coercion theory has been much discussed
but infrequently applied in federal case law, and never in favor of the challenging party.”); John
Doe, 2002 WL 225907, at *8 (“[S]tates have found little, if any, success with the coercion
theory in challenging Spending Clause conditions.”); Michigan Dep’t of State v. United States,
166 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1236 (W.D.Mich. 2001) (observing that “the state fails to cite any case
invalidating Congressional action under the Spending Clause based on coercion”); West Virginia
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 132 F. Supp. 2d 437, 443 (S.D. W.Va. 2001) (“Since
Steward, no court has invalidated a funding condition as being coercive.”), aff’d, 289 F.3d 281
(4th Cir. 2002).
Indeed, one federal district court has gone so far as to read the “coercion” test entirely out
of Dole. See Building & Constr. Trades Dep’t v. Allbaugh, 172 F. Supp. 2d 138, 151 (D.D.C.
2001) (contending that “contrary to defendants’ argument, in upholding spending clause
statutes, the Court does not address the question of whether a conditional spending grant is
‘voluntary,’ or impermissibly ‘coercive’”), rev’d, 295 F.3d 28 (D.C. Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
123 S. Ct. 992 (2003).
55. See, e.g., Kansas, 214 F.3d at 1203 (“If Kansas finds the…requirements so disagreeable,
it is ultimately free to reject both the conditions and the funding, no matter how hard that choice
may be. . . . Kansas’ options have been increased, not constrained, by the offer of more federal
dollars.”); Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1082 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S.
949 (2001) (“[T]he Arkansas Department of Education can avoid the requirements of Section
504 simply by declining federal education funds. The sacrifice of all federal education funds,
approximately $250 million or 12 per cent of the annual state education budget . . . would be
politically painful, but we cannot say that it compels Arkansas’s choice.”); Michigan Dep’t of
State, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 1236 (“This Court similarly finds the coercion theory without merit
in light of the clear choice presented to Michigan by Congress. Michigan has a free choice
whether to comply with the requirement that it collect SSNs on drivers’ license applications and
receive federal funds or not.”); Padavan v. United States, 82 F.3d 23, 29 (2d Cir. 1996) (“If New
York chose not to participate [in the federal Medicaid program], there would be no federal
regulation requiring the state to provide medical services to illegal aliens.”).
56. Two courts have come close to invalidating a spending provision on grounds of coercion.
In United States v. Sabri, 183 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1156 (D. Minn. 2002), a federal district court
considering the constitutionality of § 666 of the federal bribery statute, see infra note 133, stated
that “even if one could describe the federal funds disbursed . . . as the ‘financial inducement’ by
which Congress bargained for federal jurisdiction over offenses traditionally within the purview
of state and local governments, that bargain surely is ‘so coercive as to pass the point at which
pressure turns into compulsion.’”). The Court went on, however, to conclude that “Section 666
plainly is not a ‘condition’ statute within the reasoning of Dole and cannot be justified under
that decision as a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Spending Clause.” Id.
In Virginia Department of Education. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (en
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amount or percentage of federal money at stake is so large that it has “no choice but
to accept the [federal legislation’s] many requirements.”57 It is not surprising that the
lower courts have increasingly questioned whether “there is any viability left in the
coercion theory”58 given the courts’ willingness to uphold conditions on Medicaid
grants, for example, “even where the removal of Medicaid funding would devastate the
state’s medical system.”59
II. W HY DOLE SHOULD BE A BANDONED
The prevailing view among “liberal” academics and judges seems to be that the
Rehnquist Court’s “states’ rights” revival is one giant wrong turn, and that Dole was

banc), the Fourth Circuit struck down a provision of the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (“IDEA”) that purported to condition receipt of the federal education funds on a state’s
providing free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) to handicapped students expelled or
suspended for criminal or other serious misconduct wholly unrelated to their disabilities.
Adopting Judge Luttig’s dissenting opinion in the panel below, the en banc court held the
condition unconstitutional for failing Dole’s requirement that the condition be unambiguous. Id.
at 561, 566-69. In dicta, however, the court explained that the statute also raised “[a] substantial
constitutional question” with respect to coercion, id. at 561, and strongly intimated that, were
the statute sufficiently unambiguous, it would have held that conditioning all IDEA funds on a
state’s provision of FAPE even to handicapped students expelled or suspended for disabilityunrelated misconduct was unconstitutionally coercive. Id. at 569-71.
Interestingly, Congress amended the IDEA only months after the Riley decision to make clear
that IDEA funds were indeed conditioned on a state’s ensuring that “[a] free appropriate public
education is available to all children with disabilities residing in the State between the ages of 3
and 21, inclusive, including children with disabilities who have been suspended or expelled from
school.” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (2000) (amended by Pub. L. No. 105-17, § 612, 16 Stat. 60
(1997)). Although the Fourth Circuit has acknowledged that the ambiguity it detected in Riley
has been cured, see Amos v.Md. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 126 F.3d 589, 603 n.8
(4th Cir. 1997), to our knowledge that court has not been invited to unleash the sword it had left
hanging in Riley by holding the amended statute unconstitutionally coercive.
57. Kansas, 214 F.3d at 120. For an exploration of what it may mean for a state to have “no
choice but to accept” a conditional offer, see infra Part V.B.2.
58. California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1092 (9th Cir. 1997); see also, e.g., Virginia
v. United States, 926 F. Supp. 537, 543 (E.D. Va. 1995) (“[T]he Court has serious doubts
whether the coercion inquiry is a viable tool of spending power jurisprudence.”), aff’d, 74 F.3d
517 (4th Cir. 1996); Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he
coercion theory is unclear, suspect, and has little precedent to support its application.”). One
Court has further
seriously question[ed] the vitality of the coercion test in light of the Supreme
Court’s holding in Garcia . . . . If [state] sovereignty is adequately protected by
the national political process, we do not see any reason for asking the judiciary to
settle questions of policy and politics that range beyond its normal expertise.
Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).
59. Kansas, 214 F.3d at 1202; see also, e.g., California, 104 F.3d at 1092 (observing that
California “argues that while its choice to participate in Medicaid may have been voluntary, it
now has no choice but to remain in the program in order to prevent a collapse of its medical
system”)(citation omitted).
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the Rehnquist Court’s rare right move.60 Our own views on resurgent federalism are
somewhat more favorable, although not in complete agreement—either with each other
or with the Court.61 However, despite the various respects in which we disagree with
each other, and with the Court, over several of its recent federalism decisions, however,
we agree that Dole was a mistake of substantial import. Further, we are persuaded that
everyone should share this view, liberals and conservatives alike. In this Part we
explain why. In short, we argue that Dole has yielded, and will continue to yield,
normatively troublesome results, and is intellectually suspect as well.
A. Practical Infirmities
Our analysis begins with a consideration of a particularly important function that
we believe the judicial enforcement of states’ rights—including meaningful judicially
enforced limitations on the spending power—serves. It provides “outlier” or
“minority” states protection from federal homogenization in areas in which they deviate
from the national norm, whether that deviation is to the left or right of the political
center. In serving this function, judicially enforced limitations on the spending power
increase and preserve diversity among the states within the realm of what is
constitutionally permitted,62 thereby ultimately increasing aggregate social welfare.

60. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Spending Power, 4 CHAP . L. REV. 89, 90,
93 (2001) (contending that the Court’s recent federalism decisions were “misguided” but that
“the Supreme Court was right in South Dakota v. Dole”); Sylvia A. Law, In the Name of
Federalism: The Supreme Court’s Assault on Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 U. CIN. L. REV.
367, 391 (2002) (observing with approval that “[e]ven though the Court has sharply constrained
the power of Congress to act under the Commerce Clause and under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, many of the goals Congress seeks to achieve may still be pursued through the
federal spending power” under Dole). Of course, this view is not limited to those who would
self-identify as liberal. For a very recent, extended, critique by a distinguished Reagan appointee
to the bench, see JOHN T. NOONAN , JR., NARROWING THE NATION’S POWER: THE SUPREME
COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES (2002).
61. For a sampling of our published views on federalism, see, for example, Baker, Conditional
Federal Spending, supra note 16; Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending and States’
Rights, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL . & SOC. SCI. 104 (2001) [hereinafter Conditional Federal
Spending and States’ Rights]; Lynn A. Baker, Federalism: The Argument from Article V, 13 GA .
ST. UNIV. L. REV. 923 (1997); Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political
Safeguards of Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 951 (2001) [hereinafter Political Safeguards]; Lynn
A. Baker, Should Liberals Fear Federalism?, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 433 (2002); Lynn A. Baker,
The Revival of States’ Rights: A Progress Report and a Proposal, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL ’Y
95 (1998) [hereinafter Revival of States’ Rights ]; Lynn A. Baker, The Spending Power and the
Federalist Revival, 4 CHAPMAN L. REV. 195 (2001) [hereinafter Spending Power]; Lynn A.
Baker & Samuel H. Dinkin, The Senate: An Institution Whose Time Has Gone?, 13 J.L. & POL .
21 (1997); Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial
Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75 (2001); Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines:
Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO . L.J. 1 (2001); Berman, Reese &
Young, supra note 35.
62. As we discuss at greater length infra at Part II.A.1, the interstate diversity with which
we are concerned is diversity “above” the baseline of what is constitutionally permitted. That
is, we are taking existing federal constitutional prohibitions as given, and are concerned solely
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We go on to consider a core objection that might be raised to these arguments in
favor of judicially enforced state autonomy: that even if interstate diversity is more
likely to maximize the satisfaction of individual preferences, and therefore more likely
to maximize aggregate social welfare, than is a homogenization of policies dictated or
encouraged by Congress, permitting Congress to press states to adopt certain policies,
is likely to result in policies that are more just or otherwise preferable as a matter of
political morality. We find this defense of Dole unpersuasive, and offer three reasons
why below.
Because Dole authorizes expansive congressional power, it may not be surprising
that, notwithstanding Rehnquist’s authorship of Dole and Brennan’s dissent, Dole is
today more loved by the (typically nationalist) Democrats than by the (typically states’
rights) Republicans. Frequently overlooked, however, is the fact that liking Dole with
a Democratic Congress, in which exploitation of the Dole loophole to circumvent the
Court’s recent states’ rights and other “conservative” decisions seemed plausible, is
not the same as liking it with a Republican Congress in which use of the spending
power to achieve socially conservative outcomes seems far more likely. Thus, we
conclude this Part by explaining why liberal “nationalists” too should dislike Dole (and
celebrate limited federal power), despite their own protestations to the contrary.63
1. Dole Reduces Aggregate Social Welfare
Our central thesis can be simply stated: in the absence of a nationwide consensus,
permitting state-by-state variation will almost always satisfy more people than would
the imposition of a uniform national policy, and will almost always therefore increase
aggregate social welfare. As Michael McConnell has succinctly demonstrated, stateby-state diversity will generally allow government to accommodate the preferences of
a greater proportion of the electorate, as long as those preferences are unequally
distributed geographically.64 And, as one of us has previously explained, this is likely
to mean that the imposition of national uniformity in the absence of consensus will
reduce aggregate social welfare relative to the existence of state-by-state diversity.65
Permitting subnational political communities to choose their own visions of the
good society affords individuals the freedom to choose from among various diverse
regulatory regimes the one that best suits the individual’s preferences.66 Seth Kreimer

with diversity among the states in areas in which our nation has not yet arrived at a consensus
that it is willing or able (or deems necessary) to enshrine in the U.S. Constitution.
63. For an extended discussion of the larger topic of whether liberals should favor states’
rights more generally, see Baker, Should Liberals Fear Federalism?, supra note 61.
64. Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1484, 1494 (1987). Whether the accommodation of more people’s preferences actually
increases social welfare, of course, depends to some extent on how both preferences and welfare
are measured and, in the end, on what the preferences are for. A majority preference in a given
jurisdiction for slavery, for instance, would raise grave difficulties for any measure of welfare
based solely on satisfying the preferences of the greatest number. Our claim here is simply that
complications like this are often not present and that state-by-state diversity often will increase
welfare.
65. See Baker, Conditional Federal Spending, supra note 16, at 1947-51, 1970-72.
66. See id. at 1947-51.
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has recently illustrated the wide variety of situations in which Americans have invoked
this freedom at different points in our history:
Mormons moved from Illinois to Utah, while African Americans migrated from the
Jim Crow South. Rail travel and, later, automobiles and airplanes enabled residents
of conservative states to escape constraints on divorce and remarriage. In the years
before Roe v. Wade, women from states with restrictive abortion laws sought
reproductive autonomy in more sympathetic jurisdictions. Today, the lesbian who
finds herself in Utah, like the gun lover who lives in Washington, D.C., and the
gambler in Pennsylvania, need only cross a state border to be free of constraining
rules. These are liberties that come only with the variations in local norms made
possible by federalism.67

In sum, state autonomy to create diverse politico-legal regimes, combined with a
personal right of exit, is a critical way that American federalism promotes individual
welfare.
Because Dole’s interpretation of the spending power is so generous, it enhances
Congress’s authority to drive states toward a single nationwide policy,
notwithstanding the preferences of citizens of some states to have a different policy.
To the extent that Congress need respond only to the preferences of a majority of
states in exercising its spending power, its action may well be at odds with the
preferences of a dissenting minority of states.
There are at least three different, if not entirely discrete, scenarios in which some
states might seek to use Congress’s spending power as an instrument for imposing
their preferences on other states. The first and simplest involves a situation in which
people in some states simply do not approve of certain activities that are legal in other
states, even though the activity in the other state does not otherwise affect them.
When the states of Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Utah entered the Union, for
example, Congress required each, as a condition of admission, to include in its state
constitution a provision stating that polygamy is “forever prohibited.”68 As Justice
Scalia has pointed out, this requirement amounted to an “effort by the majority of
citizens to preserve its view of sexual morality . . . against the efforts of a

67. Seth F. Kreimer, Federalism and Freedom, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL . & SOC. SCI.
66, 72 (2001); see also Baker, Conditional Federal Spending, supra note 16, at 1947-51
(discussing the relationship between individual mobility and benefits of federalism); Richard A.
Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 LAW & CONTEMP . PROBS. 147, 150 (Winter 1992)
(observing that “[f]ederalism works best where it is possible to vote with your feet”);
McConnell, supra note 64, at 1493-94, 1503-04. On the general importance of exit rights in the
American political tradition, see ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE , AND LOYALTY :
RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 106-12 (1970).
68. See Arizona Enabling Act, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 569 (1910); New Mexico Enabling Act, ch.
310, 36 Stat. 558 (1910); Oklahoma Enabling Act, ch. 3335, 34 Stat. 269 (1906); Utah Enabling
Act, ch. 138, 28 Stat. 108 (1894). The complying state constitutional provisions—which are
still in force—may be found at ARIZ. CONST., art. XX, par. 2; N.M. CONST., art. XXI, § 1;
OKLA . CONST., art. I, § 2; UTAH CONST., art. III, § 1. Indeed, the Arizona, New Mexico, and
Utah enabling acts required that these provisions be “irrevocable without the consent of the
United States and the people of said State.”

2003]

GETTING OFF THE DOLE

473

geographically concentrated and politically powerful minority to undermine it.”69 The
preferences of polygamists in the new western states, however, did not “undermine”
the marriage laws of the majority of states in any substantial sense. Rather, the majority
states most likely acted out of a straightforward desire to impose their own moral code
on
others
in
the
absence of a constitutional amendment reflecting a nationwide consensus on the
issue.70
A second scenario involves an attempt by some states to capture a
disproportionate share of federal monetary or regulatory largesse.71 Any conditional
offer of federal funds is highly likely to make some states better off at the expense of
other states.72 Such an offer implicitly divides the states into two groups: (1) states that
already comply, or without financial inducement would happily comply, with the
funding condition, and for which the offer of federal money therefore is a gratuity; and
(2) states that find the funding condition unattractive and therefore face the choice of
foregoing the federal funds in order to avoid complying with the condition, or
submitting to undesirable federal regulation in order to receive the offered funds. One
would therefore expect such conditional funding legislation to be enacted only if a
(substantial) majority of states fall within the first group: that is, they already willingly
comply with, or favor, the stated condition, and the conditional offer of funds is
therefore no less attractive to them than a similar unconditional offer. For the states in
the majority (and their congressional representatives), a vote in favor of the conditional
grant is nearly always a vote to impose a burden solely on other states.
If most states have already set their minimum drinking age at twenty-one, for
example, then those states should find it attractive to impose a minimum drinking age
of twenty-one as a condition on federal highway funds offered all states.73 Such a
condition would bring about one of two possible results. Either outlier states with
minimum drinking ages lower than twenty-one will comply with the condition,
accepting the preferences held by the dominant majority, or they will forfeit whatever
amount of highway funds are tied to the condition. The latter result, of course, would
leave more funds in the general treasury and thus available for the benefit of all states.
The ability to impose spending conditions thus presents states in the majority with a
“no lose” proposition—”no lose,” that is, except to the extent that such measures
undermine the autonomy of all states in the long run.74

69. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 648 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70. True, some opponents of polygamy in the rest of the Union may also have been
concerned that permitting polygamy in the new states could have a corrosive influence on the
institution of monogamy in their own states. But this desire to impose their own moral values
on others may very well have been a sufficient motivation.
71. See, e.g., Baker, Conditional Federal Spending, supra note 16, at 1939-51; Baker,
Spending Power, supra note 61, at 199-217.
72. For a more extensive discussion of this argument, see Baker, Conditional Federal
Spending, supra note 16, at 1939-51; Baker, Spending Power, supra note 61, at 212-17.
73. See Baker, Conditional Federal Spending, supra note 16, at 1943-45, 1978-87.
74. Admittedly, the majority states that engineered this conditional offer could conceivably
lose in yet another way. If the majority norm confers upon the states that adhere to it a
competitive advantage relative to the minority in the competition for individual and corporate
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A final scenario arises when states seek federal regulation in order to avoid certain
costs associated with regulating a particular subject at the state level. Consider, for
example, a not-so-hypothetical state of affairs under which a majority of the states
wishes to discourage homosexual relationships. A solid majority of the citizens in each
of these states may share this preference and support state laws making clear that gay
partners are not entitled to family benefits, that gay couples cannot adopt children, and
the like. Nonetheless, the leaders of these states may know that many private
companies are more progressive on these issues, and that the minority states that
refuse to enact such laws will have an advantage in attracting corporate facilities to
their state. The states in the majority may thus seek to enact their antihomosexual
social preferences at the federal level, and a condition on federal funds offered the
states may be the path of least resistance. The primary goal here, unlike in the first
scenario discussed above, need not be the imposition of the majority states’ moral
code on the remaining states, nor the preservation by the majority states’ citizens of
their view of sexual morality against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to
undermine it. Although the federal legislation that the majority states seek may have
these effects, the states’ primary motivation is to “level the playing field.” Such
antihomosexual federal legislation will restrict the competition for residents and tax
dollars that would otherwise exist among the states on this issue, and will divest the
minority states of any competitive gains afforded by their preference not to enact
similar antihomosexual legislation at the state level.75
The net result of conditional federal spending legislation in each of the scenarios
discussed above is a reduction in the diversity among the fifty states in the package
of taxes and services, including constitutional rights and other laws, that each offers
its residents and potential residents.76 Some individuals (and corporations) may no
longer find any state that provides a package (including the permissibility of polygamy,

residents and their tax dollars, and if the conditional funding offer causes the minority states to
adopt the majority norm, then the majority states will have lost their preexisting competitive
advantage. Presumably, then, states would employ the conditional offer strategy only when
they expect either that minority states would not comply with the condition or that compliance
by the minority would not undermine a competitive advantage enjoyed by the majority.
75. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL . ECON. 416
(1956). For commentary on Tiebout’s classic model, see, for example, CLAYTON P. GILLETTE
& LYNN A. B AKER, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW: CASES AND M ATERIALS 384-385 (2d ed. 1999);
Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 506-14 (1991) (offering critique and collecting
sources); Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 25-34 (1998) (offering critique
of “theory of public goods” including Tiebout’s article).
76. One caveat though. As Evan Caminker reminded us, an exercise of federal spending
power could, in theory, be diversity-protecting if it conditions funds on a state’s lifting
diversity-squelching restrictions that the state would otherwise impose on local autonomy. For
example, it would seemingly foster diversity at the local level were Congress to condition funds
to the states on each state’s not preventing local governments from deciding for themselves the
reach of antidiscrimination laws. This is an important observation. See also Edward L. Rubin
& Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903,
919 (1994). But federal conditions of this sort are sufficiently rare that their hypothetical
existence should not be taken to overshadow the arguments we make above.
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a minimum drinking age of eighteen, or the availability of various family benefits for
homosexual partners) that suits their preferences, while other individuals and
corporations may confront a surfeit of states offering a package (including prohibitions
on polygamy, a minimum drinking age of twenty-one, and laws restricting various
family benefits to married couples of different genders) that they find attractive. In
many instances, this reduced diversity is likely to mean a decrease in aggregate social
welfare, since the loss in welfare to those with the minority preference is unlikely to
yield a comparable gain in welfare for those who oppose that preference.77
Even if one is persuaded that inter-state diversity increases aggregate social
welfare, one might still doubt that judicial review is necessary to secure that benefit.
That is, the fact that the Dole doctrine permits potentially homogenizing use of the
conditional spending power may not be enough to indict that bit of judicial doctrine.
“Political safeguards” proponents such as Herbert Wechsler78 and Larry Kramer79 have
argued that state autonomy (and, therefore, inter-state diversity) is adequately
protected by various aspects of the federal political process and that judicial review—
under Dole of any other doctrine—is therefore not necessary to secure these benefits.
As one of us has shown at length elsewhere, however, such arguments are especially
unpersuasive when the concern is “horizontal” impositions on state autonomy of the
sort described above.80 Indeed, the particular safeguards identified by Wechsler and

77. That is, the mere existence of the last remaining state in which polygamy is legal, the
minimum drinking age is eighteen, or homosexual couples are eligible for family benefits seems
likely to yield aggregate benefits for individuals with those (minority) preferences that are far
greater than the aggregate benefits that individuals with the opposing, majority preferences
would realize if there were fifty rather than forty-nine states with laws consistent with those
majority preferences. Indeed, for a gay couple, the last remaining state in which same-sex
couples are eligible for family benefits may well have a value beyond measure. Of course, the
precise measure and calculation of the actual welfare gains and losses in any of these situations
is not currently possible, so the above claim seems unlikely to progress any time soon beyond
the status of an open empirical question and a theoretical likelihood. See Baker, Conditional
Federal Spending, supra note 16, at 1970-71 & n.279.
78. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
79. See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000).
80. In previous work, one of us has found it useful to distinguish between two different
potential threats to state autonomy that often are conflated in the federalism debate. One sort
of threat, termed “vertical” aggrandizement, involves efforts by the federal government to
increase its own power at the expense of the states. Such aggrandizement may occur, for
example, when the federal government takes over regulatory functions traditionally exercised by
the states, preempts sources of state revenue, or imposes regulatory burdens on state
governments. The substantive preferences of the states in these situations are irrelevant to the
issue of vertical encroachment. The defining characteristic is that the impetus for the expansion
of federal power comes from the federal government or from interest groups operating at the
federal level, and not from state governmental institutions or geographically based interests
primarily concentrated at the state level.
The focus of “horizontal” aggrandizement, in contrast, is precisely on the differences among
the states in their substantive policy preferences. Here the federal political process threatens
state autonomy insofar as that process is the means by which a majority of states may impose
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Kramer—the Senate and political parties, respectively—ironically are both more likely
to threaten than to protect state autonomy.81
Contrary to Wechsler’s claims, the state-based allocation of representation in the
federal lawmaking process facilitates, rather than impedes, federal homogenization of
divergent policy preferences. Although the state-based structure of representation
facilitates congressional responsiveness to state-based interests and preferences, the
majoritarian nature of that process ultimately permits a simple majority of states to
impose its will on the minority. It is particularly ironic in this regard that it is the Senate,
celebrated by Wechsler as the preeminent safeguard of federalism, 82 that presents the
greatest horizontal threat to state autonomy. Because the Senate affords small
population states disproportionately greater representation relative to their shares of
the nation’s population, it ensures small population states a disproportionately large
slice, and large population states a disproportionately small slice, of the federal fiscal
and regulatory “pie.”83 This systematic wealth redistribution obviously disadvantages
the states that are burdened by, rather than beneficiaries of, this redistribution. In the
absence of such redistribution, the burdened states would effectively have greater
resources and, therefore, greater freedom of choice.84
An examination of the primary political safeguards Larry Kramer identifies—the
political parties—reveals that they fare no better than Wechsler’s candidates as
bulwarks against federal homogenization.85 Under Kramer’s view, the modern political
party “link[s] the fortunes of officeholders at different levels” of government, fostering
“a mutual dependency that induce[s] federal lawmakers to defer to the desires of state

their own policy preferences on a minority of states with different preferences. Horizontal
aggrandizement is typically overlooked in contemporary debates about federalism, but it raises
a distinct and potentially more serious criticism of the efficacy of political safeguards than
traditional critiques focusing exclusively on vertical issues.
For further discussion of this distinction, see Baker & Young, supra note 61, at 107-28;
Baker, Political Safeguards, supra note 61, at 955-56. For an early discussion of the importance
of horizontal threats to state autonomy, see Baker, Conditional Federal Spending, supra note
16, at 1940 (demonstrating that conditional federal spending unfettered by the Constitution’s
constraints is problematic because it allows “some states to harness the federal lawmaking
power to oppress other states”).
81. See Baker, Political Safeguards, supra note 61.
82. Wechsler, supra note 78, at 548 (observing that “the Senate cannot fail to function as the
guardian of state interests as such,” and that “the composition of the Senate is intrinsically
calculated to prevent intrusion from the center on subjects that dominant state interests wish
preserved for state control”).
83. Baker, Spending Power, supra note 61, at 199-211; Baker & Dinkin, supra note 61, at
24-42.
84. Baker, Spending Power, supra note 61, at 199.
85. Although Kramer acknowledges that “the parties’ effectiveness in safeguarding state
government may have been compromised to some degree by twentieth-century developments,”
he contends that “these same developments have yielded new “political” safeguards that assure
and in some respects may even strengthen the states’ voice in national politics.” Kramer, supra
note 79, at 283. The primary such safeguard that Kramer identifies is the existence of
interlocking state and federal bureaucracies. Id. at 283-85. For a brief critique of the effectiveness
of this additional, “new” safeguard, see Baker & Young, supra note 61, at 117 n.197.
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officials and state parties.”86 Although parties may therefore (sometimes) “guarantee
state official an influential voice in the [federal] lawmaking and budgetary processes,”87
this seems likely to facilitate, rather than deter, the use of the federal lawmaking
process by some states as a means of imposing their majoritarian policy preferences
on the minority.
Kramer’s own description of the modern political party gives potential outlier states
little reason to view political parties as safeguards against federal homogenizing
legislation. According to Kramer, the parties’ two “critical features” that have shaped
their role in American federalism are: (1) the fact that they “are not especially
programmatic,” being “more concerned with getting people elected than with getting
them elected for any specific purpose;” 88 and (2) the fact that they are “basically noncentralized” with their “most conspicuous features [being] flabby organization and
slack discipline.”89 Taken together, these features suggest that political parties have
neither the interest nor the ability to protect a minority state in Congress against
majoritarian encroachments on its sovereignty.90
In the end, the issue is not whether the federal political process taken alone is likely
to afford some protections for state autonomy. It almost certainly does.91 The issue
rather is whether judicial review is necessary to maintain and reinforce these political
safeguards. We contend that substantive judicial review of federalism issues, including
conditional federal spending, is necessary both to remind Congress of its own
obligation to restrain itself, and to catch any instances of federal overreaching that slip
through the system’s political and procedural checks.
2. An Objection Considered
The discussion thus far should not be read to suggest that we believe that
increased diversity among the states, even within the realm of what is constitutionally
permitted, is always a good thing. We acknowledge that federal homogenizing
legislation may sometimes increase aggregate social welfare by impeding welfarereducing interstate races to the bottom, 92 or by reducing the costs that disuniformities

86. Kramer, supra note 79, at 278; see also Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47
VAND . L. REV. 1485, 1523 (1994).
87. Kramer, supra note 79, at 284.
88. Id. at 278-79; Kramer, supra note 86, at 1524.
89. Kramer, supra note 79, at 279; Kramer, supra note 86, at 1527.
90. For an extended critique of Kramer’s arguments, see Baker, Political Safeguards, supra
note 61.
91. See id. at 972; see also Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of
Federalism, 79 T EX. L. REV. 1321 (2001); Ernest A. Young, Federal Courts: Constitutional
Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 T EX. L. REV. 1549,
1609 (2000) (“[T]he ultimate political safeguard may be the procedural gauntlet that any
legislative proposal must run and the concomitant difficulty of overcoming legislative inertia.”).
92. The most obvious examples are laws concerning environmental regulation and poverty
relief. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, ECONOMICS, ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY , AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE 75-79 (1979) (giving a classic depiction of environmental
pollution as an uninternalized externality); PAUL E. PETERSON, T HE PRICE OF FEDERALISM 12124 (1995) (arguing that devolution of welfare responsibility to the states induces a “race to the
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may impose on corporations and individuals seeking to act in more than one state.93
But partisans of Dole, and of expansive federal power more generally, often seem to be
driven by a different sort of objection. Sometimes this objection takes the form of a
claim that there are “right answers” to questions of social policy, which makes interstate diversity of questionable value. 94 Other times it takes the form of an argument that
Congress is more likely than the states to enact “good” social policies, ceteris
paribus. 95 Underlying both claims, however, is a core belief: Even if interstate diversity
is more likely to maximize the satisfaction of individual preferences, and is thereby more
likely to maximize aggregate social welfare, than is a homogenization of policies
dictated or encouraged by Congress, permitting Congress to press states to adopt
certain policies is more likely to result in policies that are more just or otherwise
preferable as a matter of political morality. We find this defense of Dole unpersuasive
for three reasons.
First, it is not clear that this contention is cognizable from a perspective internal to
American constitutional law. Our nation has enshrined certain policy choices in the
United States Constitution, thereby declaring these to be consensus “right answers”
on the relevant social issues. These “right answers” have a unique political legitimacy
and morality within our constitutional system. State laws that violate no federal
constitutional provision but which nonetheless express a moral preference that some
find reprehensible—for example, laws making the death penalty available,96 providing
free abortions to indigent women,97 or providing legal recognition of same-sex

bottom” because of interstate competition to avoid becoming a “welfare magnet”); Sherryl D.
Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor: Accounting for the Tyranny of State
Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552, 552 (1999) (arguing for “a more aggressive framework of
national [welfare] standards or incentives that would insulate the disadvantaged poor from the
tyranny of the advantaged majority”) (alteration added). See also Baker, Conditional Federal
Spending, supra note 16, at 1951-52 n.186 (discussing “race to the bottom” in various contexts);
Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom”
Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1210-11 (1992)
(footnotes omitted) (observing that “the race to the bottom has been invoked as an overarching
reason to vest regulation that imposes costs on mobile capital at the federal rather than the state
level, and has been cited as one of the bases for [federal environmental statutes and for] the New
Deal.”) (alteration added).
93. The costs imposed by such disuniformities are among the arguments frequently made in
favor of the federal reform of tort law. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Considering the Proper
Federal Role in American Tort Law, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 917 (1996).
94. For more extensive discussion of this claim, see Baker & Young, supra note 61, at 13357, and sources discussed therein.
95. See, e.g., Rubin & Feeley, supra note 76, at 935 (contending, inter alia, that “the United
States is a single, functioning nation, and that it generally defines good policy through a national
decision-making process”); see also Baker & Young, supra note 61, at 133-57 (discussing this
claim), and sources cited therein.
96. See, e.g., T RACY L. SNELL , CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1999, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
BULL . (U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ), Dec. 2000, at 3 tbl. 1 (listing capital offenses, if any, by state).
97. See, e.g., Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 935, 938 (N.J. 1982) (under New
Jersey law, state must provide funds for all medically necessary abortions) (interpreting N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 30:4D-6.1 (West 1997)); see also Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 143-45 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1986) (same result under Connecticut law) (interpreting Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17-
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marriages or “domestic partnerships”98—denote areas of significant moral
disagreement within our society. These are issues on which we, as a nation, have not
yet reached a consensus. They are therefore precisely the areas in which interstate
diversity is most valuable and federal homogenization through conditional federal
spending will therefore most greatly reduce aggregate social welfare.99
Should our society reach a substantial consensus that interstate diversity in some
area is no longer acceptable, concerned individuals and groups may seek to formally
amend the United States Constitution to prohibit the practice(s) agreed to be immoral.
Although the amendment process is concededly difficult, 100 history does offer several
examples of our willingness and ability to amend the Constitution to reflect such shifts
in our moral sensibilities: the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments’
prohibitions against slavery and race-based and other discrimination;101 the Eighteenth
and Twenty-First Amendments’ imposition and repeal, respectively, of prohibition;102
and the Nineteenth and Twenty-Sixth Amendments’ extension of voting rights to
women and to all citizens eighteen years of age or older, respectively.103

134b (renumbered as § 17b-261), and holding invalid regulation limiting funding to those
abortions necessary to save the life of the mother). See also Lina M. Vanzi, Freedom at Home:
State Constitutions and Medicaid Funding for Abortions, 26 N.M. L. REV. 433, 441-45 (1996)
(discussing state constitutional challenges to state statutes restricting public funding for
abortions).
98. VT. STAT. ANN . tit. 15 § 1202 (Supp. 2000) (authorizing establishment of a “civil union”
by individuals who are “of the same sex and therefore excluded from the marriage laws of this
state” and who meet various other criteria); see also Carol Ness, Couples Flock to Vermont, Only
Legal Place to Get Hitched: Vermont Gays’ State of the Union, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 7, 2000,
at A1, available at 2000 WL 6166744 (observing that of the first 263 couples whose civil unions
had been registered with the Vermont Vital Records Office, eighty-four were from Vermont and
179 were from other states).
99. Some nationalists, most notably Ed Rubin and Malcolm Feeley, do seem to understand
this point. See, e.g., Rubin & Feeley, supra note 76, at 912 (contending that “the point of
federalism . . . is to allow normative disagreement amongst the subordinate [governmental] units
so that different units can subscribe to different value systems.”).
100. For recognition of occasions on which the Constitution has proven surprisingly difficult
to amend, see Baker, Conditional Federal Spending, supra note 16, at 1950 n.182 (describing
failure to adopt Equal Rights Amendment even though from 1972 to 1982 “a majority of
Americans consistently told interviewers that they favored this amendment to the
Constitution,” quoting JANE J. M ANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA 1 (1986)). See also Lynn
A. Baker, Constitutional Change and Direct Democracy, 66 U. COLO . L. REV. 143, 152-53
(1995) (discussing difficulties posed by supermajority requirement for constitutional
amendments).
101. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (prohibiting slavery; adopted 1865); id. amend. XIV, § 1
(guaranteeing all persons due process and equal protection of the laws; adopted 1868); id.
amend. XV, § 1 (prohibiting race-based discrimination in voting rights; adopted 1870).
102. Id. amend. XVIII, § 1 (prohibiting the manufacture, sale, or transportation of
intoxicating liquors within the United States; adopted 1919); id. amend. XXI, §§ 1-2 (repealing
the Eighteenth Amendment; adopted 1933).
103. Id. amend. XIX, § 1 (prohibiting gender-based discrimination in voting rights; adopted
1920); id. amend. XXVI, § 1 (guaranteeing the right to vote to all citizens eighteen years of age
or older; adopted 1971).
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Second, even insofar as the Constitution, as amended and properly interpreted,
permits policies that are suboptimal on some plausible, even persuasive, account of
political morality, advocates of national power often give too little weight to the value
of self-governance by state political communities. A state’s freedom from federal
interference, like an individual’s freedom from governmental restrictions on expression
or private choices, is a freedom to make choices, not just a freedom to choose wisely.104
That is, federalism, including judicially enforced limits on Congress’s spending power,
seeks to create a space within which a subnational political community can make
choices about how to govern itself without interference from the national government.
This is out of respect not for the autonomy or dignity of states qua states, but for the
capacity of communities at a subnational level to exercise political self-governance.
Indeed, in this respect, civic republican values are in keeping with the liberal political
tradition, which has not normally equated the appeal of liberty with the normative
appeal of what the individual chooses to use it for. Instead, contemporary liberalism
distinguishes “between the ‘right’ and the ‘good’—between a framework of basic
rights and liberties, and the conceptions of the good that people may choose to pursue
within the framework.”105 Just as, say, freedom of speech does not prescribe what the
individual shall do within this protected sphere of liberty, so too federalism does not
dictate that a state political community make any particular substantive choice within
the range of options permitted it.
Finally, even putting aside the value of choice to subnational political communities
and individuals, and focusing solely on the political morality of policy outcomes, we
think that partisans of Dole are at once unduly pessimistic about state policies and
overly sanguine about national ones. There have always been areas of social policy
in which certain states have been more “progressive,” more “liberal,” than the federal
government, and those areas are particularly marked today. For example, many states
currently provide constitutional and statutory protection against various forms of

104. Federalism, however, has generally been deplored for the ends to which certain groups
in our history have sought to use state autonomy—specifically, as a sanctuary for slavery and
segregation. This identification of federalism’s intrinsic value with the ends to which it has
sometimes been employed is particularly noteworthy in light of the enthusiasm with which
liberals are willing to embrace guarantees of many individual rights, notwithstanding the fact that
those rights will often protect individuals and activities that they consider unattractive, even
evil. In areas such as the freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment, or the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights of due process, liberals have long been eager to defend their
enemies’ rights in the name of a higher principle of broad applicability. Most famously, in 1977,
the “liberal” American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) defended the rights of uniformed neoNazis to march in Skokie, Illinois, a city with a large Jewish population, including many
Holocaust survivors. See, e.g., Martin Finucane, ACLU to Represent Group that Advocates Sex
Between Men and Boys, AP NEWSWIRE , Aug. 31, 2000, available at 2000 WL 25992549
(observing that the “ACLU has long accepted unpopular clients and despised causes, including
Ku Klux Klansmen and neo-Nazis. In 1977, the ACLU defended the right of Nazis to march in
Skokie, Illinois—home to many Holocaust survivors. Thousands of ACLU members quit and
contributions plunged.”). For further elaboration on this point, see Baker, Should Liberals Fear
Federalism?, supra note 61, at 442-49; Baker & Young, supra note 61, at 133-62.
105. Michael Sandel, Introduction to LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 3 (Michael Sandel ed.,
1984).
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discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, while federal law does not.106 Other
areas in which some states have been more “progressive” than the federal government
include: the right to use marijuana for medical purposes,107 welfare rights,108 and
freedom of expression.109 By ignoring the benefits of federalism, nationalists increase
the risk that each of these areas of state law will fall victim to federal homogenization
by a less “progressive” Congress, whether through conditional federal spending,
preemption, or direct regulation.
At the same time that they undervalue interstate diversity, contemporary advocates
of strong national power seem to us to be overly sanguine about the normative
attractiveness of the policies that Congress is likely to promote with its spending
conditions. The view of the federal government as the inevitable purveyor and
protector of “good” social policies is an especially easy one for today’s liberals to hold
because of the Democratic Party’s dominance of Congress from 1955 to 1995. The
Democrats had a majority of the House for that entire period, and had a majority of the
Senate for all but six of those years.110 Although the November 1994 election yielded

106. Compare CONN . GEN . STAT. § 46a-81e (1995) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation) and HAW . REV. STAT. ANN . § 368-1 (Michie 1999) (same) with 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604 (1994) (prohibiting housing discrimination only on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex,
familial status, or national origin”—the reference to “familial status” referring not to sexual
orientation but to “one or more individuals (who have not attained the age of 19 years) being
domiciled with (1) a parent or another person having legal custody of such individual or
individuals; or (2) the designee of such parent or other person having such custody.” Id. at §
3602(k)). Compare CAL . LAB. CODE § 1102.1 (West 1989 & Supp. 2001) (prohibiting
employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation) and HAW . REV. STAT. ANN . § 3681 (Michie 1999)(same) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988) (prohibiting employment discrimination
only on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”) and 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994)
(prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of age).
107. Since 1996, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Maine, Nevada, Oregon,
Washington, and Washington, D.C., have adopted laws legalizing the medical use of marijuana.
See Law, supra note 60, at 417 n.307. Compare CAL . HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5
(West Supp. 2002) (creating exception to California laws prohibiting possession and cultivation
of marijuana for seriously ill persons who use it for medical purposes), and M E . REV. STAT.
ANN . tit. 22 § 2383-B (West Supp. 2001) (making lawful the possession of marijuana for
medical use by individuals with certain serious diseases), with 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-863 (1994)
(prohibiting manufacture and distribution of various drugs, including marijuana), and United
States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 486 (2001) (holding there to be no
“medical necessity exception” to the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (1994)).
108. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1 (providing that “[t]he aid, care and support of the
needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions, and
in such manner and by such means, as the legislature may from time to time determine”); see
also Helen Hershkoff, Welfare Devolution and State Constitutions, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1403
(1999) (discussing history and judicial interpretation of Article XVII).
109. See, e.g., New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp.,
650 A.2d 757, 760 (N.J. 1994) (stating that Article I of New Jersey Constitution confers on
“citizens an affirmative right of free speech that [is] protected not only from governmental
restraint—the extent of First Amendment protection—but from the restraint of private
property owners as well”).
110. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP ’T OF COMMERCE , HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE
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a Republican majority in the House that exists to this day,111 and a Republican majority
in the Senate that has existed for all but the period from May 2001 (Jim Jeffords’
defection)112 through the November 2002 elections,113 liberals may view the past seven
years as nothing more than an unfortunate (and surely short lived) aberration. Because
recent events are more salient than those of long ago, it may be easy for liberals to
forget that the Republican Party, too, has had periods when it has controlled both
houses of Congress for several decades.114
Given the unpredictability of national elections over the long-term, the rational and
risk-averse position, even for those who believe there are “right answers” to important
questions of social policy, is to favor states’ rights and judicially enforced limits on
Congress’s spending power. If some measure of state autonomy exists, liberals and
conservatives alike can expect there to be at least one state with laws that will reflect
one’s own views on certain social issues, even when both houses of Congress are
controlled by the party one opposes. Liberals, however, rarely seem to appreciate that
judicial enforcement of states’ rights provides them this long-term benefit.
If all this is right, then Dole should strike its present-day supporters (who we
assume are disproportionately liberal nationalists) as bad constitutional doctrine
because it enables Congress to use the carrot of federal funds to induce states to
adopt a raft of policies likely to be favored by conservative Republicans and hated by
liberal Democrats. Consider, for example, the following conditional spending schemes:
(1) Congress conditions grants for state law enforcement on a state’s enactment of
right-to-carry laws and on enactment, and enforcement, of the death penalty; (2)
Congress conditions Head Start funds on a state’s prohibiting affirmative action even

UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, pt. 2, at Y204-10 (1975) [hereinafter HISTORICAL
STATISTICS] (1955-1970 statistics); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP ’T OF COMMERCE ,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 2000, at 281 tbl. 460 (120th ed. 2000)
[hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT] (1971-1999 statistics). The Republican Party had a majority
in the Senate from 1981-1987. Id.
111. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 110 at 281 tbl. 460. See also, Editorial, Protest Vote:
An Angry Electorate Hands the Republicans a Landslide, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE , Nov. 10,
1994, at C2, available at 1994 WL 9663339.
112. See Katharine Q. Seelye with Adam Clymer, Balance of Power: The Power Shift; Senate
Republicans Step Out and Democrats Jump In, N.Y. T IMES, May 25, 2001, at A1 (observing
that Jefford’s departure from the Republican Party to become an independent “tips the fragile
50-50 power balance in the Senate to a 50-49 Democratic edge”); see also STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT, supra note 110, at 281 tbl. 460.
113. See Alan Fram, Senate passes jobless-pay bill; The House was due to act today on the
measure; About 750,000 people are facing an end to the aid, PHIL . INQUIRER, Jan. 8, 2003 at A3
(“The fall elections turned a narrow Democratic edge in the Senate into a 51-48-1 GOP majority,
giving Republicans the control they lost when Sen. James Jeffords of Vermont left the GOP to
become an independent in 2001.”).
114. HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 110, at Y204-10. See also Adam Clymer, Theorists
Look at ‘94 Voting: Was It Major or Minor Trend?, N.Y. T IMES, Sept. 4, 1995, at 8 (noting that
Republican victory of 1894 ushered in a third of a century of Republican congressional
dominance); Michael Wines, Donkey Drop; Bradley’s Exit Is Not Just the Democrats’ Problem,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1995, § 4, at 1 (“Republicans had ruled politics for 30 years, and
Democrats were a husk of a party, too feeble even to repudiate the Ku Klux Klan, only eight
years before Franklin D. Roosevelt founded a political dynasty in 1932.”).
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by private educational institutions; and (3) Congress conditions a package of funds
designed to promote child welfare (perhaps in health and education) on a state’s
prohibiting homosexual couples from adopting.
Each of these statutes would very likely pass muster under Dole. The general
welfare, clear statement, and independent constitutional bar prongs would be satisfied
with ease. So long, then, as the magnitude of funds at stake is not so great as to pass
the point at which pressure becomes compulsion, all comes down to relatedness. And
Congress can make a strong argument that, in each case, the condition is related to the
expenditure: in hypothetical (1), the expenditures and the condition each serve a
purpose in reducing crime; the expenditures and condition in (2) each serve an interest
in promoting equal educational opportunity; and, the expenditures and the condition
in (3) each promote the well being of children. To be sure, the premises upon which
these
arguments of relatedness rely are, to say the least, contestable. But the Court is likely
to defer to Congress’s assessment.
The judicial enforcement of states’ rights, including judicially enforced limits on
Congress’s spending power, would at least sometimes require congressional
supporters of homogenization in these areas to secure a federal constitutional
amendment to that effect. For an outlier state (such as Vermont in the case of same-sex
civil unions 115 or Massachusetts in the case of the death penalty116), the advantage of
that requirement is clear: It will usually be easier to assemble the coalition of thirteen
states necessary to block an amendment to the United States Constitution117 than to
garner the simple majority in either the House or Senate necessary to block a
congressional enactment.
B. Conceptual Infirmities
The examples of possible federal legislation discussed at the end of the previous
section are designed, of course, to provoke the reader’s intuition that Congress should
have less power to achieve substantive ends than Dole permits. Admittedly though,
we are not optimistic that this brief discussion will have changed the minds of many
not already persuaded. After all, one could reasonably object on policy grounds to any
of the statutes we have hypothesized without believing that the objectionable
legislation would exceed Congress’s appropriately broad constitutional authority.
That the unwisdom of a congressional action does not entail its
unconstitutionality118 is no doubt true. Nonetheless, there are good reasons of

115. See Ness, supra note 98, at A1 (observing that July 1, 2000 “was the date when
Vermont became the first and only state to give legal status to gay and lesbian couples”).
116. See, e.g., SNELL , supra note 96, at 3 tbl. 1 (listing capital offenses, if any, by state).
117. Article V of the U.S. Constitution requires the consent of two-thirds of both houses of
Congress to propose amendments, and the subsequent consent, by the legislature or by a
convention, of three-fourths of the states for ratification. An amendment also can be proposed
by a national convention called by Congress pursuant to “the Application” of the legislatures
of two-thirds of the states. U.S. CONST. art. V.
118. This is plainly one of the Supreme Court’s most oft-referenced principles. For a
randomly selected example see Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 728-30 (1963).
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constitutional method to be suspicious of the particular shape that contemporary
conditional spending doctrine takes, even if you believe that Congress does enjoy
constitutional power to achieve a state of affairs, say, in which, nationwide, affirmative
action is abandoned, concealed weapons are permitted, homosexuals are barred from
adopting children, and capital punishment is everywhere imposed. That is, even if the
Constitution is best interpreted to confer upon Congress sufficient power to set
national policy on matters such as these, Dole is the wrong way to effectuate that
authority.
At least three reasons to doubt Dole’s soundness, each independent of the
substantive results that the test would seem to permit, stand out. First, Dole coheres
poorly with the body of current federalism doctrine. As everyone knows, the
Hamiltonian conception of the spending power provides Congress a means to achieve
ends that it could not achieve through other means. That is not by itself conceptually
problematic: laws, like other types of norms commonly proscribe particular means to
desired objectives without condemning the objectives themselves. For example, our
culture allows individuals to seek to amass great personal wealth, while prohibiting
only certain paths to that goal. But to police means rather than ends presupposes that
the means permitted will differ from the means prohibited on grounds that matter. To
allow Congress to achieve a given end, x, by means of conditional spending but not
by the means, say, of direct regulation or of commandeering can make sense, then, only
if the former means better serves ends that the Constitution can be reasonably
understood to care about: ends such as promoting human liberty, welfare, dignity, or
the like. We will seek to demonstrate, however, that, over a nontrivial range of cases,
Dole’s way of operationalizing the Hamiltonian conception of the spending power
produces a state of affairs in which the permitted route (spending) is not functionally
superior to those regulatory routes that the Court’s interpretation of such other
constitutional provisions such as the Commerce Clause and the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments rules off limits.119
If this is true, then two possibilities suggest themselves: either Dole itself is wrong,
or the Court has been wrong in foreclosing those other means that prove functionally
equivalent to the Dole-sanctioned use of the spending power. But while many critics
of the Rehnquist Court’s recent federalism decisions will be attracted to the latter
possibility, this line of argument is hard to sustain. For the internal tension that arises
between Dole and other aspects of the Court’s federalism jurisprudence does not
depend upon the narrow particularities of recent innovations by the Rehnquist Court.
To the contrary, Dole allows extensive circumvention of whatever limitations exist on
other congressional powers. Thus, while it is true that the practical significance of
this circumventionist potential increases as the fetters imposed on other congressional
powers are drawn tighter, it is the fact of federalism-based limitations on congressional
power, and not their precise content, that renders Dole anomalous. This anomaly,
therefore, is one conceptual strike against the Dole test.
But if Dole fits uncomfortably within one body of law within which it is situated—
that body whose subject matter is described by federalism—it fits just as
uncomfortably within a second body of law—that body whose structure is defined by
the unconstitutional conditions problem. The unconstitutional conditions problem is

119. See infra Part IV.
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said to arise whenever government conditions a benefit on the offeree’s waiver of a
constitutional right.120 Familiar instances involve abortion funding,121 land use
exactions,122 conditions on public employment,123 plea bargaining,124 and so on. The
conditional spending problem is just another example of this phenomenon, for it
involves the federal government’s conditioning the benefit of federal funds on an
offeree state’s waiver of one of its sovereign prerogatives (such as the prerogative to
set whatever minimum drinking age it prefers). This is well known. And, equally well
known is that Dole does not so much as nod to this fact.125 That is, Dole proceeds as
though the Court’s own resolution of other unconstitutional conditions cases has
absolutely no bearing on the conditional spending problem.
This is worrisome, for there is reason to expect that some of the same general
principles or considerations will prove at least relevant in helping to resolve cases that
share the structure of the unconstitutional conditions problem, even if those cases
arise in distinct doctrinal contexts.126 Surely the possibility cannot sensibly be
dismissed out of hand. That Dole wholly fails to inquire into such principles—and, as
we explain later,127 adopts standards entirely at odds with those that appear to underlie
other manifestations of the unconstitutional conditions problem—constitutes
additional reason to doubt that Dole gets things right.
In these two respects, the particular shape of the Dole test is troubling when viewed
with an eye toward the overall coherence or topology of constitutional doctrine. But,
Dole does not any better even when viewed entirely on its own terms—when
assessed, that is, not as a component within a vast and complex web of constitutional
law but as though in a doctrinal vacuum. This third problem, very simply, is that Dole
relies on concepts—most notably “coercion” or “compulsion”—that are, at best, illsuited for judicial administration and, at worst, incoherent.128 For all these reasons,
even if Dole does not grant Congress too much power absolutely (as we believe it
does), it remains doubtful that the particular way in which this doctrine allows
Congress effectively to set national policy is defensible. It should be reformed.
III. SHORT -TERM PROSPECTS

120. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413,
1421 (1989).
121. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492
U.S. 490 (1989); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
122. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S.
825 (1987).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
124. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
125. See, e.g., Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism’s
Trojan Horse, 1988 SUP . CT. REV. 85, 87.
126. This is a fairly weak assumption. It does not depend upon the far more controversial
supposition that unconstitutional conditions cases can be resolved solely by application of
general principles without regard for context-specific considerations.
127. See infra Part V.C.4.
128. Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992) (explaining that a prior
case should be overruled if, among other things, it proves “unworkable”).
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The criticisms of Dole presented in Part II above are not wholly new. We and many
others have scrutinized and criticized Dole at length en route to proposing alternatives
to its seemingly toothless and largely problematic test. Despite Dole’s many and
obvious weaknesses, however, there is reason to fear that its short-term prospects are
good, barring the departure of Chief Justice Rehnquist or one of the current
“Nationalist Four.” None of the nationalist justices presumably is willing to narrow
congressional power nor, therefore, to add bite to the Dole doctrine. And Chief Justice
Rehnquist, normally a defender of states’ rights, may also not be eager to abandon
Dole, given pride of authorship and his attraction to the “greater includes the lesser”
argument at the center of Dole.129 For these reasons, most academic commentators
have speculated that Dole is secure.130
We agree that the Court is unlikely to change or abandon Dole in the near future.
The spending statute now winding its way through the courts that many Court
watchers view as resting on the most shaky constitutional footing131 is the

129. For a discussion of Rehnquist’s attraction to the greater-includes-the-lesser reasoning,
see, for example, Baker, Conditional Federal Spending, supra note 16, at 1914-15; Lynn A.
Baker, The Majority Opinion in Romer v. Evans, 68 U. COLO . L. REV. 387, 390-91 (1997).
Nonetheless, Rehnquist’s largely unnoticed conversion in commercial speech cases suggests
that his commitment to the greater/lesser may be weaker than is commonly supposed. One of
Rehnquist’s most notorious applications of the principle that the greater power includes the
lesser came a year before Dole in Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328
(1986), a case challenging Puerto Rico’s prohibition of casino advertising. In his last opinion as
an associate justice, Rehnquist led a bare five-member majority in upholding the advertising ban,
reasoning in part that “the greater power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes
the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling.” Id. at 345-46. Commentators excoriated
this reasoning. See, e.g., Philip B. Kurland, Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Company,
“‘Twas Strange, ‘Twas Passing Strange; ‘Twas Pitiful, ‘Twas Wondrous Pitiful,” 1986 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, and the Court renounced it a decade later. See 44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517
U.S. 484, 511-13 (plurality opinion). In the years following Posadas, Rehnquist maintained an
uncharacteristically low profile, neither confessing error in that case nor seeking to defend it.
Indeed, it is difficult to discern just what his current view of commercial speech is. In just the
past two Terms, for instance, he signed on to one case that invalidated advertising restrictions
that would have been upheld on a greater/lesser rationale, see Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,
533 U.S. 525 (2001) (striking down state restrictions on tobacco advertising), while dissenting
from a second, see Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357 (2002) (dissenting
from Court’s upholding FDA restrictions on advertising of pharmaceutical compounding). For
an argument that Rehnquist was closer to being right in Posadas than have been his critics, and
that the greater/lesser intuition does have significant force in commercial speech cases (even
though the greater power does not “necessarily” include the lesser) see Mitchell N. Berman,
Commercial Speech and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine: A Second Look at “the
Greater Includes the Lesser,” 55 VAND . L. REV. 693 (2002).
130. See, e.g., Daniel O. Conkle, Congressional Alternatives in the Wake of City of Boerne
v. Flores : The (Limited) Role of Congress in Protecting Religious Freedom from State and Local
Infringement, 20 U. ARK . LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 633, 675 (1998); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.,
Listening to the “Sounds of Sovereignty” but Missing the Beat: Does the New Federalism Really
Matter?, 32 IND . L. REV. 11, 17-18 (1998); Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State
Sovereign Immunity, 1996 SUP . CT. REV. 1, 52 n.240.
131. We exclude from consideration here the Children’s Internet Protection Act (“CIPA”),
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institutionalized persons section of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”).132 We analyze RLUIPA in Part III.B, concluding that
the Court is not likely to exploit the RLUIPA litigation as an opportunity to change its
spending doctrine regardless of whether it upholds or strikes down the Act.133

Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 1712, 114 Stat. 2763A-335 (2000), which requires public libraries to use
internet filters as a condition for the receipt of certain federal subsidies. As mentioned earlier,
see supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text, the Court will resolve a challenge to CIPA this
Term. See Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002), probable
jurisdiction noted, 123 S. Ct. 551 (2002). We put this aside because, although the “independent
constitutional bar” prong of Dole makes this nominally a spending case, we (and others) expect
the Court to analyze and decide the case on substantive First Amendment grounds. See, e.g.,
Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Review Internet Pornography Filters, N.Y. T IMES, Nov. 13, 2002,
at A24 (“[T]he government must still defend the law in basic First Amendment terms. The main
argument in the administration’s appeal . . . is that the lower court was fundamentally mistaken
in framing the issue as one of speech in a public forum and in viewing the libraries as surrogates
for the First Amendment interests of their patrons.”).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc.
133. Another challenge under the spending power that might well reach the Court in the next
few years would involve § 666 of the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2000). Subsection
(a)(1) of the statute “makes it a federal offense for an agent of an organization or a state, local,
or tribal governmental body or agency that receives more than $10,000 in federal funds in a year
to solicit, demand, accept, or agree to accept anything of value with the intent to be influenced
or rewarded in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of the entity
valued at $5000 or more.” United States v. Sabri, 183 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1148 (D. Minn. 2002)
(summarizing 18 U.S.C. §666(a)(1)) (emphasis in original)). Subsection (a)(2) is a
complementary provision that makes it a federal crime for any person to “corruptly give[],
offer[], or agree[] to give anything of value to any person, with intent to influence or reward”
such an agent under similar circumstances. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2).
Several federal courts that have ruled on the constitutionality of § 666 to date have
undertaken an analysis under Dole, sometimes simultaneously questioning whether such an
analysis was appropriate. See, e.g., United States v. Lipscomb, 299 F.3d 303, 321 (5th Cir.
2002) (“[A]lthough we may debate whether the § 666 peg fits the conditional-grant hole, I shall
test it under the four prongs of Dole.”); United States v. McCormack, 31 F. Supp. 2d 176, 188
(D. Mass. 1998) (“Of the four limits [on the spending power] established in Dole, limit (3)—
requiring that the conditions be related to the federal interest in particular national projects or
programs—provides the most plausible attack on § 666(a).”); United States v. Cantor, 897 F.
Supp. 110, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (discussing Dole, but concluding that § 666 “does not impose
a condition on the receipt of federal funds” and that “the conduct prohibited by § 666 [is not]
so remote from the federal interest in protecting federal funds from the effects of local bribery
schemes as to exceed the scope of Congressional spending power….”).
Several federal courts have held § 666(a)(2) to exceed Congress’s authority under the Dole
doctrine. See, e.g., Sabri, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 1156 (“[E]ven if one could describe the federal
funds disbursed . . . as the ‘financial inducement’ by which Congress bargained for federal
jurisdiction over offenses traditionally within the purview of state and local governments, that
bargain surely is ‘so coercive as to pass the point at which pressure turns into compulsion.’”)
(citation omitted); McCormack , 31 F. Supp. 2d at 189 (finding the conduct at issue to be clearly
“not ‘related to a legitimate national problem’ because it is not directed towards protecting the
integrity of federal funds” and holding it unconstitutional to prosecute the defendant under §
666); Lipscomb, 299 F.3d at 328-29 (“Some district courts have tested § 666 against the Tenth
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Before engaging RLUIPA, however, we discuss in Part III.A a non-spending
decision that the Court handed down in January 2003, Pierce County v. Guillen.134
Guillen was the first case in which a court (here, the Supreme Court of Washington)
employed Dole to strike down a federal statute as exceeding Congress’s spending
power. 135 The United States Supreme Court granted cert and then unanimously upheld
the statute as a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power.136 As we explain briefly,
we find the Court’s Commerce Clause analysis questionable. More significantly for
present purposes, we suggest that the Court’s unanimous willingness to resolve the
case on dubious—and substantially underdeveloped—Commerce Clause grounds may
indicate that the justices are ill-disposed to tinker with existing Spending Clause

Amendment, treating the statute as an emanation of the spending power, and have come to
varying conclusions. Additionally, four of our fellow appellate courts have examined the sweep
of § 666, either as a statutory matter or a constitutional one, and are also divided.”) (footnotes
omitted).
We do not believe that § 666 is a conditional spending statute, however, and we thus do not
believe an analysis under Dole is appropriate for determining the constitutionality of that
statute. Cf. Sabri, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 1156 (“Section 666 plainly is not a ‘condition’ statute
within the reasoning of Dole and cannot be justified under that decision as a valid exercise of
Congress’s power under the Spending Clause.”).
As the Court itself has observed on multiple occasions, a conditional grant of federal funds
to the states is in the nature of a contract: in exchange for federal funds, a state agrees to give
something up. See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640 (1999)
(“When Congress acts pursuant to its spending power, it generates legislation ‘much in the
nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally
imposed conditions.’”) (quoting Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S 1, 17
(1981); see also id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (same); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch.
Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286 (1998) (observing that a law that “conditions[s] an offer of federal
funding on a promise by the recipient . . . amounts essentially to a contract between the
Government and the recipient of funds.”). So one must ask what is the quo that the state
relinquishes for all the federal quid to which § 666 attaches? State permission for the federal
government to impose criminal penalties on some of its agents and on private individuals who
bribe such agents? That, we think, is the only possible answer, but such permission is not
something within a state’s power to give. Either Congress has the power to enact a given
criminal law (most likely under its Commerce authority) or it doesn’t. And if it doesn’t, then
New York teaches us that the state’s consent doesn’t change anything. See New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992) (“Where Congress exceeds its authority relative to the States,
. . . the departure from the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the ‘consent’ of state
officials.”). A discussion of whether § 666 is a legitimate exercise of Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause is beyond the scope of this Article.
For present purposes, it is important only to note that we believe that a Spending Clause
analysis of § 666 should provide the Court no opportunity to reconsider existing spending
doctrine.
134. 123 S.Ct. 720 (2003).
135. Guillen v. Pierce County, 31 P.3d 628, 650-51 (Wash. 2001). For an early, brief
discussion of the potential importance of this case, see Michael C. Dorf, What an Auto Accident
Decision Teaches about Federalism, FINDLAW ’S WRIT, Oct. 15, 2001, at
http://writ.findlaw.com/dorf/ 20011015.html.
136. 123 S. Ct. 720 (2003).
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jurisprudence.
A. Pierce County v. Guillen
The dispute in Guillen arose when certain Washington State motorists involved in
traffic accidents requested accident reports and other materials and data held by
county agencies related to the traffic history of the sites of their accidents.137 The
motorists sought the information in part in order to pursue tort claims that the relevant
city and county governments were negligent in their maintenance and operation of the
intersections at which the accidents occurred.138 Pierce County refused to provide the
requested reports and data in reliance in part on a federal statute,139 23 U.S.C. § 409, as
amended in 1995, which states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, reports, surveys, schedules, lists, or
data compiled or collected for the purpose of identifying, evaluating, or planning
the safety enhancement of potential accident sites, hazardous roadway conditions,
or railway-highway crossings, pursuant to sections 130, 144, and 152 of this title
or for the purpose of developing any highway safety construction improvement
project which may be implemented utilizing Federal-aid highway funds shall not
be subject to discovery or admitted into evidence in a Federal or State court
proceeding or considered for other purposes in any action for damages arising from
any occurrence at a location mentioned or addressed in such reports, surveys,
schedules, lists, or data.140

Because the accident reports and other materials that the plaintiffs sought had been
collected by the relevant county as part of an application to the state of Washington
for federal hazard elimination funds under 23 U.S.C. § 152,141 the county argued that
they were privileged under § 409. The question for the Washington Supreme Court was
whether the collecting of certain reports and other materials for this statutorily
specified purpose rendered them privileged even if those reports and other materials
had been compiled for other purposes, such as routine law enforcement.142
To understand the import of the question, consider the following example. A local
police officer prepares (compiles) an accident report as he is required to do under longstanding state law. At a later point in time, that report is collected by a state authority
pursuant to 23 U.S.C. § 152 in order for the state to determine the twenty intersections
in the state where safety improvements are most needed.143 The state authority

137. Guillen, 31 P. 3d at 632-638.
138. Id. at 632-38.
139. Id. at 632, 634-35.
140. 23 U.S.C. § 409 (1995).
141. Guillen, 31 P.3d at 634.
142. Id. at 644-46.
143. Section 152 states in relevant part:
Each State shall conduct and systematically maintain an engineering survey of all
public roads to identify hazardous locations, sections, and elements, including
roadside obstacles and unmarked or poorly marked roads, which may constitute
a danger to motorists, bicyclists, and pedestrians, assign priorities for the
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prepares a report discussing those twenty intersections, and uses the report and the
data on which it was based to set its priorities for spending its annual allotment of
federal highway safety funds. Plainly, the report prepared by the state pursuant to §
152 would be covered by the § 409 privilege. The question before the state court,
however, was whether the original accident reports—reports that (by hypothesis)
would have been prepared even in the absence of the federal scheme, and which were
not prepared pursuant to § 152—would also be covered by the privilege once they
were
collected
pursuant to § 152 in order to generate the report of state-wide highway safety
priorities.
The Washington Supreme Court held that they were.144 Under the statute’s plain
language, it reasoned, materials or data that have been “collected” for a statutorily
specified purpose are covered by § 409.145 Whether the materials or data had been
originally compiled for distinct purposes appears irrelevant.146 Moreover, the history
of the evolution of § 409 bolstered this interpretation. When initially enacted in 1987,
that section did not contain the words “or collected.”147 Accordingly, the court
observed, “most state courts restricted the application of the federal privilege” to
materials and data “that had been specifically created for the purpose of applying for
federal safety improvement funding or implementing a funded project.”148 Congress
amended § 409 in 1995 by adding the words “or collected” after “compiled” specifically
in response to these narrow decisions and in order to “clarify” the intended scope of
the privilege.149 And Congress described the privilege’s scope as follows:
It is intended that raw data collected prior to being made part of any formal or
bound report shall not be subject to discovery or admitted into evidence in a
Federal or State court proceeding or considered for other purposes in any action
for damages arising from any occurrence at a location mention[ed] or addressed in

correction of such locations, sections, and elements, and establish and implement
a schedule of projects for their improvement.
23 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1).
Notice that this provision is stated as an unconditional mandate: apparently, a state’s
obligation to conduct and maintain an engineering survey of the sort described exists
independently of that state’s pursuit or receipt of federal funds. If this is the correct
understanding of § 152, then the mandate seemingly violates the anticommandeering rules of
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
(1997). To save § 152, it could be read, then, as a spending provision that conditions certain
federal highway funds on a state’s evaluation of its roads. This is how the Supreme Court
seemed to view the statute in Guillen. See Pierce County v. Guillen, 123 S.Ct. 720, 724-25
(2003).
144. Guillen, 31 P.3d at 646.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987, Pub. L. 10017, Title I, § 132(a), 101 Stat. 170 (1987).
148. Guillen, 31 P.3d at 641.
149. Id. at 644.
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such data.150

For these reasons, the Washington Supreme Court agreed with Pierce County that any
reports or data collected for the statutorily specified purposes became fully
privileged.151
But Pierce County’s victory on the question of the scope of the privilege afforded
by § 409 quickly turned pyrrhic. For the Washington Supreme Court proceeded to hold
that when construed so broadly the § 409 privilege violated Dole’s relatedness
requirement:
We find that no valid federal interest in the operation of the federal safety
enhancement program is reasonably served by barring the admissibility and
discovery in state court of accident reports and other traffic and accident materials
and “raw data” that were originally prepared for routine state and local purposes,
simply because they are “collected,” . . . among other reasons, pursuant to a
federal statute for federal purposes.152

The court therefore held § 409, as amended, to exceed Congress’s spending power.153
It concluded, as well, that § 409 exceeded Congress’s commerce power because such
an expansive privilege “cannot reasonably be characterized as an ‘integral part’ of the
Federal-aid highway system’s regulation.” 154 Lastly, relying heavily on its construal of
recent Rehnquist Court federalism decisions as displaying a “fundamental respect for
state sovereignty,”155 the court reasoned that § 409 “cannot be characterized as a valid
exercise of any power constitutionally delegated to the federal government”156 because
Congress lacks “power to intrude upon the exercise of state sovereignty in so
fundamental an area of the law as the determination by state and local courts of the
discoverability and admissibility of state and local materials and data relating to traffic
and accidents on state and local roads.”157
Three justices of the Washington Supreme Court disagreed with the majority’s
interpretation of § 409. As Justices Madsen and Johnson and Chief Justice Alexander
read the privilege, an individual report originally compiled for an ordinary state or local
law enforcement purpose was not covered by § 409 merely because it was later
collected, along with other reports or data, for the purpose of applying for a share of
the state’s federal safety-improvement funds.158 All that the 1995 amendment clarified,
in the view of the concurring justices, was that if these reports were subsequently
“collected” pursuant to § 152 or another specified provision of federal law, the

150. H.R. REP . NO . 104-246, at 59 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) at
651.
151. Guillen, 31 P.3d at 644.
152. Id. at 651 (emphasis in original).
153. See id. at 655.
154. Id. at 654 (quoting Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 328 n.17 (1981)).
155. Id. at 653.
156. Id. at 655.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 657 (Madsen, J., concurring).
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collection of reports would not itself be discoverable.159
In other words, as the concurring justices read the legislative history, in amending
§ 409 in 1995, Congress was reacting against judicial decisions that permitted plaintiffs
“to gain information that was ‘collected’ by an agency for purposes of preparing an
application for federal funding from the agency that ‘collected’ the information.”160 By
adding “or collected” to “compiled,” under this view, Congress simply wanted to
ensure that a plaintiff could not exploit the state’s action of collecting reports to save
it from doing its own work in litigation against the state or any of its political
subdivisions. It would not follow, Madsen concluded, that plaintiffs should be
handicapped when “seeking information or reports from their original source, such as
accident reports from a law enforcement agency.”161
Reversing the Washington Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court upheld
§ 409 in a unanimous decision issued on January 14, 2003.162 In a short opinion by
Justice Thomas, the Court interpreted § 409 as the Solicitor General advocated,163 and
much as the concurring justices at the state court had, explaining that § 409
protects all reports, surveys, schedules, lists, or data actually compiled or
collected for § 152 purposes, but does not protect information that was originally
compiled or collected for purposes unrelated to § 152 and that is currently held by
the agencies that compiled or collected it, even if the information was at some
point “collected” by another agency for § 152 purposes.164

Thus construed, the Court thought that the statute passed muster under the Commerce
Clause with ease. Indeed, its opinion proceeds as a straightforward syllogism. First,
“under the Commerce Clause, Congress ‘is empowered to regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce,
even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities.’” 165 Second, “both the
original § 409 and the 1995 amendment can be viewed as legislation aimed at improving
safety in the channels of commerce and increasing protection for the instrumentalities

159. Id. at 658 (emphasis added).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. 123 S.Ct. 720 (2003). Oral argument in the case had been only 10 weeks before, on
November 4, 2002.
On August 19, 2002, the authors of this Article filed an Amicus Brief in the U.S. Supreme
Court in support of Respondents in Guillen. See 2002 WL 1964091. The authors received no
monetary contribution to, or financial compensation for, the preparation and submission of that
brief.
163. Guillen, 123 S.Ct. at 730.
164. Id. (emphasis in original). The Court elaborated:
Under this interpretation, an accident report collected only for law enforcement purposes
and held by the county sheriff would not be protected under § 409 in the hands of the
county sheriff, even though that same report would be protected in the hands of the
Public Works Department, so long as the department first obtained the report for § 152
purposes.
Id.
165. Id. at 731(quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995)).
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of interstate commerce.”166 Therefore, “they fall within Congress’ Commerce Clause
power.”167 In light of this disposition, the Court noted in a footnote, “we need not
decide whether [§ 409] could also be a proper exercise of Congress’ authority under the
Spending Clause . . . .”168
We think this is a questionable analysis, all the more remarkable for its brevity.169
Some readers of the Court’s opinion may follow along without resistance. Surely other
readers, however, will feel a nagging, if hard to articulate, disquiet. As a first pass, such
readers might be drawn to something like the following objection: “But § 409 isn’t a
regulation of the channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce; it’s a regulation
of state court procedure!” An objection of this sort, it seems to us, really contains two
analytically distinct elements, each of which has significant (if not ultimately
dispositive) force.
The first element of this objection draws a distinction between what is being
regulated and what such regulation is for. Hornbook law holds that, after Lopez, the
Commerce Clause allows Congress to regulate “three types of activities”:170 the
channels of interstate commerce, the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and
intrastate economic activities that, in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate
commerce. But § 409 did not regulate instrumentalities or channels, in the sense that
these are not the things upon which the statute operated. It seems more accurate—
certainly no less accurate—to describe § 409 as a regulation of state court procedure
adopted for the purpose of protecting instrumentalities and channels. That might be
a permissible use of the commerce power. But its permissibility is not so obviously
established, either by the Lopez dictum that the Guillen Court quotes or by the
previous decisions that Lopez had cited, as to be assumed without discussion.171

166. Id. at 732.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 732 n. 9.
169. The Court’s entire Commerce Clause analysis comprises seven sentences of a
seventeen-page slip opinion. Id. at 731-32.
170. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW : PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 261 (2d ed.
2002). See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (“[W]e have identified three broad categories of activity that
Congress may regulate under its commerce power.”).
171. The first premise of what we have called the Guillen syllogism quotes Lopez for the
proposition that “Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may
come only from intrastate activities.” See supra note 165 and accompanying text. That
statement in Lopez was immediately followed by the following string cite: “See, e.g., Shreveport
Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914); Southern R. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911)
(upholding amendments to Safety Appliance Act as applied to vehicles used in intrastate
commerce); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (“[F]or example, the destruction of an
aircraft (18 U.S.C. § 32), or . . . thefts from interstate shipments (18 U.S.C. § 659)”).” Lopez,
514 U.S. at 558 (quotation edited for form).
The legal proposition stated in Lopez, however, is not identical to the proposition implicitly
assumed by the second premise of the Guillen syllogism—and which is necessary to support
the Guillen holding—namely, that Congress may regulate things other than instrumentalities or
channels in order to protect instrumentalities or channels. That is, “regulate and protect” need
not mean “regulate or protect.” Furthermore, as the parenthetical that the Lopez majority
provided to describe the holding of Southern Railway and its very brief quotation from Perez
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The second point that our imagined objection is meant to capture emerges after its
semicolon: It is not only that § 409 does not regulate instrumentalities or channels but
that what it does regulate is the rules of evidence to be applied in state court
proceedings involving causes of action brought solely under state law. Even insofar
as Commerce Clause precedent permits Congress to regulate some things other than
instrumentalities and channels when the aim is to protect instrumentalities or channels,
that precedent is not indifferent to what those other things, matters, or subjects of
regulation are. To the contrary, a large number of opinions authored by the States’
Rights Five have strongly suggested that the Constitution imposes special constraints
upon federal legislation that intrudes upon integral areas of historical state
sovereignty.172 If this is so, then it is not quite enough that “Congress could
reasonably believe that” privileging § 152 data in the relatively modest way that § 409
(as construed by the Court) did “would result in more diligent efforts to collect the
relevant information, more candid discussions of hazardous locations, better informed
decisionmaking, and, ultimately, greater safety on our Nation’s roads.”173 And the fact
that § 409 proceeds by the specific means of regulating the rules of evidence to be
applied in state court proceedings involving causes of action brought solely under
state law would seem nonetheless to be a matter of constitutional concern.
To be sure, the Court gestures in the direction of this worry when acknowledging
in a footnote that “Respondents contend in passing that § 409 violates the principles
of dual sovereignty embodied in the Tenth Amendment.”174 But its immediately
following assertion, that this contention did not merit discussion because “[t]he court
below did not address this precise argument, reasoning instead that the 1995

suggest, neither of those cases obviously supports the critical proposition of law that the second
Guillen premise presupposes. The Shreveport Rate Cases are no more helpful. Those cases
rested on the proposition that “Congress in the exercise of its paramount power may prevent
the common instrumentalities of interstate and intrastate commercial intercourse from being used
in their intrastate operations to the injury of interstate commerce.” 234 U.S. at 353 (emphasis
added).
172. Then-Justice Rehnquist’s plurality opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833, 852 (1976) (invalidating federal legislation because it “operate[s] to directly displace
the States’ freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions”), is the most obvious point of reference, especially given his and Justice O’Connor’s
refusal to accept the legitimacy of Usery’s subsequent overruling in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). See id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
id. at 589 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). See also, e.g., United States v. Morrison 529 U.S. 598, 615
(2000) (criticizing an argument in support of federal legislation on the basis that it could “be
applied equally as well to family law and other areas of traditional state regulation”); Lopez, 514
U.S. at 564 (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zone Act in part because, under the government’s
theories, “it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as
criminal law enforcement or education where States historically have been sovereign.”); id. at
579-80 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that although the limits of the Commerce Clause
presents “questions of constitutional law not susceptible to the mechanical application of bright
and clear lines[,] . . . at the least we must inquire whether the exercise of national power seeks
to intrude upon an area of traditional state concern”).
173. Guillen, 123 S.Ct. at 731-32.
174. Id. at 732 n.10.
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amendment to § 409 was beyond Congress’ enumerated powers,”175 seems less than
wholly candid. For one thing, the Washington Supreme Court did devote an entire
section of its opinion—separate from its Commerce Clause, Spending Clause, and
Necessary and Proper Clause sections—to a discussion of “State Sovereignty.”176 Yet
more fundamentally, the implication of the Guillen footnote that the Commerce Clause
and Tenth Amendment inquiries are independent of each other seems inconsistent
with the Court’s explanation in New York, that in a case
involving the division of authority between federal and state governments, the two
inquiries are mirror images of each other. If a power is delegated to Congress in the
Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that
power to the States; if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the

Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred
on Congress.177

For this reason, the state court’s conclusion that § 409 exceeded Congress’s commerce
power need not emerge separate and distinct from a conclusion that the statute
“violates the principles of dual sovereignty embodied in the Tenth Amendment.” To
the contrary, the state court opinion is most fairly read, in our view, to reason that §
409 was not a valid exercise of the commerce power precisely because of the way it
intruded upon core areas of state sovereignty.178
Our point is not that the Court’s bottom-line holding that § 409 was a valid exercise
of the commerce power was wrong. We are agnostic on this question179 pending a full
exploration of the sort that is beyond the scope of this Article. Our point is only that
the Commerce Clause question is far more complex than the unanimity and brevity of
the Guillen Court’s analysis would suggest. That all nine justices were content to
proceed in this way might indicate an affirmative wish to steer clear of the Spending

175. Id. at 732 n.10.
176. See Guillen v. Pierce County, 31 P.3d 628, 655 (Wash. 2001). Moreover, toward the
end of that section, the state court stated:
If this state court has misconstrued the United States Constitution’s limitations
upon the federal government’s power to intrude upon the exercise of state
sovereignty in so fundamental an area of law as the determination by state and
local courts of the discoverability and admissibility of state and local materials and
data relating to traffic and accidents on state and local roads, we are confident that
the United States Supreme Court will so instruct . . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
177. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992).
178. See Guillen, 31 P.3d at 651-54.
179. In the interest of full disclosure, however, we note that in our Amicus Brief filed with
the Court in Guillen we argued that “[n]o matter how this Court ultimately resolves the various
ambiguities in § 409, as amended, . . . enactment of that provision was not within Congress’s
power under the Commerce Clause.” Amicus Brief of Law Professors Lynn A. Baker and
Mitchell N. Berman In Support of Respondents, 2002 WL 1964091, at *22.
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Clause thicket. At the least, Guillen strongly undermines any guess that members of
the present Court are actually eager to revisit Dole.
B. RLUIPA
Although the Guillen Court escaped the need to apply or reconsider Dole by
choosing to uphold § 409 on Commerce Clause grounds,180 the Court is unlikely to find
a similar avenue of avoidance open to it if and when it entertains a challenge to the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”).181 The
spending power basis for the Act is important only to the institutionalized persons
sections. In essence, that portion of the Act seeks to provide more protection to the
religious exercises of prisoners in state and local institutions than they receive under
existing Supreme Court doctrine.
Under the Supreme Court’s decisions in Turner v. Safley 182 and O’Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz,183 regulations in state and local prisons, including those that impinge on the
prisoners’ free exercise of religion, are subject to a “reasonableness” test: “When a
prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if
it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”184

Under RLUIPA, however,
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a
person residing in or confined to an institution, as defined in section 2 of the Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act . . . , even if the burden results from a rule
of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the
burden on that person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.
. . . This section applies in any case in which—(1) the substantial burden is
imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance . . . .185

In the words of one commentator, “RLUIPA replaces minimal scrutiny under Turner
and O’Lone with the compelling interest and least restrictive means tests. The Act also
displaces Smith, applying this strict scrutiny ‘even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability.’” 186
Does this restriction on state and local governments exceed Congress’s power

180. Guillen, 123 S.Ct. at 732. See also discussion supra Part III.A.
181. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000).
182. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
183. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
184. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
185. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2000).
186. Heather Guidry, Comment, If at First You Don’t Succeed . . .: Can the Commerce and
Spending Clauses Support Congress’s Latest Attempt at Religious Freedom Legislation?, 32
CUMB. L. REV. 419, 423 (2001-02).

2003]

GETTING OFF THE DOLE

497

under Dole? Several courts have ruled on this question to date and all have found the
statute to be a legitimate exercise of Congress’ spending power.187 A plausible case can
be made, however, that this portion of the statute fails scrutiny under any one of three
aspects of the Dole doctrine: the clear-notice requirement,188 the relatedness test,189 or
the noncoercion requirement.190
As we have seen, Dole requires that “if Congress desires to condition the States’
receipt of federal funds, it ‘must do so unambiguously . . ., enabl[ing] the States to
exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their
participation.’” 191 Possibly, however, RLUIPA does not provide this clarity of notice.
Suppose that a state prisoner challenges a practice of a work program instituted at his
prison as substantially burdening his religious exercise, and that the state department
of prisons received federal financial assistance for building improvements at a different
prison but none for the work program, and indeed none for the prison that operates the
challenged work program. Whether the prisoner can plausibly allege a violation of
RLUIPA would depend, then, on whether the “program or activity” that receives the
federal funds, and is thereby subject to RLUIPA’s strictures, is the construction
program or the prison system as a whole. The plain language of the statute suggests
the former interpretation. After all, the latter interpretation would be tantamount to
reading “program or activity” to mean “department or agency,” which is what the
statute could have said, but does not. On the other hand, because RLUIPA specifically
incorporates 192 the extremely broad definition put forth in the Civil Rights Restoration
Act of 1988 pursuant to which a “program or activity” encompasses “all of the
operations of” any government department or agency that receives federal funding,193
the latter interpretation is very possibly precisely what is intended.194

187. See Johnson v. Martin, 223 F. Supp. 2d 820, 831 (W.D. Mich. 2002) (denying state’s
motion for summary judgment); Charles v. Verhagen, 220 F. Supp. 2d 955, 966 (W.D. Wis.
2002) (granting prisoner’s motion for injunctive relief); Gerhardt v. Lazaroff, 221 F. Supp. 2d
827, 849 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss); Mayweathers v. Terhune,
No. CIVS961582LKKGGHP, 2001 WL 804140, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 2, 2001), aff’d sub nom.,
Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming lower court’s denial
of defendant’s motion to dismiss).
Two courts, however, recently have held the institutionalized persons sections of RLUIPA
to violate the Establishment Clause. See Gashiyah v. Dep’t of Corrections, 2003 WL 1089526
(E.D. Wis. 2003); Madison v. Riter, 240 F.Supp.2d 566 (W.D. Va. 2003).
188. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 211.
191. Id. at 207 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
192. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(6) (2000).
193. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4(a) (2000).
194. Although the statute employs several vague terms—for example, “substantial burden,”
“compelling governmental interest,” and “least restrictive means”—this should not run it afoul
of the unambiguousness requirement. Contracts frequently employ comparably loose terms,
without raising any notice problems. RLUIPA does give the states clear notice that receipt of
federal prison funds renders them subject to the command that they not impose what a
factfinder may determine, ex post, is a “substantial burden” unless the compelling-interest and
least-restrictive-means requirements are adjudged to be satisfied. Armed with this knowledge,
a state may choose to play things more or less close to the line. See Mayweathers v. Terhune,
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Were the Court to hold, as is most likely correct, that RLUIPA unambiguously
makes every activity at each prison within a state subject to the compelling interest
requirement so long as the state department of prisons accepts some federal funding
for any purpose, the statute would raise very serious relatedness concerns. Dole
requires, recall, that the condition on federal funds not be “unrelated ‘to the federal
interest in particular national projects or programs.’” 195 Yet surely the intuition is
strong that requiring all of a prison’s programs to satisfy RLUIPA’s compelling interest
test is unrelated to the federal interest in, say, eliminating prison overcrowding. Now,
this intuition might be defeated. It has been argued, for example, that all federal prison
money is partly motivated by an interest in promoting either rehabilitation or, at the
least, the humane treatment of inmates—interests that are also served by facilitating
greater religious exercise by prisoners.196 But the Court might reject the premise (that
is, it might conclude that some federal prison funds, the receipt of which would make
state prisons subject to the RLUIPA condition, do not promote interests in
rehabilitation or the like) and could conclude that this relationship is too tenuous in
any event.197 In short, if RLUIPA is interpreted as a condition on any and all federal
funds received by a state or local government for any prison-related program, RLUIPA
might be held to fail Dole’s relatedness prong.
Finally, the Court might find that the condition on federal funds imposed by
RLUIPA violates Dole’s prohibition against impermissibly “coercive” conditions. The
Dole Court acknowledged that “in some circumstances the financial inducement
offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns
into compulsion.’” 198 The Court went on to focus on the percentage of federal funds
at stake and found that because the funds at issue—five percent of “certain federal
highway funds”—was a “relatively small percentage” the threat of withholding it did
not constitute impermissible coercion.199 Under RLUIPA, however, seemingly 100
percent of all federal funds received by a covered institution would be subject to
withholding.200 If, as the very brief discussion of the matter in Dole suggests, the

No. CIVS961582LKKGGHP, 2001 WL 804140, at *3 (“Contrary to defendants’ position, the
court concludes that RLUIPA’s prohibition is clear. The Act bars the recipient of federal funds
from placing substantial burdens on an inmate’s free exercise of religion absent a compelling
interest and the employment of the least restrictive means.”).
195. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461
(1978) (plurality opinion)).
196. See Charles v. Verhagen, 220 F.Supp. 2d 955, 963 (W.D.Wis. 2002)(“Congress can
rationally seek to insure that states receiving federal funds targeted at rehabilitating prisoners are
not simultaneously using those funds or other federal money to impede prisoners’ exercise of
religion and its perceived rehabilitative effects.”); Mayweathers, 2001 WL 804140 at *4
(“RLUIPA’s provisions are directly related to the rehabilitation of federal inmates housed in
state prisons.”); 139 Cong. Rec. 26,410 (1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“[E]xposure to
religion is the best hope we have for rehabilitation of a prisoner.”) (commenting on the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act).
197. For discussion of how the Court could tighten Dole’s relatedness prong, see infra Part
V.B.1.
198. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
199. Id.
200. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b)(1) (2002).
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coercion inquiry turns upon the percentage of federal programmatic funds that a state
would lose by failing to comply with a funding condition, the Court should hold that
the RLUIPA condition rises to the level of impermissible coercion.201
To be sure, all of these possible objections apply as well to the civil rights statutes
upon which RLUIPA is modeled, most notably Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which bars discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin by “any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”202 Some may suppose that
at least some members of the Court’s states’ rights majority—Justices O’Connor and
Kennedy being the most obvious bets—would be unwilling to strike down these core
antidiscrimination provisions, yet unable plausibly to distinguish RLUIPA, in which
event RLUIPA would be upheld. This may be right; we cannot know with any
confidence whether the Court would hold the Institutionalized Persons provisions of
RLUIPA to violate the Dole doctrine. What is important for purposes of this Article,
however, is that a Court willing (or even eager) to invalidate RLUIPA—perhaps
because it views the statute as a bald attempt by Congress to circumvent the Court’s
free exercise cases 203—plausibly could do so without abandoning or amending any
aspect of existing spending clause doctrine.
IV. EXPLOITING THE DOLE LOOPHOLE
Part II reviewed why the Court should get off the Dole. Part III, however, bolstered
the prevailing wisdom that, at least in the very near term, it probably will not. This Part
picks up a thread opposing that of Part II. Whereas some commentators (ourselves
included) have criticized Dole and proposed alternatives, others have applauded it.204

201. If, instead, whether a condition is impermissibly coercive depends upon the percentage
of the funded program’s budget that would be lost upon noncompliance, cf. infra note 304,
RLUIPA would likely survive. Federal funds for prisons constitute only a tiny percentage of
state prison budgets. See, e.g., Mayweathers v. Terhune, No. CIVS961582LKKGGHP, 2001
WL 804140, at *5 n.1 (E.D.Cal. July 2, 2001), aff’d sub nom., Mayweathers v. Newland, 314
F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that the federal funding received by the California Department
of Corrections in 2001-2002 “amounts to a paltry 1.9 million dollars out of the Department’s
annual budget of roughly 4.8 million dollars”).
202. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2002). Similarly, Title IX bars programs or activities receiving
federal funds from discriminating on the basis of sex, and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act bars
such discrimination on the basis of disability. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2002); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)
(2002).
203. See, e.g., Gregory S. Walston, Federalism and Federal Spending: Why the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 is Unconstitutional, 23 HAW . L. REV. 479,
481 (2001):
Congress’s overt circumvention of the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Boerne
is transparently unconstitutional. While RLUIPA is based upon different
congressional powers, the result is the same as RFRA: a significant and undue
intrusion into the authority of the judiciary and the states in violation of
fundamental notions of separation of powers and federalism. Congress cannot
override the Supreme Court’s explicit holding in City of Boerne by simply drawing
on different congressional powers. RLUIPA, like its precedent RFRA, is patently
unconstitutional.
204. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 60; Ann Carey Juliano, The More You Spend, the
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Yet more significantly, some observers in this latter camp have urged not merely that
Congress should make broad use of its conditional spending powers, but that it should
employ its conditional spending power to effectively overturn Supreme Court
decisions that have restricted congressional power.205 Just how that might work is the
subject of this Part.
That Dole stands in some sort of tension with whatever restrictions on
congressional power may otherwise exist was never a secret: allowing Congress to
spend for objectives that it could not pursue under its other enumerated powers at
least partially undermines the limitations upon those other powers. Indeed, this was
obvious to the Court back in Butler when it first confronted the need to choose
between the Madisonian and Hamiltonian views of the spending power, and even
explains the schizophrenic character of that decision—nominally adopting the
Hamiltonian conception, but ruling in seeming accord with the Madisonian.206 But
during the sixty years following Butler this observation had more academic than
practical significance. The steady expansion of Congress’s commerce power rendered
the spending power’s circumventionist potential relatively inconsequential.207 For this

More You Save: Can the Spending Clause Save Federal Anti-Discrimination Laws?, 46 VILL.
L. REV. 1111 (2001); Earl M. Maltz, Sovereignty, Autonomy and Conditional Spending, 4 CHAP .
L. REV. 107 (2001) (defending Dole on political process grounds); Rebecca E. Zietlow,
Federalism’s Paradox: The Spending Power and the Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, 37 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 141 (2002); Jennifer Cotner, Note, How the Spending Clause Can Solve the
Dilemma of State Sovereign Immunity from Intellectual Property Suits, 51 DUKE L.J. 713 (2001).
205. This argument prevailed with the enactment of RLUIPA. See supra Part III.B. See also,
e.g., Zietlow, supra note 204 (advocating broad use of the spending power to secure waiver of
state sovereign immunity); Julian Epstein, Evolving Spheres of Federalism After United States
v. Lopez and Other Cases, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 525, 553-54 (1997) (stating that Congress
could use conditional spending to achieve the objectives of the Gun-Free School Zones Act and
the Brady Act); Sheriffs Have Gun Point, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Dec. 6, 1996, at
A8, available at 1996 WL 13667664 (arguing that “[t]he Brady bill makes good sense” and that
“[i]f Congress wants universal cooperation by sheriffs, experience suggests that it has only to
hold hostage continued federal law-enforcement grants”); Cotner, see supra note 204, at 751
(“Congress should adopt the conditional waiver plan advocated by this Note to circumvent the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank.”).
206. Recent scholarship has challenged the Court’s characterization of Hamilton’s position—
that Congress may spend so long as it is for the General Welfare, unconstrained by other limits
to Article I powers. See David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1 (1994) (arguing
that Hamilton understood the spending power to permit Congress to spend for ends beyond
those authorized by other powers, but subject to the caveats that such expenditures could gain
no leverage from the Necessary and Proper Clause and could be frustrated in their objects by the
states); Jeffrey T. Renz, What Spending Clause?, 33 J. M ARSHALL L. REV. 81, 103-06 (1999)
(describing this as the “weak” Hamiltonian position—subsequently championed by Story—and
distinguishing it from a “strong” Hamiltonian position that Article I, Section 8, Clause 1
conferred on Congress power even to regulate—not just spend—for the general welfare). We
take no position on this historical controversy here. Whether what is commonly termed
“Hamilton’s position” was really Hamilton’s position is immaterial for our purposes.
207. In Professor Rosenthal’s oft-quoted terms, “[I]f the front door of the commerce power
is open, it may not be worth worrying whether to keep the back door of the spending power
tightly closed.” Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39
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reason, Dole was of no great moment back in 1987.
Its true importance became plain, though, as soon as the Rehnquist Court started
to impose constraints.208 Indeed, mere days after the Court announced its decision in
Lopez,209 the New York Times already reported that President Clinton was considering
conditioning federal education funds on each state’s enactment of a state gun-free
school zone law that would replicate the provisions of the newly invalidated federal
law.210 Congress ultimately decided against this strategy but only because it happened
upon an even more attractive means of circumvention: adding a “jurisdictional
element” to the statute.211
Although not adopted,212 this spending-based response to Lopez shows clearly just

STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1131 (1987).
208. This is not to suggest that nobody anticipated the difficulty. For a particularly prescient
analysis in the immediate wake of Dole, see Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional
Spending: Federalism’s Trojan Horse, 1988 SUP . CT. REV. 85.
209. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
210. See Todd S. Purdum, Clinton Seeks Way to Retain Gun Ban in School Zones, N.Y.
T IMES, Apr. 30, 1995, at A1.
211. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2000) (criminalizing the possession near schools of guns
that have “moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce”).
212. Conceivably, the bill could be revisited. The only court to have addressed the question
has held the modified § 922(q) constitutional. United States v. Danks, 221 F.3d 1037 (8th Cir.
1999). Many courts, however, have addressed the constitutionality of other statutes containing
a jurisdictional element, including, for example, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), which makes it illegal for a
felon to possess, “in or affecting commerce,” a firearm. These courts overwhelmingly have held,
in response to post-Lopez attacks, that § 922(g)’s jurisdictional element makes it constitutional
under the Commerce Clause, e.g., United States v. Williams, 128 F.3d 1128, 1133-34 (7th Cir.
1997); United States v. Wells, 98 F.3d 808, 811 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Sorrentino, 72
F.3d 294, 296 (2d Cir. 1995), and have held that evidence simply showing a gun has previously
traveled in interstate commerce is sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional element, see, e.g., United
States v. Crump, 120 F.3d 462, 466 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Murphy, 107 F.3d 1199,
1211-12 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Garcia, 94 F.3d 57, 65 (2d Cir. 1996).
Commentators, on the other hand, vary in their opinions about the constitutionality of the
modified § 922(q). Cf. e.g., Ann Althouse, Enforcing Federalism After United States v. Lopez,
38 ARIZ. L. REV. 793, 805-06 n.99 (1996) (“It would clearly be inconsistent with the majority’s
conception of the Commerce Clause in Lopez for the jurisdictional device to work.”); Barry
Friedman, Legislative Findings and Judicial Signals: A Positive Political Reading of United
States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 757, 799 (1996) (labeling a “stretch” the position
“that simply because an article once traveled in commerce, Congress may regulate any activity
involving that article,” and stating that this stretch “may be one the Supreme Court is ready to
eliminate”); Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg, Federal Power and Federalism: A Theory of
Commerce-Clause Based Regulation of Traditionally State Crimes, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
921, 925 (1997) (“the revised statute is constitutional and will be upheld”); Deborah Jones
Merritt, COMMERCE!, 94 M ICH . L. REV. 674, 697 (1995) (“It is unclear whether a
jurisdictional element . . . will resurrect the constitutionality of the Gun-Free School Zones
Act.”).
We think there are good reasons to doubt the long-term prospects for the revised § 922(q).
As most observers recognize, the jurisdictional element provides the flimsiest of fig leaves.
Virtually every gun travels in interstate commerce. As far as effective state power and
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how simple the circumventionist method is. First, Congress must articulate a demand,
and do so in terms explicit enough to meet Dole’s clear-statement requirement. This
proposed statutory response to Lopez, for example, would demand that states enact
into state law a criminal ban on the possession of guns within a specified distance of
schools. Second, Congress must identify a federal purpose or interest that the demand
serves. Here, let us suppose, the demand serves an interest in improving public
education. Third, Congress must identify a federal spending program that pursues that
same purpose and then attach the “demand” as a “condition” upon that spending
program. Doing all this should ensure that the condition on the federal grant is not
“unrelated ‘to the federal interest in [the] particular national project[] or program[]’ “
to which the condition is attached213 or, put affirmatively, that the condition “bear[s]
some relationship to the purpose of the federal spending.”214 Fourth and finally,
Congress must set the amount of funding at risk at a level sufficient to secure state
acquiescence without running afoul of the coercion restriction. As Dole itself
suggests, this is not hard: although every single state acceded to the demand, the
Court considered the offer at issue in Dole “relatively mild encouragement,” and
dismissed “the argument as to coercion . . . [as] more rhetoric than fact.”215

prerogatives are concerned to a state that is home to no firearm manufacture, there is literally no
difference between the version struck down in Lopez and the present version that incorporates
the jurisdictional element. To be sure, practical considerations are not all: different treatment of
functionally identical statutes could be justified if the difference was demanded by constitutional
text. But the text provides little or no support for the jurisdictional element. It is one thing to
interpret the Commerce Clause as granting Congress plenary power to regulate the movement
of things in interstate commerce. That Congress would enjoy equal power (indeed any power)
to regulate items merely because they have moved in interstate commerce (and not because, for
example, the regulation would substantially affect interstate commerce) is something else
entirely. And though some precedent may support the jurisdictional element, see, e.g.,
Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1973); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971);
Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), we think
that stare decisis has little force in this case. Among other things, after Lopez, the jurisdictional
element rule creates just the sort of doctrinal anomaly that justifies its being overruled. See
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992).
In truth, we think, the jurisdictional element serves mostly to give the States’ Rights Five
some breathing room by mitigating the impact of Lopez and Morrison while they work out a
coherent post-Lopez Commerce Clause jurisprudence. If they can craft a doctrine that
adequately serves state interests without causing the upheaval that Thomas’s preferred
solution—abandoning the substantial effects test—would engender, they could follow the logic
of their recent federalism cases and jettison the jurisdictional element. Were this to happen at
all, and were it to precede any significant change to Dole, then Congress could reconsider the
Spending Clause fix that Clinton had initially floated, see supra note 210.
213. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461
(1978) (plurality opinion)).
214. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992).
215. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211; cf. William Van Alstyne, “Thirty Pieces of Silver” for the Rights
of Your People: Irresistible Offers Reconsidered as a Matter of State Constitutional Law, 16
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL ’Y 303, 319-20 (1993) (“Congress sets the terms of its offers quite
knowingly—at just the ‘right’ level—to make them ‘irresistible’ and, accordingly, no state tends
very long to resist.”). Dissenting from conventional academic wisdom, Rick Hills has argued that
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Following this formula, plausible responses to each of the Court’s recent federalism
decisions are easy to imagine. The command that states help administer the Brady Act,
for example, is plainly directed by a federal interest in reducing crime. After Printz,216
therefore, Congress could attach the command as a condition on full eligibility for
federal grants to state and local law enforcement.217 Additionally or alternatively,
federal law enforcement grants could be conditioned on state enactment of an effective
civil damages remedy for victims of gender-related crimes of violence. Because
existence of such a remedy might deter some of the violence, relatedness appears
satisfied and Morrison218 circumvented.219
Or turn to the sovereign immunity cases. Abrogation of state sovereign immunity
in intellectual property disputes is plausibly driven by an interest in promoting privatesector innovation by increasing the expected value of intellectual property rights.
Accordingly, Congress could respond to Florida Prepaid220 by conditioning full
federal funding for university research on a state’s waiver of its immunity in intellectual
property cases.221 As another example, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

“the evidence does not support the conclusion that the states are so dependent on federal
revenue that they cannot just say ‘no’ to federal grants.” Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political
Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual
Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 M ICH . L. REV. 813, 862-65 (1998). Perhaps not, but the sort of
conditional grant Hills is discussing is much narrower than we contemplate here. See id. at 859
(defining “conditional grants” as funds Congress provides to the states “on the condition that
the state spend the funds in accordance with federal priorities”). Indeed, Hills acknowledges that
the assumption that states cannot resist the federal offer is stronger with respect to “the
congressional practice of imposing new ‘cross-cutting’ conditions on ‘old’ grant money” because
states become addicted to the funds initially and then find it politically impossible to
discontinue participation later, when more onerous conditions are added. Id. at 865 n.184. Of
course, Hills’s survey of the terrain is not exhaustive: conditions can be attached when funds are
initially offered (and thus not fall into the second category Hills mentions) and yet do more than
merely specify how granted funds must be spent (and thus fall outside of Hills’s initial
definition). In any event, that states do not always accede to federal conditions tells us little, for
presumably Congress is sometimes indifferent (or nearly so) regarding whether a state accepts
the offered funds on the specified condition. See supra Part II.A. (discussing conditions that
serve to increase the majority states’ share of federal grants). The important question is whether
Congress can structure its conditional offers in a way that states find nonacquiescence
practically impossible in those situations in which Congress strongly prefers that states accept
the condition.
216. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
217. It has been suggested to us that this option was considered but rejected out of fear not
that the Supreme Court would have struck it down but that many states would reject the
condition, thereby creating political pressure on the administration to backpedal.
218. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
219. This circumvention is hypothesized in Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, The Scope of
the Commerce Clause after Morrison, 25 OKLA . CITY U. L. REV. 843, 857-58 (2000).
220. College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666
(1999).
221. For a fuller discussion of possible ways Congress could respond to Florida Prepaid,
including analysis of proposed bills, see, for example, Daniel J. Meltzer, Overcoming Immunity:
The Case of Federal Regulation of Intellectual Property, 52 STAN . L. REV. 1331 (2001); Berman,
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(“ADEA”) is designed to promote the dignity, and material and psychological wellbeing of senior citizens. Naturally, abrogating state sovereign immunity in suits
alleging violations of the ADEA promotes the very same goals by increasing the
probability that states will comply with the ADEA requirements. A plausible response
to Kimel,222 then, would require states to waive immunity in ADEA suits as a condition
for receipt of all medicare funds for which the state is otherwise eligible. 223 Similarly, the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), along with its abrogation of state sovereign
immunity, aims broadly to improve the life prospects of disabled persons. So Congress
might circumvent Garrett224 by conditioning some portion of federal funds provided
to assist disabled persons225 on a state’s waiver of immunity in ADA suits.

V. PREDICTING THE REHNQUIST COURT ’S RESPONSE
Suppose Congress exploits the Dole loophole in one of the ways we have just
described or in any similar context to achieve an end that the Court had closed off by
an earlier pro-state decision, one interpreting, say, the Commerce Clause or the Tenth
or Eleventh Amendments. How might the Rehnquist Court respond to such an
assertion of congressional power?
We predict here that such a maneuver is unlikely to succeed and, furthermore, is
highly likely to provoke precisely the sort of change to Spending Clause jurisprudence
that nationalists will hate. First, we argue in Part V.A, the States’ Rights Five would be
strongly disposed against such circumvention. In developing this argument, we
elaborate upon the notions of circumvention and exploitation that we have thus far
used unreflectively. Next, Part V.B shows that if a majority of the Court is committed
or strongly disposed to invalidate such circumvention, Dole could be “tightened”
sufficiently to render many circumventions impermissible and, indeed, to turn Dole
from a largely ineffectual doctrine into a markedly stringent one. Finally, supposing
that Congress were able to enact at least some circumvention statutes in forms
impervious even to a reinvigorated version of Dole, we argue in Part V.C that the Court

Reese & Young, supra note 35. This particular Dole-inspired circumvention is discussed id. at
1134-37.
222. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
223. Shortly following Kimel, the Senate proposed a different sort of circumvention. The
Older Workers Rights Restoration Act of 2000, S. 3008, 106th Cong. (2000), followed the
model of the civil rights acts, see supra Part III.B., in providing that every state program or
activity that receives any federal financial assistance must waive its immunity in suits under the
ADEA (This bill died in committee but was reintroduced as The Older Workers’ Rights
Restoration Act of 2001, S. 928, 107th Cong. (2001).). For an explanation of why this broad
“program or activity” approach is probably inconsistent with Dole, see Berman, Reese &
Young, supra note 35, at 1137-42.
224. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2000).
225. E.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1411 (2000) (Individuals with Disabilities Education Act); 29 U.S.C.
§ 3011 (2000) (Assistive Technology Act of 1998); 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000) (Grants to States
for Medical Assistance Programs).
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could well react by abandoning Dole or (what may be much the same thing for
advocates of expansive national power) supplementing it. Although we do not hazard
a guess as to what the Court would put in Dole’s place, we survey a few possibilities.
Our aim is to show that replacements are possible and that they are likely to be
significantly more hostile to congressional power than is Dole itself.
A. The Impulse
1. A Brief Lesson from History
In 1918, in the famous (or notorious) case of Hammer v. Dagenhart,226 the Court
struck down a federal statute that barred the interstate shipment of goods in the
production in which children under fourteen had been employed. Over a vigorous
dissent by Justice Holmes for himself and three other Justices, the Court insisted that
were it to uphold the ban, “all freedom of commerce will be at an end, and the power of
the States over local matters may be eliminated, and thus our system of government be
practically destroyed.”227 Congress reacted quickly. Turning from its Commerce Power
to the Taxing Power, it had within a year imposed a new 10 percent excise tax on the net
profits of mining and manufacturing companies that employed children under specified
minimum ages.228
The Child Labor Tax Act (“CLTA”) appeared to be on solid constitutional footing
thanks to a number of Supreme Court decisions including, most notably, the sixteen
year-old precedent of McCray v. United States.229 McCray had involved a challenge
to a scheme of discriminatory federal taxation which taxed white oleomargarine at the
rate of one-quarter cents per pound but subjected yellow oleomargarine to a whopping
tax of ten cents per pound. Responding to the taxpayer’s complaint that the tax “is of
such an onerous character to make it manifest that the purpose of Congress in levying
it was not to raise revenue but to suppress the manufacture of the taxed article,”230 the
Court flatly rejected the legal premise “that the judiciary may restrain the exercise of a
lawful power on the assumption that a wrongful purpose or motive has caused the
power to be exerted.”231 Proceeding, then, to “put[] entirely out of view all
considerations based upon purpose or motive,” the Court appealed to a single
principle en route to concluding that the legislation was a valid exercise of the taxing
power: “[I]t is self-evident that on their face [the acts] levy an excise tax. That being
their necessary scope and operation, it follows that the acts are within the grant of
power.”232
These principles were confirmed in Doremus v. United States, a case decided a week

226. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
227. Id. at 276.
228. Child Labor Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 65-254, 40 Stat. 1138 (1919).
229. 195 U.S. 27 (1904).
230. Id. at 51. Presumably Congress sought to suppress yellow margarine, but not white,
because the former competed more effectively against butter because the color either confused
consumers or simply proved more appealing.
231. Id. at 56.
232. Id.
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after the CLTA was passed.233 Citing McCray and other cases, the Court reiterated
that the fact that other motives may impel the exercise of federal taxing power
does not authorize the courts to inquire into that subject. If the legislation enacted
has some reasonable relation to the exercise of the taxing authority conferred by
the Constitution, it cannot be invalidated because of the supposed motives which
induced it.234

And the “reasonable relation” the Court had in mind was simple: “Considering the full
power of Congress over excise taxation the decisive question here is: Have the
provisions in question any relation to the raising of revenue?”235
In light of this jurisprudence, Congress had some reason for surprise when, in
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.,236 the Court struck down the CLTA by a vote of eight
to one. The heart of the Court’s reasoning was contained in a proclamation of stirring
candor:
[A] court must be blind not to see that the so-called tax is imposed to stop the
employment of children within the age limits prescribed. Its prohibitory and
regulatory effect and purpose are palpable. All others can see and understand this.
How can we properly shut our minds to it?237

This is refreshing stuff, surely appealing to all readers who tire of the cant and
disingenuousness judges too often foist upon us. The problem, though, is that prior
cases did not compel the Court to pretend that Congress’s purpose was something
other than regulation. They dictated, rather, that the Court treat the purpose as legally
immaterial. On this point McCray had been unequivocal: “[T]he motive or purpose of
Congress in adopting the acts in question may not be inquired into.”238
McCray was, therefore, a difficult case to distinguish. And the Bailey Court’s
attempt was weak. The oleomargarine tax at issue in McCray, it explained, did not
“show on its face as does the law before us the detailed specifications of a regulation
of a state concern and business with a heavy exaction to promote the efficacy of such
regulation.”239 This was sophism. As far as animating regulatory purposes were
concerned, the CLTA and the earlier margarine tax were on identical ground. Both taxes
were obviously passed for the purpose of discouraging a certain practice that, for
different reasons, Congress disfavored. The Court would have had to be no less blind
to see this in McCray than in Bailey, and such a purpose was no more apparent “on
the face” of the CLTA than on the face of the Oleo Tax. But there was one respect in
which the motivation behind the CLTA was different: Congress sought not only to

233. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919), was decided March 3, 1919, while the CLTA was passed
on February 24, 1919.
234. Id. at 93 (citing Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 147, 153, 156 (1911); McCray
v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 541 (1869)).
235. Id. at 94.
236. 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
237. Id. at 37.
238. McCray, 195 U.S. at 59.
239. Bailey, 259 U.S. at 42.
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regulate in ways that it could not achieve through its other Article I powers, but also
to circumvent a recent Supreme Court decision that specifically barred such regulation.
A reasonable lesson of Bailey, then, was that the Court would not tolerate
circumvention of its precise holdings.
If the Taft Court would not tolerate circumvention of this sort, it would seem odd
to expect anything different from the Rehnquist Court. That this Court is unusually
guilty of arrogating power to itself has become an article of faith in some circles,
especially after the suite of decisions culminating in Bush v. Gore.240 Others insist that
the Court’s recent federalism decisions reflect merely its refusal to abdicate its
constitutional duty.241 For present purposes, it is not necessary for us to choose sides
in this debate. We need only agree that the present Court is no less concerned than
were its predecessors to preserve judicial prerogatives. When the 103rd Congress
enacted The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) in a bid to circumvent
Smith,242 for example, the Court’s rebuff was unequivocal.243 And there is little reason
to dismiss Boerne as exceptional. The States’ Rights Five have made clear in a variety
of contexts that they will not allow their substantive doctrines to be evaded by niceties
of
pleading.244 Surely they will be just as committed to ensuring that federalism does not
become an ingenious exercise in legislative drafting.
2. An Objection Considered
But maybe this conclusion is too quick. After all, repeatedly in cases that have
curbed congressional power, members of the States’ Rights majority have taken pains
to note that current spending jurisprudence permits Congress to achieve the ends that
the invalidated legislation pursued.
In New York , for example, even while striking down the “take title” provision of the
Low-Level Radioactive Policy Amendments Act of 1985, the Court specifically upheld,
as a straightforward conditional exercise of Congress’s spending power, “monetary

240. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). For discussions of this theme, see Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme
Court 2000 Term, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001); Robert C. Post &
Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section
Five Power, 78 IND . L.J. 1 (2003).
241. See, e.g., Baker, Revival of States’ Rights, supra note 61, at 95 (contending that with its
recent federalism decisions “the Court has signaled a willingness to resume its too-long ignored
duty to enforce the Constitution’s protections for state autonomy”); Steven G. Calabresi, “A
Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94
M ICH . L. REV. 752, 752 (1995) (describing Lopez as marking a “long overdue revival of the
doctrine that the federal government is one of limited and enumerated powers”).
242. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
243. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
244. See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 270 (1997) (“The real
interests served by the Eleventh Amendment are not to be sacrificed to elementary mechanics
of captions and pleading.”); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 566 (1992) (“Standing
is not ‘an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable’”) (citing United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973)).

508

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 78:459

incentives” under which states that achieved a series of milestones in establishing
waste disposal sites would receive payments from a dedicated federal fund.245 And five
years later, briefly concurring in Printz, Justice O’Connor reconfirmed her acceptance
of conditional spending. Insisting that the Court’s “holding, of course, does not spell
the end of the objectives of the Brady Act,” O’Connor explained that, among other
things, “Congress is . . . free to amend the interim program to provide for its
continuance on a contractual basis with the States if it wishes.”246 Similarly, in that
portion of Alden which sounded the same theme as O’Connor’s Printz concurrence—
namely, that the Court’s invalidation of federal legislation did not circumscribe
congressional power as much as the Court’s critics would charge—the majority
dropped a “cf.” cite to Dole in observing that, “subject to constitutional limitations, .
. . the Federal Government [does not] lack the authority or means to seek the States’
voluntary consent to private suits.”247 Based on evidence such as this, some scholars
have supposed that, far from viewing a possible spending-based circumvention with
hostility, the States’ Rights justices would in fact welcome it.248
We do not think so, for the particular uses of the spending power that we have
hypothesized in Part IV do not appear to be what these justices meant to invite or to
authorize. Notice the words that commentators use to describe the sorts of statutes we
have discussed: exploit, evade, circumvent, loophole.249 We think this nomenclature
is not accidental. Instead, it suggests a useful distinction: the States’ Rights may have
intended to invite Congress to avoid some of the consequences of the Court’s

245. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 171-72 (1992).
246. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 936 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing the
highway safety program, 23 U.S.C. § 402 (2000)).
247. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999).
248. See, e.g., Zietlow, supra note 204, at 190-91 (claiming that the Court “virtually has
invited Congress to use its Spending Power to circumvent Tenth Amendment limitations”).
249. See, e.g., Choper & Yoo, supra note 219, at 857 (“Given the broad sweep of the
spending power as currently construed, the federal government would quite clearly have the
ability to evade the direct limits on its Commerce Clause powers.”); Norman Redlich & David
R. Lurie, Federalism: A Surrogate for What Really Matters, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1273, 1283
n.60 (1997) (“As commentators have noted, the Court’s current Spending Clause jurisprudence
appears to offer a significant potential loophole to the reach of New York.”); Angel D. Mitchell,
Comment, Conditional Federal Funding to the States, 48 U. KAN . L. REV. 161, 168 (1999)
(“Although the Court set forth this prohibition against congressional commandeering of the
states, it nevertheless preserved a method by which Congress may readily evade this prohibition
by simply exercising its spending power.”); Brett D. Proctor, Note, Using the Spending Power
to Circumvent City of Boerne v. Flores: Why the Court Should Require Constitutional
Consistency in its Unconstitutional Conditions Analysis , 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 469-70 (2000)
(“[T]he spending power has been invoked repeatedly in recent years as the clearest, and perhaps
only, tool with which Congress might circumvent the Supreme Court’s apparent willingness to
enforce federalism-based constitutional norms.”); Kimberly Sayers-Fay, Comment, Conditional
Federal Spending: A Back Door to Enhanced Free Exercise Protection, 88 CAL . L. REV. 1281,
1299 (2000) (“Depending on one’s perceptions, Dole is either a crack in the constitutional
foundation or an opportunity begging to be exploited.”); Ryan C. Squire, Note, Effectuating
Principles of Federalism: Reevaluating the Federal Spending Power as the Great Tenth
Amendment Loophole, 25 PEPP . L. REV. 869 (1998).

2003]

GETTING OFF THE DOLE

509

decisions by using the spending power in a way that would comply with Dole;250 they
did not intend Congress to evade or circumvent its holdings by exploiting Dole.
Precisely what distinguishes avoidance from evasion and mere rule compliance from
rule exploitation are nice questions.251 But for present purposes exquisite precision is
not required, for the root ideas are easy enough to grasp. Start with the idea of a
loophole. No rule perfectly fits the considerations that generate it. Relative to its
underlying reasons, every rule is overinclusive or underinclusive, or both. As a first,
if rough, cut, then, let us stipulate that “loophole” describes the space in which the rule
permits conduct that its own underlying considerations, if directly enforced, would
prohibit.252 It is that place where the letter of the rule underenforces the spirit. Dole
creates a loophole because it is a judge-made rule designed to implement a standardlike constitutional norm. However that norm could conceivably be interpreted, there is
little doubt that the States’ Rights Five understand it as designed to preserve a sphere
for the vibrant exercise of meaningful state sovereignty. Insofar as the particular
limitations set forth in Dole prove inadequate to that task—a prospect there is every
reason to predict253—to that extent the doctrine contains a loophole.254

250. It is possible that Justice Scalia, at least, does not truly mean to invite even this.
Consider this intriguing passage from Printz on the subject of whether Congress has engaged in
a historical practice of commandeering state or local officials:
The Government points to a number of federal statutes enacted within the past
few decades that require the participation of state or local officials in implementing
federal regulatory schemes. Some of these are connected to federal funding
measures, and can perhaps be more accurately described as conditions upon the
grant of federal funding than as mandates to the States; others, which require only
the provision of information to the Federal Government, do not involve the precise
issue before us here, which is the forced participation of the States’ executive in
the actual administration of a federal program. We of course do not address these
or other currently operative enactments that are not before us; it will be time
enough to do so if and when their validity is challenged in a proper case.
Printz, 521 U.S. at 917-18. One might read the last sentence as tipping Scalia’s hand. See Baker,
Revival of States Rights, supra note 61 at 103. But if he means to hint that some of the measures
discussed earlier would not survive a proper challenge, it remains unclear whether that hint is
intended to cover the entire preceding sentence or just the measures referenced after the
semicolon.
251. For a provocative, if idiosyncratic, exploration, see LEO KATZ, ILL -GOTTEN GAINS:
EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD , AND KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE LAW (1996).
252. It is worth noting that this is apparently not the sense of loophole at work in Celestine
Richards McConville, Federal Funding Conditions: Bursting Through the Dole Loopholes, 4
CHAP . L. REV. 163 (2001). McConville appears to treat each of the five Dole conditions as a
“loophole” through which to promote state interests as against national ones.
253. Dole did not purport to announce anything new. Not only did it merely identify
limitations that had emerged from previous Supreme Court spending decisions, see Dole, 483
U.S. at 207-08, it provided no reason to suspect that this common law process of doctrinemaking had reached a stable resting place. Indeed, the decision upon which Dole relied most
heavily made clear that the difficult task of articulating precise limits to the spending power was
ongoing. See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 591 (1937) (“In such circumstances,
if in no others, inducement or persuasion does not go beyond the bounds of power. We do not
fix the outermost line. Enough for present purposes that wherever the line may be, this statute
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Now, the Court might be willing to tolerate some statutes falling into the Dole
loophole. Loopholes are ubiquitous in law and not always filled. But two other
concepts become important: exploitation and circumvention. Sometimes actions fall
into loopholes, other times they are deposited there. Borrowing from Meir DanCohen’s useful trope of an “acoustic separation” between conduct rules and decision
rules,255 we might imagine that a loophole-containing rule was formulated as a decision
rule designed to adjudicate alleged violations of a conduct rule that was articulated in
the standard-like terms of the rule’s animating considerations. Even were the decision
rule acoustically separated from the conduct rule’s subjects—and thus the locations
and shapes of the decision rule’s loopholes unknown—the conduct rule’s addressees
might nonetheless sometimes act in ways that bring them within the loopholes. But
accidents of this sort could not be expected often. Because acoustic separation is a
fiction, however, the rule’s addressees know just where the loopholes are and therefore
enter them far more frequently. We may say, accordingly, that one “exploits a
loophole” when she steers her behavior into that space where the hypothetical
decision rule safeguards conduct that the hypothetical conduct rule prohibits, and
does so with awareness or at least suspicion that the space is just of this sort. This, we
think, is no more than the common intuitive sense of what it means to exploit a
loophole.
Third, and finally, circumvention occurs (as opposed, say, to mere, non-normatively
charged, avoidance) when one escapes the bite of any given rule precisely by
exploiting a loophole in the system, rather than by some other means. Put another way,
one circumvents Rule B when she achieves an outcome that Rule B is designed to
protect against and does so by exploiting a loophole in Rule A. And even though
persons will disagree about when the phenomenon occurs,256 we suspect that many
will share the intuitive sense that there is something at least dodgy, and sometimes
plain wrongful, about it.257 Surely when viewed from a perspective internal t o a

is within it. Definition more precise must abide the wisdom of the future.”).
254. Cf. New York, 505 U.S. at 167 (explaining that it is necessary to limit conditional
spending lest “the spending power . . . render academic the Constitution’s other grants and
limits of federal authority”).
255. See generally, Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984).
256. Precisely because the reasons underlying a given rule are contestable, it will not always
be obvious to any given onlooker just where the loopholes are—where, that is, the rule’s letter
underenforces its spirit—nor whether the loopholer acted inadvertently or exploitatively. Still
less, then, could all reasonable onlookers always be in agreement. But sometimes they will be.
257. It is probably true that courts often tolerate exploitation of loopholes. But we suppose
that any such tolerance usually occurs when the reviewing court did not create the loophole in
the first place. Where a legislature or agency has created the loophole, a common (but not
invariable) judicial reaction is to enforce the letter, not the spirit, and leave it up to the rule
maker to close the loophole if it can and so wishes. Matters are very different where, as in Dole,
the Court itself inadvertently created the loophole in the exercise of its power to make
constitutional doctrine. Of course, one might be tempted to respond that what we have called
the Dole loophole is not really a creation of the Court but, rather, the direct and inescapable
force of the Constitution itself. We do not doubt that the Constitution does itself create
loopholes. But given the richness of interpretive resources at the judiciary’s disposal, we cannot
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particular normative system, it is presumptively improper to exploit that system’s
loopholes to circumvent others of its rules.
If this is right, then it misses our point to object that for one to engage in specified
conduct “only because the law allows it” is commonplace, indeed desirable.258
Consciously shaping one’s conduct to the demands of the law is concededly what the
law desires. Consciously shaping one’s conduct to comply with what one suspects are
the law’s loopholes is not.259 More to the point, for Congress to shape its policy to
what it suspects are Dole’s loopholes is not what the States’ Rights Five desire. Note
this telling recent observation by Justice Kennedy, joined by the Chief Justice and
Justices Scalia and Thomas: Because, under Dole,
Congress can use its Spending Clause power to pursue objectives outside of
Article I’s enumerated legislative fields by attaching conditions to the grant of
federal funds . . ., the Spending Clause power, if wielded without concern for the
federal balance, has the potential to obliterate distinctions between national and
local spheres of interest and power by permitting the Federal Government to set
policy in the most sensitive areas of traditional state concern, areas which
otherwise would lie outside its reach.260

This is a revealing passage. We read it to indicate that at least these four Justices
recognize that merely nominal compliance with Dole’s strictures might not be enough
to maintain the “distinctions between national and local spheres of interest and
power”—distinctions that they, along with Justice O’Connor, plainly deem essential—
and, therefore, that they will expect Congress to be guided when exercising its
spending power not only by the letter of Dole but also by an adequate “concern for
the federal balance” (adequate, presumably, by these Justices’ lights).261 How much
clearer a signal could they send that they do not intend to sit idly by if Congress,
insufficiently motivated by concern for the federal balance, consciously exploits Dole’s
imperfections to trench upon sensitive areas of traditional state concern—such as

agree that this is one of them. The particular requirements that emerge from Dole—especially,
that the condition not be unrelated to the federal interest in the spending program to which it is
attached and that it not be impermissibly coercive—are no more constitutionally compelled than
would be a doctrine that closed the loophole by, for example, interpreting the Spending Clause,
in conjunction with the Tenth Amendment, to disallow spending conditions that “unduly
interfere with state sovereignty.”
258. See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 251, at 12 (“Why exactly should we disapprove of someone
for doing something only because of the law?”) (emphasis in original).
259. For a persuasive argument to this effect, see Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law Is an
Excuse—but Only for the Virtuous, 96 M ICH . L. REV. 127 (1997).
260. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 654-55 (1999) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
261. Recall those passages from recent federalism decisions that some commentators have
read as authorizing any legislation that complies with Dole. See supra notes 245-48. We can see
now that these passages are most safely interpreted to mean that Congress may realize the ends
that the stricken legislation pursued by using its spending power in a way that complied with
constitutional strictures, but not to mean that Congress should feel itself free to pursue those
ends in any way that existing judge-made spending doctrine permits, insofar as those two things
may differ.
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those areas that recent precedent has preserved against other sorts of national
intrusion?
Of course, even if the States’ Rights Five would look with disfavor upon a maneuver
by Congress to exploit the Dole loophole so as to circumvent one of the Court’s recent
decisions, that is not enough to establish that it would do something about it. The
reason loopholes exist, after all, is that it is often difficult to craft judicial doctrine that
both is administrable and closely tracks the underlying policy considerations. Closing
a doctrinal loophole almost always comes at the cost of creating overenforcement;
sometimes that cost is thought too high. So the question becomes whether the Court
could find a way to repulse Congress at a cost it finds tolerable.262
B. Tightening Dole
The first possible route to invalidating a circumventionist statute is to tighten Dole
itself. “Rational basis with bite” provides a useful (though imperfect)263 analogy. Just
as the Court in Cleburne264 (and this very Court in Romer)265 maintained nominal
fidelity to the rational basis test while applying it with new-found stringency to strike
down discrimination that a majority evidently found obnoxious, perhaps a majority of
the present Court could apply Dole with greater bite without formally changing or
adding to any of its requirements. The relatedness and coercion prongs of the Dole
test are the most obvious candidates for tightening.266 Each of these prongs could be
applied with greater bite than was applied in Dole itself.
1. Relatedness
That the relatedness requirement could be applied more or less rigorously is
obvious and was plainly recognized in Dole itself by both the majority and the
principal dissent. But just how strictly it was applied in Dole and what it would mean
to apply it more strictly are rather less obvious.

262. Cf. Choper & Yoo, supra note 219, at 858 (“the Court may find it difficult to develop
more limiting standards for the Spending Clause—such as by attempting to narrow the nexus
it requires between federal spending programs and their related conditions”).
263. The analogy is imperfect because “rational basis with bite” involves applying the
standard-like terms that constitute the test—”rational” and “substantial”—with greater rigor,
whereas the more interesting ways to tighten Dole involve reconceptualizing the test’s
constituent concepts, as we will explain.
264. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
265. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
266. Perhaps the “general welfare” requirement should be added to this list. Given that the
Court had questioned in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-91 (1976) (per curiam), “whether
‘general welfare’ is a judicially enforceable restriction at all,” Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 n.2, this
prong probably has the least bite of all. Yet the most obvious tightening would involve the
Court’s either substituting its own judgment on an ad hoc basis as to whether a particular
condition did or did not advance the general welfare or specifying standards or a definition to
distinguish “general” welfare from “particular.” It would be hard to invigorate this prong in
either of these ways without acknowledging that the rules have changed. We therefore pursue
this line of thought in the next section. See infra Part V.C.2.
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After observing that previous “cases have not required that we define the outer
bounds of the ‘germaneness’ or ‘relatedness’ limitation on the imposition of conditions
under the spending power,” the Dole majority concluded that the condition that a state
impose a minimum drinking age of twenty-one did in fact “relate[] directly to the
purpose of the expenditure to which it is attached” and, therefore, that it was
unnecessary for the Court to determine how directly related the condition and the
expenditure need be.267 Justice O’Connor, in dissent, took issue with the majority on
just this score, deeming “the Court’s application of the requirement that the condition
imposed be reasonably related to the purpose for which the funds are expended . . .
cursory and unconvincing,”268 and insisting that “establishment of a minimum drinking
age of 21 is not sufficiently related to interstate highway construction to justify so
conditioning funds appropriated for that purpose.”269 This was so, she explained,
because
if the purpose of [the condition] is to deter drunken driving, it is far too over- and
under-inclusive. It is over-inclusive because it stops teenagers from drinking even
when they are not about to drive on interstate highways. It is under-inclusive
because teenagers pose only a small part of the drunken driving problem in this
Nation.270

In short, the relationship between the condition and the purpose of the federal
expenditures was too “attenuated or tangential.”271
All these modifiers—directly, reasonably, sufficiently, attenuated, tangential—make
clear that the relatedness requirement could be applied more or less stringently. That
is, the requirement could be operationalized to make it easier or harder to satisfy.
Unfortunately, the sheer variety of these modifiers and the wholly unsatisfying
analyses in which they feature leave entirely unclear precisely how the standard could
be applied with greater or lesser bite.272 Take the majority’s assertion that a requirement
of direct relatedness, whether or not constitutionally compelled, was “satisfied in this
case in any event.”273 Why so? And if so, what would an indirect relationship look
like? Imagine a federal statute that required states to criminalize drunk driving as a
condition for receiving their full allotment of federal highway funds. Surely this seems
“directly related to one of the main purposes for which highway funds are expended—
safe interstate travel.”274 A minimum drinking age promotes the same purpose one step
removed: it reduces drunk driving by reducing the number of persons who may legally
drink. To be sure, it is perfectly reasonable to suppose that reducing the number of
legal drinkers (especially among young people) reduces the total amount of drunk

267. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208-09 n.3.
268. Id. at 213.
269. Id. at 213-14.
270. Id. at 214-15.
271. Id. at 215.
272. Cf. Proctor, supra note 249, at 481-82 (observing that the relatedness “requirement is
commonly viewed as the most important of all the Dole criteria” but that “[i]ts precise content
today is unclear”).
273. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208 n.3.
274. Id. at 209.
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driving. But because one more causal link is involved the relationship between the
condition and the spending purpose in the actual statute is at least somewhat less
direct than it is in the hypothetical statute. So if the actual statute is not as directly
related to the spending program’s purpose as it could be, what makes it directly related
at all, as opposed to “indirectly related”? That is, what determines where on the
continuum between direct and indirect the critical line gets drawn?275 The majority
offers no hint.
Unfortunately, while the majority’s analysis is unsatisfying, Justice O’Connor’s is
simply confused. In concluding that the “relationship between the supposed purpose
of the expenditure . . . and the drinking age condition” is not “reasonable[],”276
O’Connor relies heavily on notions of under- and overinclusiveness. That the
condition is in fact under- and over-inclusive in just the ways she claims is undeniable.
But so what? If South Dakota had prevailed against the United States and retained its
minimum drinking age of nineteen, and if eighteen year-olds had challenged the law on
equal protection grounds, does anyone doubt that the plaintiffs would have been
laughed out of court notwithstanding that the same under- and overinclusiveness
would be present? Or suppose that after Dole Congress finds that many teenagers are
drinking and driving despite the nationwide minimum drinking age of twenty-one. In
an effort to reduce teenage drinking, and thereby to promote highway safety, Congress
authorizes funds to subsidize state-run educational programs designed to urge
teenagers to abstain from alcohol. As a means to promote safe highway travel, this
spending program would be infected by just the same over- and underinclusiveness
that tainted the condition upheld in Dole. And yet this statute would pass the test that
O’Connor ultimately endorses: “Congress has no power under the Spending Clause
to impose requirements on a grant that go beyond specifying how the money should
be spent.”277 Both of these points suggest that determining the constitutional
sufficiency
of
the
relationship

between condition and expenditure by reference to the under- and overinclusiveness
of means to end is mistaken.278
If cashing out Dole’s relatedness requirement by reference to degrees of directness
between the condition and the “purpose” of the expentidture seems unpromising, and

275. Indeed, concerns like this have persuaded various of the States’ Rights Justices in at
least some contexts to eschew tests that depend at all upon “directness” inquiries. See, e.g.,
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 818 (2000) (plurality opinion) (“Whether one chooses to label
this program ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’ is a rather arbitrary choice, one that does not further the
constitutional analysis.”).
276. Dole, 483 U.S. at 214 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
277. Id. at 216 (quoting Brief for the National Conference of State Legislatures as Amici
Curiae). We assume that O’Connor’s proposed test incorporates the negative implication.
278. Not too surprisingly, then, the cases that Dole relied upon for its relatedness
requirement—Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality opinion),
and Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958)—invoked the barest dueprocess-style notion of reasonableness; they lend little or no support for the Dole majority’s
seeming interest in directness of relationship or O’Connor’s focus on equal-protection-like
closeness-of-fit.
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by inquiry into magnitudes of over- and underinclusiveness positively misguided,
there may be another possibility.279 Start with the commonplace idea that every
governmental action, like all purposive action, serves a chain of purposes or
interests.280 Consequently, two governmental actions (be they expenditures,
regulations, requests, proclamations, etc.) are related more or less closely in inverse
proportion to the number of purposive links each must serve before their two chains
coincide.
This perhaps obvious point, like many points of comparable intuitiveness, may be
brought home more clearly with a graphical representation. The notion of relatedness
that Justice O’Connor invokes is famously represented, thanks to Tussman and
tenBroek, by Venn Diagrams.281 That is the classic way to represent the relationship
between sets. It is not, however, an apt way to depict the relationship among actions
and purposes. A family tree is. Consider, then, this highly schematic view of a tiny
piece from a hypothetical tree depicting actions and purposes of the federal
government (the actions represented by the shaded rectangles). (See FIGURE 1.)

279. Others have argued that the Court might hold that the broad “program or activity”
language of Titles VI and IX runs afoul of the relatedness requirement. See, e.g., Berman , Reese
& Young, supra note 35, at 1137-42; Conkle, supra note 130, at 675-76. Although we continue
to think that is possible, see supra note 202 and accompanying text, our analysis here is very
different. We here explore ways to make the relatedness prong tighter than it was in Dole. It is
not at all clear that it requires any tightening of that requirement as it was applied in Dole in
order to hold Congress not entitled to restrict the behavior of every program or activity of an
institution as a condition of that institution’s receiving federal funding.
280. This familiar point is nicely made in John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative
Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1217-21 (1970).
281. See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL .
L. REV. 341, 347 (1949).
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FIGURE 1
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The family tree metaphor is appropriate. For one thing, a given purpose might be said
to generate or sire the subordinate purposes that serve it. More significantly, the
distance between actions as measured by the connecting branches seems to capture
our intuitive sense of the closeness of their relationship. A federal request that states
raise their minimum drinking age, for example, is more closely related to a federal
regulation requiring all new cars to be outfitted with ignition locks that will not open
unless the operator passes a breathalyzer test than to a federal law imposing criminal
penalties upon accidental discharge of a firearm. And each of these actions is more
closely related to the other two than to, say, federal funding of the Kennedy Center for
the Performing Arts, which presumably serves purposes at some distant remove in the
complete tree.
Given this general way to think about the relationships among governmental actions
like expenditures and conditions (the relationship is closer the fewer the purposive
links that connect them), and given the particular way that this chart characterizes
actions and the hierarchy of purposes they subtend, it becomes clear that the
relatedness requirement could be applied more stringently than it was in Dole itself.
Indeed, the directness language of Rehnquist’s majority opinion provides a clue, for
the relatedness prong could be reformulated to require that the expenditure and the
condition be so closely related that the purpose each “directly” (or immediately) serves
be the same.282 Under this formulation of the rule—what we might term, with a nod to
the “least restrictive means” test from First Amendment jurisprudence,283 a “most direct
relationship” test—Congress would be permitted to condition funds for highway
improvements on a state’s agreement to undertake a specified schedule of road
maintenance because each would promote the immediate federal purpose in improving
roadway conditions, but Congress could not condition the same funds on a state’s
enacting any specified minimum drinking age because that condition serves the
distinct immediate purpose of reducing drunk driving. This formulation, in short,
dictates a different result on the very facts of Dole. It is, therefore, unmistakably a
tightening.
Although we do believe that the twin notions (a) that governmental actions serve
a chain of nested purposes and (b) that the conceptual structure of these purposes is
best represented by a tree, provide a coherent and sensible way to think about how
closely or distantly particular governmental actions are related, we hasten to
acknowledge that trying to turn this appreciation into a determinate and administrable
judicial rule confronts severe, possibly intractable, difficulties.284 We do not pursue
these concerns here, though, for a variety of reasons, not the least of which being that
we are emphatically not recommending that the Court should tighten Dole in this

282. Continuing the familial metaphor, this would be to require that the expenditure and
condition be “siblings.”
283. See, e.g., Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
284. Perhaps the most obvious challenges involve how to choose among competing plausible
formulations of purposes and, relatedly, how thinly to slice the purposive chain. And even once
the nodes in the tree are set, the problem of measuring distance remains, for the tree depicts
topological relations but not geometric ones. Therefore, the fact that funding highway
improvements is five links removed from both imposing criminal penalties for accidental
discharge of a firearm and asking states to enact a specified minimum drinking age should not
entail that each relationship is identically close (or distant).
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fashion. However useful or illuminating this way of conceiving the relationship
between expenditure and condition may be for some purposes, we do not think it
makes sense as a test of constitutionality. In fact, one of the signal benefits of this
conceptualization and graphic representation is that they help show why this is so.285
Be that as it may, so long as the Court requires that each spending condition “bear[s]
some relationship to the purpose of the federal spending,”286 this discussion shows
how that relationship could be conceived and articulated to give Dole greater bite.
2. Coercion
The Dole Court’s treatment of coercion is nearly as confusing as its treatment of
relatedness.287 As a purely nominal matter, it is not even clear whether the Court meant
to prohibit all coercive offers or just some subset of them. The Court’s observation
“that in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so
coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion,’” 288 suggests
the latter: some coercion is permissible so long as the coercion is not so great in
magnitude as to constitute compulsion. But the Court’s subsequent approval of
Justice Cardozo’s remark that “‘to hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to
coercion is to plunge the law in endless difficulties,’” 289 suggests the former: a too-

285. Two points, the first practical, and the second theoretical. First, the tree makes clear
why the Dole approach to relatedness becomes easier to satisfy the more Congress does.
Whenever Congress desires to induce a given behavior from the states, all it must do (as far as
the relatedness requirement is concerned) is look up the tree for the purpose that such behavior
would serve and then look down from that purpose for a spending program that also serves it.
As Congress expands its spending to serve more and more low-level interests (that is, immediate
interests as opposed to ultimate ones), it becomes increasingly unlikely that any demand would
be designed to promote an interest that is not already being promoted by a federal funding
program. The perverse consequence of this rule designed to protect state prerogatives, then, is
that congressional power begets congressional power.
Second, regardless of how extensive federal spending is or becomes, a test which requires that
a condition serve the same purpose as the expenditure to which it is attached invites cynical or
self-defeating legislation. Suppose that in the shadow of the Second Amendment, Congress has
identified only two means to pursue its interest in reducing firearm accidents: asking states to
impose their own stringent limits on gun ownership, and funding state-administered firearm
safety classes. What the diagram shows, were it not clear enough already, is that conditioning
the latter on a state’s acquiescence in the former is an all-or-nothing strategy. If a state declines
the federal request then the federal interest will not be advanced in that state at all, even though
(what is not always the case) the condition and the expenditure are in fact fully independent
means to realize the purpose that they share.
286. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992).
287. Still, the Court should not be criticized too heavily for this. As one philosopher has
noted, “In concept, dimensions, and the realities of phenomena, coercion is indeed laden with
ambiguity, complexity, and elusive ingredients.” Samuel Dubois Cook, Coercion and Social
Change, in NOMOS XIV: COERCION 107, 115 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds.,
1972). For a recent effort by one of us to unravel some of these complexities, see Mitchell N.
Berman, The Normative Functions of Coercion Claims, 8 LEGAL T HEORY 45 (2002).
288. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
289. Id. (quoting Steward, 301 U.S at 589-90).
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quick finding of coercion would create difficulties only if such a finding would require
the law’s invalidation.
Putting nomenclature aside, though, the Court’s general idea is clear enough. In one
common sense of the term, coercion stands as an antonym of sorts for freedom or
voluntariness:290 When one is “coerced” (or “compelled”) to do x, one does not do x
“voluntarily” or of one’s own “free will.” And it is this sense that Dole has in mind:
Congress has not impermissibly coerced291 “the States to enact higher minimum
drinking ages than they would otherwise choose” because “the enactment of such
laws remains the prerogative of the States not merely in theory but in fact.”292
Yet if the general idea is clear enough, its specification is not. For what it might
mean for a state to accept a condition involuntarily is highly ambiguous. Because this
is well-worn ground,293 we will be brief.
Consider the different ways to make sense of involuntary or compelled conduct by
individuals.294 Sometimes we say that an individual acted “involuntarily” or was
compelled to act as she did when her conduct was not preceded by volition at all, as
when A forcibly propels B’s arm into C.295 Were B subsequently charged with an
assault on C, she would be acquitted precisely on the ground that her conduct was not
voluntary. Likewise if B moved her arm as a consequence of hypnosis or while sleep
walking.296
But this is only one sense of involuntariness and the least interesting at that.
Consider another familiar situation in which B is said to be compelled to accept a
condition: when in response to a credible threat of death. If B slaps C in response to

290. An example of this sense of coercion is emphasized in, for example, J. Roland Pennock,
Coercion: An Overview, in NOMOS XIV: COERCION, supra note 287, at 1. There is a distinct
sense of coercion in which A coerces B when presenting a certain sort of wrongful proposal.
One of us has argued that the Court should revise its conditional spending jurisprudence to
operate upon this sense of coercion—one that looks to the character of Congress’s conduct—
rather than the other sense of coercion—that looks to the voluntariness of the state’s choice.
Although this revision would still use the word “coercion,” the underlying concept would be
different. We therefore treat this proposal as an alternative to the Dole test not as a tightening
of it. See infra Part V.C.4.
291. The phrase “impermissible coercion” is intended to meet the ambiguity we have just
noted. If the constitutional line is drawn between coercion and compulsion, then read
“impermissible” as a modifier: coercion is okay, impermissible coercion (i.e., compulsion) is not.
If the line is drawn between encouragement and coercion, then read “impermissible” as a
characterization not a qualification: coercion is impermissible.
292. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211-12.
293. See, e.g., McConville, supra note 252, at 172-83; Donald J. Mizerk, Note, The
Coercion Test and Conditional Federal Grants to the States, 40 VAND . L. REV. 1159 (1987);
Sayers-Fay, supra note 249, at 1299-1301.
294. This discussion is indebted to Alan Wertheimer’s illuminating analysis. See ALAN
WERTHHEIMER, COERCION 192-201 (1987). It also draws from Berman, Reese & Young, supra
note 35, at 1152-54.
295. We anticipate that some readers may resist calling this coercion, deeming only
“compulsion” apt. For what it is worth, though, theorists often do classify this as a form of
coercion. See, e.g., Michael D. Bayles, A Concept of Coercion, in NOMOS XIV: COERCION,
supra note 287, at16, 17.
296. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 2.01 (2001).
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A’s threat to kill B if she does not, we would have no difficulty in adjudging B’s action
“compelled” or “involuntary,” not the product of mere “encouragement” or
“temptation.” Surely B had “no choice” but to slap C. As a conceptual matter, though,
if perhaps not a normative one, this situation is readily distinguishable from the first.
To return to the criminal law, B will still be acquitted, but this time thanks to the
affirmative defenses of necessity297 and duress;298 her conduct is sufficiently voluntary
to satisfy the actus reus requirement.
Extreme situations like this, however, do not exhaust the range of cases in which we
commonly seek to excuse, or at least explain, our actions on the grounds of having had
“no choice” in the matter—cases in which one’s conduct is not the product of one’s
own “prerogative.” For our limited purposes, one example—the destitute widow
hypothetical—should suffice. Suppose that a wealthy bachelor offers to house and
feed a destitute widow and her three children in exchange for periodic sexual intimacies
(with the widow, not the children).299 Suppose too that the bachelor is no more
obligated to these unfortunates than is anyone else and that the widow’s best
alternatives would be extremely hard on her and her family but far from threatening
death. The widow accepts. Feeling a mix of sorrow, anger, and degradation, however,
she might find herself explaining, to herself or to others, that she really had “no choice”
but to accept. It seems to us that this is an eminently plausible claim. And yet the
widow surely had more choice than the gunman’s victim did. She might even
acknowledge that, yes, she could have chosen to reject the bachelor’s offer in a way
that B, in the earlier hypothetical, could not.
If all this is so, at least two distinct, but not mutually exclusive, ways to make sense
of the widow’s claim suggest themselves. The underlying thought might be, first, that
her choice predicament was so unfair, her options so far from what the society might
deem minimally normatively acceptable, as to justify our thinking her choice not
“really” voluntary. Second, regardless of the fairness of her choice predicament, there
is a possible sense in which the widow’s decision to accept did not issue from the
exercise of her own subjective decisional autonomy but, rather, from the demands of
rationality itself. Acceptance was so plainly the only thing to do that the choice was
not hers, but was instead made for her by circumstances.300

297. See id. § 3.02 (1)(a) (“Conduct that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm
or evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided that the harm or evil sought to be avoided
by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense
charged.”).
298. See id. § 2.09 (1) (extending an affirmative defense to an actor who was coerced to
commit an offense “by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the
person of another, that a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable
to resist”).
299. This hypothetical is raised in Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d 395, 402 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1985).
300. This is a subtle and potentially controversial take on what “no choice” could mean and
might therefore warrant more fleshing out. Perhaps part of what it means to choose among
alternatives includes the idea of exercising one’s individuality. That is, the act of choosing both
expresses and partially constitutes an agent’s uniqueness. What makes a choice my choice is, in
part, precisely that it is mine, and not, for example, yours or everyone’s. But if everybody (at
least every sane and rational human being) would make the same choice then that distinction
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This brief discussion suggests, then, that we might usefully distinguish four sorts
of claimed involuntariness or unfreedom that might arise in response to behavior of
another: when the claimant’s conduct is “non-volitional” in the sense of having been
produced by “no choice at all”; when she has “no practical choice” but to do as she
does because doing otherwise would be in a literal or figurative sense suicidal; when
she has “no fair choice” because we think the range of alternatives she faced was
unacceptably narrow as a normative matter; and when she has “no rational choice”
because only one alternative is consistent with the minimum demands of instrumental
rationality. This is not an exhaustive division of the terrain but it is at least a plausible
start.
Of these four ways to cash out the notion of being compelled to accept a condition
attached to a spending program, it is not entirely clear on the face of Dole which
Rehnquist intended. The first possibility can be ruled out as being simply inapposite
when transferred from the domain of human action to that of state action. States cannot
be physically manipulated by other states nor are they subject to reflexive or
convulsive action.301 Whatever Rehnquist may have had in mind (even if inchoately),
most lower courts seem to read Dole as implicating the “no practical choice”
conception of what it means to be impermissibly coerced: if a state could reject the
condition and still survive essentially as a state, then acceptance of the condition is
freely chosen and the condition is not impermissibly coercive.302 Indeed, this seems the
conceptualization most faithful to the precedents upon which Dole relies.303 If this is
so, then the ways to tighten the coercion prong become plain. It is not only a matter
of the Court’s being disposed to find impermissible coercion present at some less
onerous point on a single continuum of pressure like that measured by the barometric
scale (though the Court could, of course, change its views in just this way). Rather, or
more interestingly, the Court could adopt a different conception of what it means for
a state to be presented with “no choice.”304 The Court could reconceptualize the

cannot be drawn: “my choice” becomes, in a sense, simply “the choice.” And we could perhaps
go even further: if the notion of a choice includes the notion that there exists an opportunity
(even a need?) for an agent to do the choosing (that is, if there exists “a choice” to be made
between A and B only when “my choosing” A over B would reflect my choosing A over B),
then the lack of the opportunity for the exercise of individual agency entails that there is in fact
no choice to be made; the act that the presentation of alternatives calls for is not, properly
speaking, a “choice” but rather, say, an “identification” of the correct alternative.
301. Cf. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937) (“Nothing in the case
suggests the exertion of a power akin to undue influence, if we assume that such a concept can
ever be applied with fitness to the relations between state and nation.”).
302. See Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir.) (“According to the coercion theory,
the federal government may not, at least in certain circumstances, condition the receipt of funds
in such a way as to leave the state with no practical alternative but to comply with federal
restrictions.”).
303. Steward, 301 U.S. at 586 (“There must be a showing in the second place that the tax and
the credit in combination are weapons of coercion, destroying or impairing the autonomy of the
states.”). See also id. at 593 (observing, after concluding that the tax was not coercive, that, “The
statute does not call for a surrender by the states of powers essential to their quasi sovereign
existence.”).
304. Lower courts have noted and criticized Dole’s seemingly exclusive focus on the
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coercion prong as providing that a spending condition is impermissibly coercive if it
presents a state with either no rational choice or no fair choice but to accept,305 even
if it leaves the state with a practical choice not to.
3. Prospects
We have spent some time exploring what it might mean for the Court to preserve
Dole but apply it with greater bite. It seems that, in theory, the test’s bite could be
varied in two principal ways: by assessing the purposes served by the condition and
the expenditure to which it is attached at stages of greater or lesser immediacy; and by
conceptualizing impermissible coercion as occurring when Congress presents the
states with a conditional funding offer that they have no fair choice or no rational
choice but to accept, even when the states do enjoy a practical choice not to. In both
respects the Dole test could be applied with greater rigor than the Court applied it to
the facts of that case. That is to say, the Court could maintain at least nominal fidelity
to the Dole test but operationalize the relatedness and impermissible coercion prongs
in ways such that the statute at issue in Dole would have failed both of them. The
drinking age condition could be held insufficiently related to the expenditure of
highway funds because although each serves an interest in reducing the number of
highway accidents, the condition does so via the more immediate purpose of reducing
the number of intoxicated drivers on the roads whereas the expenditure does so via the
immediate purpose of, for example, improving the road surface. And the condition
could be found impermissibly coercive on the grounds that the states have no rational
choice but to accept given the amount of money at stake and the relatively slight
importance to a state of maintaining a minimum drinking age under twenty-one.
The true question, though, is not simply whether the Dole test is amenable to being
applied with bite and a bite forceful enough to have produced a different result in Dole.
Rather, having determined that the test could be ratcheted up in a manner that would
enable a Court bent on invalidating a circumventionist statute to do so without
jettisoning Dole, the more important question becomes whether this possibility is
realistically to be anticipated.306

percentage of programmatic funds as the window into impermissible coercion, wondering why
the relevant metric might not be, for example, total dollars or dollars as a percentage of the
offeree state’s budget. See, e.g., Skinner, 884 F.2d at 448. The deeper point, naturally, is that
a choice among these or any other measures would be arbitrary without an understanding of
what it means for a state to have “no choice” but to accept a condition and thus to be
impermissibly coerced into it.
305. A decade prior to Dole, one scholar objected that “[d]ebating whether conditions on
federal grants . . . ‘coerce’ the state is an unhelpful anthropomorphism. . . . The question . . . is
not whether federal requirements overbear on a hypostasized state ‘free will,’ but whether they
unduly compromise a normative political conception of state autonomy.” Richard B. Stewart,
Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandatory State Implementation of National
Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1254 (1977). We share this aversion to inquiries that
depend at all on notions of a state’s free will (or on anyone’s “free will” for that matter). Still,
Stewart’s proposal could be recast in “no choice” terms, in particular as asking whether a
conditional offer was coercive because it gave a state “no fair choice” but to accept.
306. For a political-science-inspired discussion that would bear on this question, see Mark
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Toughening the coercion prong is, we think, unlikely. Very simply, the no-rationalchoice and no-fair-choice constructions of impermissible coercion are just too
amorphous to be judicially administrable. It is virtually unimaginable that Justice Scalia,
for instance, would agree to this formulation.307 Giving significant teeth to the coercion
prong is a theoretical but not practical possibility.
Tightening the relatedness prong, in contrast, is feasible. And it would give Dole
real bite. Consider the circumventionist response to Printz.308 Requiring background
checks for gun purchases and providing funds for the hiring of additional police
officers both serve an interest in reducing violent crime. But the condition does so via
an immediate goal of keeping firearms away from felons while the expenditure does so
by increasing the prospects of apprehending criminals and thereby improving
deterrence. Because the immediate purposes behind the condition and the expenditure
are not the same, the two might be held insufficiently related. A College Savings
Bank 309 circumvention would fare similarly. Reducing bars to vindicating intellectual
property rights promotes the progress of science and the useful arts by increasing
expected returns on successful innovations. Funding research promotes scientific and
artistic progress by reducing the costs to the would-be innovator: different immediate
purposes adopted to serve the same slightly more ultimate purpose.
Our hypothetical exploitations of Dole to circumvent Kimel310 and Garrett311 would
also be at risk. Sure, the condition that states waive immunity in ADEA cases, like the
medicare program, serves an interest in promoting the overall well being of senior

Tushnet, supra note 6, at 61-62.
307. Scalia’s hostility to standards is well known. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654, 697-734 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989). For the most recent installment in this ongoing harangue, see
Devlin v. Scardelletti, 122 S. Ct. 2005, 2013-17 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Evan Caminker
has pointed out to us that Scalia’s assertion for the Court in College Savings Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666, 687 (1999), that “where the
constitutionally guaranteed protection of the States’ sovereign immunity is involved, the point
of coercion is automatically passed—and the voluntariness of waiver destroyed—when what
is attached to the refusal to waive is the exclusion of the State from otherwise lawful activity”
might be viewed as adopting a “no fair choice” conception of coercion. That is to say, that a
threat by Congress to bar states from engaging in specified sorts of commercial ventures unless
they agree to waive sovereign immunity in certain types of suits arising from such ventures is
coercive because this is not a “fair choice” to put to the states. We are not sure that Scalia is
thinking in “no fair choice” terms; he might be better understood as viewing the hypothetical as
presenting “no constitutionally acceptable choice.” See infra note 372. In any event, College
Savings Bank shows at most that Scalia is prepared to operationalize “no fair choice” judgments
into categorical rules, not that he would sanction such judgments on an ad hoc basis, and
conditional spending does not provide a hospitable context for any such categorical rules. Surely
it is not plausible that all conditional offers of funds present the offeree state with “no fair
choice,” and it is not the least bit clear how Scalia might sensibly articulate the subset of
conditional funding proposals for which the “no fair choice” conclusion would be categorically
apt.
308. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
309. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 666.
310. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
311. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2000).
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citizens. But the condition does so by increasing employment opportunities for the
elderly; medicare does so by safeguarding seniors’ access to healthcare. And while we
earlier suggested that the ADA is designed to promote the interests of disabled
persons, it does so by pursuing a more immediate purpose—namely, “to provide a
clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities.”312 If the federal expenditures to which the waiver
condition is attached aim to benefit disabled people through a different immediate
mechanism, then the condition could be held insufficiently related.
Nonetheless, this tightening may not give Dole quite so much bite as would be
needed to strike down all possible exploitations of the Dole loophole. Consider the
Morrison circumventions. Imagine that Congress conditioned federal funds for local
law enforcement on a state’s adopting an effective civil damages remedy for the victims
of such violence. Because the expenditure and the condition are each designed to
advance an immediate interest in deterring violence, it may be hard to credibly maintain
that the relationship between the condition and the spending program could, let alone
should, be any closer.313
C. Alternatives to Dole
Suppose the Court does not choose to reinvigorate Dole by tightening relatedness
in the way we have discussed. Perhaps one or more of the States’ Rights Five would
disfavor this form of tightening as simply too stringent, or as raising problems of
administrability comparable to those that, we think, will deter it from tightening the
coercion prong. Or suppose the Court finds itself confronted with a circumventionist
spending statute that it cannot dispose of consistent with even an invigorated
application of the Dole test.
We think it would still be premature for self-congratulations by the statute’s
drafters. For any such congratulations to be in order, one must assume that a majority
of the Court either would be content to let such a statute stand or would be unable to
craft a doctrine up to the task of defeating it. We gave reasons to doubt the first
possibility in Part V.A. Here we give a reason to doubt the second. That reason, in
short, is that there already exists a growing menu of possible Dole alternatives. We
identify some of them here.314 Our goal is not to assess each in detail or to champion

312. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2003).
313. One might be tempted to object that the expenditures are designed to deter violence
generally whereas the condition is designed to deter gender-related violence in particular, in
which case the “most direct relationship” test is not satisfied. That is a tough question. We are
disposed to believe that this objection errs by confusing different framings with different steps
in a causal chain, but believe too that defending this judgment would demand more space than
can be justified here.
314. This is not an exhaustive survey of extant proposals. Ilya Somin, for example, has
recently argued that even unconditional grants of federal funds to the states and their
subdivisions are unconstitutional (unless properly predicated on Congress’s power to enforce
the Reconstruction Amendments) because they threaten the values underlying federalism and
are inconsistent with both the text of the Spending Clause and the original intent. Ilya Somin,
Closing the Pandora’s Box of Federalism: The Case for Judicial Restriction of Federal Subsidies
to State Governments, 90 GEO . L.J. 461 (2002). He recognizes, however, that immediate judicial
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one or another. Our more modest ambition is to give credence to the idea that if a
majority had sufficient will to strike down a circumventionist statute it could find a way
to do so.
1. Return to Madison
The most obvious possibility—and the most staggering—would be to return to the
Madisonian idea that Congress may not spend to achieve ends it could not achieve
through its other enumerated powers. This alternative would spell a revolution in
federalism sufficient to make all the other Rehnquist Court’s federalism decisions
appear mere frivolities by comparison. Although the scope of the imaginable is ever
changing, we think that this falls outside.315
2. Giving Meaning to the “General” Welfare
Under current doctrine, the requirement that federal funds be spent only for the
general welfare is essentially empty.316 But it was not always thus. In founding
thought, some argue, the qualifier “General” had meaning: it enabled Congress to
provide for the welfare of the nation generally, but not for the particular welfare of a
single state or region.317 Were the Court to readopt this view, the narrow holding of
Dole might survive (the national highway system presumably serving the general
welfare) but surely some circumventions would not—not because of anything
objectionable about the conditions themselves but because the spending programs as
a whole would fall. For example, because federal expenditures to aid local education

implementation of a categorical ban on all offers of federal funds to the states would be
unworkable and therefore proposes that the Supreme Court work toward this goal
incrementally. See id. at 497-502.
Although an evaluation of Somin’s argument is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth
questioning here at least one part of his analysis. Somin contends that Dole “need not pose a
barrier” to his proposal because that decision “did not consider the danger that even
unconditional and wholly noncoercive grants to state governments pose to federalism.” Rather,
he says, “[t]he sole point at issue [in Dole] was whether or not the conditions South Dakota
was required to meet were ‘so coercive as to pass the point at which pressure turns into
compulsion.’” Id. at 488. See also id. at 489 (asserting that pre-Dole cases “also failed to
consider the possibility that federal grants may be constitutionally dubious even if not
coercive”). Somin’s view that a prohibition on impermissibly coercive spending conditions,
instead of constituting a de facto fifth prong, is the entirety of the Dole test strikes us as
inexplicable.
315. Perhaps this reflects a failure of imagination on our part, for other scholars have not
only imagined it, but urged it. See, e.g., John C. Eastman, Restoring the “General” to the
General Welfare Clause, 4 CHAP . L. REV. 63, 66-71 (2001); Richard A. Epstein, Standing and
Spending—The Role of Legal and Equitable Principles, 4 CHAP . L. REV. 1, 2 (2001).
316. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-92 (1976); supra text accompanying notes 22-24
& 34.
317. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 87 (1935) (Stone, J., dissenting) (“The
power to tax and spend is not without constitutional restraints. One restriction is that the
purpose must be truly national.”); Eastman, supra note 315.
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and local law enforcement might not promote the general welfare,318 our hypothetical
Lopez and Morrison circumventions would be at risk. To be sure, we would not bet on
this sort of revision being adopted, nor do we recommend it.319 We mention this
possibility only to challenge what may be a complacent assumption that an utterly
toothless “general welfare” requirement is inescapable.320
More significantly in our view, the “general welfare” requirement could be rendered
meaningful even without trying to recover the precise historical distinction between
general and particular. One possible approach is suggested by Donald Regan’s
marvelous essay on the commerce power.321 Regan’s suggestion is simply stated:
“[W]hen we are trying to decide whether some federal law or program can be justified
under the commerce power, we should ask ourselves the question, ‘Is there some
reason the federal government must be able to do this, some reason why we cannot

318. As Eastman puts it, Congress “has only the power to spend for the ‘general’ welfare
and not for the special welfare of particular regions or states, even if the spending was
undertaken in all regions or all states and therefore might be said to enhance ‘general’ welfare in
the aggregate.” Eastman, supra note 315, at 65.
319. For some arguments about why this distinction is unworkable, see Chemerinsky, supra
note 60, at 92-93.
320. Another proposal in a related vein is Laurence Claus’s recent suggestion that
congressional authorization to provide for the “general welfare” be read together with the other
provisions of Article I, Section 8, Clause 1—namely, that Congress may provide for “the
common defense,” and that “all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the
United States”—to ensure that federal taxing and spending decisions not discriminate in the
distribution of burdens and benefits to the people of the United States by reference to what
Claus terms “the political identities of their states.” Laurence Claus, “Uniform Throughout the
United States”: Limits on Taxing as Limits on Spending, 18 CONST. COMMENT 517, 520
(2001)(emphasis added). This means, according to Claus, that
congressional spending via state grants must always be part of a federal spending
program which will proceed in all states for the benefit of their populations
whether state governments choose to participate or not. State governments may
be offered the option of spending federal funds in accordance with the policy
requirements of a federal program, but only where the federal government can and
will implement the program directly should state governments choose not to do
so.
Id. at 546. Thus, “Congress can never validly give states a choice between affording their
citizens the benefit of federal money and declining to implement a federal regulatory scheme.”
Id. at 547. An assessment of this proposal is beyond the scope of this Article.
321. Donald H. Regan, How To Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally
Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 M ICH . L. REV. 554 (1995). As Regan explains, inspiration
for this approach comes from the sixth of the Virginia Resolutions, approved by the
Constitutional Convention, which provided:
That the National Legislature ought to possess the Legislative Rights vested in
Congress by the Confederation; and moreover, to legislate in all cases for the
general interests of the union, and also in those to which the States are separately
incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by
the exercise of individual Legislation.
Id. at 555-56 (quoting JAMES M ADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 380 (W.W. Norton & Co. ed., 1966)).
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leave the matter to the states?’” 322 Were this the critical inquiry, Regan explains, Lopez
was probably rightly decided—there being no reason why the states were incompetent
to address the problem of guns near schools—notwithstanding the palpable
inadequacies of the Court’s opinion.323 Whatever may be said for this approach—and
we are disposed to think there is much to recommend it—it is readily transferred to the
spending power too:324 expenditures and conditions thereto being constitutional only
when some general interest of the union lies behind them—interests that would include
overcoming collective action problems.325 Moreover, the general welfare requirement
might be thought to give the approach greater textual support as a limitation on the
spending power than on the commerce power.
3. O’Connor and the “Regulatory Spending”/“Reimbursement Spending”
Distinction
In her dissent in Dole, Justice O’Connor claimed to concur in the nominal fourprong test set out by the Dole majority,326 but added that she would apply their
“germaneness” requirement differently,327 ultimately reaching a different result in the
case.328 In fact, however, as suggested earlier,329 O’Connor would have imposed a
substantially different germaneness requirement. The Dole majority was concerned
only that a funding condition not be “unrelated ‘to the federal interest in particular
national projects or programs,’” 330 and seemed to cash out this requirement in terms of

322. Id. at 555.
323. The principal inadequacy, in our view, being the Court’s suggestion, strongly reinforced
in Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), that the permissibility of Commerce Clause regulation should
depend upon whether the activity being regulated was itself commercial in character. As we
discuss above, Guillen is in arguable tension with this aspect of Morrison. See supra notes 17073 and accompanying text. If the activity being regulated should be commercial for purposes of
the “substantial effects” prong of post-Lopez Commerce Clause jurisprudence, why ought not
a similar restriction apply to the first two prongs of that doctrine?
324. Cf. Regan, supra note 321, at 613 (opining that “an essay could be written about the
spending power much like this essay about the commerce power, justifying most, if not all, of
what Congress has done by reference to the general interests of the union or state incapacity”).
325. Tellingly, the Steward Court relied upon precisely this sort of problem in upholding the
federal unemployment compensation scheme created by the Social Security Act. See Steward
Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 588 (1937):
But if states had been holding back before the passage of the federal law, inaction
was not owing, for the most part, to the lack of sympathetic interest. Many held
back through alarm lest, in laying such a toll upon their industries, they would
place themselves in a position of economic disadvantage as compared with
neighbors or competitors.
326. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 213 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“I agree
that there are four separate types of limitations on the spending power.”). Conspicuously,
O’Connor made no reference to the de facto fifth prong, coercion. See infra text accompanying
notes 340-41.
327. Dole, 483 U.S. at 212-13.
328. Id. at 212-13, 218.
329. See supra Part V.B.1.
330. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461
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degree of directness. O’Connor, in contrast, would have operationalized the
germaneness requirement in terms of acceptable degrees of over- and
underinclusiveness. How much over- or underinclusiveness O’Connor would tolerate
is unclear.331 Arguably, though, she may be intending to require a “substantial
relationship” between the funding condition and the proclaimed federal interest.332
O’Connor explicitly traced the jurisprudential roots of her germaneness requirement
to the distinction that the Court drew in United States v. Butler, between “a statute
stating the conditions upon which moneys shall be expended and one effective only
upon assumption of a contractual obligation to submit to a regulation which otherwise
could not be enforced.”333 Thus, she would interpret the Spending Clause to afford
Congress no power “‘to impose requirements on a grant that go beyond specifying
how the money should be spent,’” unless the condition “‘falls within one of Congress’
delegated regulatory powers.’” 334
It is not clear what O’Connor means by a condition that specifies “how the money
should be spent,” however. For example, she asserts that the condition at issue in
Dole, “that a State will raise its drinking age to 21,” is not “a condition determining how
federal highway money shall be expended.”335 Yet she also contends that a condition
prohibiting members of a state Highway Commission from “tak[ing] any active part in
political management or in political campaigns” if their “principal employment is in
connection with [an] activity which is financed in whole or in part by loans or grants
made by the United States or by any Federal agency”336 is a permissible “condition
relating to how federal moneys [are] to be expended.”337 Unfortunately, O’Connor fails
to explain why the latter condition is not instead a “regulation” on the extracurricular
activities of the employees of various state and local agencies, and therefore beyond

(1978) (plurality opinion)).
331. See supra text accompanying notes 276-78.
332. Cf., e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (invalidating New York law giving
unmarried mothers, but not fathers, a veto power over the adoption of their child, and finding
this classification not substantially related to the state’s proclaimed interest in promoting
adoption); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770-71 (1977) (invalidating Illinois law prohibiting
illegitimate children from inheriting from their fathers through intestate succession because the
state “failed to consider the possibility of a middle ground between the extremes of complete
exclusion and case-by-case determination of paternity”); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976) (gender-based classification must be “substantially related” to achievement of the
objectives invoked to defend it); id. at 201-02 (finding “an unduly tenuous ‘fit’” between the
protection of public health and safety and a law providing different minimum drinking ages for
men and women); cf. also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 64044 (6th ed. 2000) (discussing standard of intermediate review in equal protection cases).
333. Dole, 483 U.S. at 216 (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 73 (1936)).
334. Id. (quoting Brief for the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. as Amici Curiae
at 19-20).
335. Id. at 218.
336. Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 129-30 n.1 (1947)
(quoting Hatch Act § 12(a), 5 U.S.C. § 118K(a) (1940), repealed by Federal Election Campaign
Act Amendments of 1976, § 201, 90 Stat. 475).
337. Dole, 483 U.S. at 217.
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the scope of Congress’s spending power and other delegated regulatory powers.338
Nor does she elaborate on the difference she sees between the relationship this
condition
and the drinking age restriction each have with “the expenditure of funds for highway
construction.”339
O’Connor also does not discuss the role, if any, that “coercion” would play under
her analysis. The Dole majority was explicit that “in some circumstances the financial
inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which
‘pressure turns into compulsion,’” and emphasized that the legislation at issue in that
case would withhold from a noncomplying state only five percent of its otherwise
obtainable allotment of federal highway funds.340 O’Connor, in contrast, never
expressed any concern with the amount of federal money that a state would forego if
it chose not to comply with an attached condition. Thus, she apparently would find
equally unproblematic (1) legislation that would withhold a state’s entire yearly
allotment of federal highway funds if any employee of a state or local agency, whose
principal employment is in connection with any activity which is financed in whole or
in part by those funds, takes any active part in political management or in political
campaigns and is not removed from his office or employment within thirty days of the
political activity; and (2) identical legislation that would withhold highway funds from
a state only in “an amount equal to two years’ compensation at the rate such officer
or employee was receiving at the time of such violation.”341 Obviously, the first
enactment provides states a significantly greater incentive to comply with the funding
condition than the second does.
Finally, O’Connor never details the normative underpinnings of her proposed test
beyond an expressed concern with “the Framers’ plan,”342 “the meaning of the
Spending Clause,”343 and the precedent established by the Court in Butler.344 Despite
these flaws, however, the test O’Connor outlined in her Dole dissent makes substantial
progress toward workable principles for cabining Congress’s spending power.
The test proposed by one of us (Baker) in 1995 sought to build upon the best
elements of O’Connor’s test while remedying some of the problems with that test
outlined above.345 Baker’s proposed test can be concisely stated: those offers of

338. Compare O’Connor’s discussion of the condition at issue in Dole:
The only possible connection, highway safety, has nothing to do with how the
funds Congress has appropriated are expended. Rather than a condition
determining how federal highway money shall be expended, it is a regulation
determining who shall be able to drink liquor. As such it is not justified by the
spending power.
Id. at 218.
339. Id.
340. Cf. Oklahoma, 330 U.S. at 129-30 n.1.
341. Id.
342. Dole, 483 U.S. at 217.
343. Id.
344. See id.
345. For an extended discussion of this test, see Baker, Conditional Federal Spending, supra
note 16, at 1962-78. For Berman’s reservations, see Berman, supra note 61, at 55-57.
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federal funds to the states which, if accepted, would regulate the states in ways that
Congress could not directly mandate, will be presumed invalid.346 This presumption will
be rebutted upon a determination that the offer of funds constitutes “reimbursement
spending” rather than “regulatory spending.” “Reimbursement spending” legislation
specifies the purpose for which the states are to spend the offered federal funds and
simply reimburses the states, in whole or in part, for their expenditures for that purpose.
Most “regulatory spending” legislation thus includes a simple spending component
which, if enacted in isolation, would be unproblematic under the proposed test.
In seeking to distinguish between reimbursement spending and regulatory spending
legislation, the proposed test, like the Dole test, imposes a type of “germaneness”
requirement on conditional offers of federal funds to the states. In contrast to that in
Dole, however, the germaneness inquiry under the proposed test has two separate
parts, and a challenged condition will be found “germane” and subsequently sustained
if it meets the requirements of either part.347
The germaneness requirement of the Dole test focuses solely on the relationship
between the funding condition and “the federal interest in particular national projects
or programs,” and is met if the condition is not “unrelated” to some “federal
interest.”348 Moreover, the Court’s notion of a permissible “federal interest” is
seemingly boundless, expressly including even those regulatory objectives that
Congress cannot achieve directly.349 Under the first part of the proposed test’s
germaneness inquiry, in contrast, the notion of a “federal interest” is strictly and
unambiguously limited by Congress’s regulatory powers other than the spending
power, and a funding condition will be found to be germane under this part whenever
its regulatory effects are ones that Congress could otherwise achieve directly.
The second part of the germaneness inquiry under the proposed test is embodied
in the distinction between “reimbursement spending” and “regulatory spending,” and
applies only to those conditional offers of federal funds which, if accepted, would
regulate the states in ways that Congress could not directly mandate. It focuses on the
relationship of the funding condition to both the purpose for which the funds are
offered and the amount of money at issue. A condition will be found to be germane
under this portion of the proposed test’s inquiry only (1) if it specifies nothing more
than how—that is, the purpose for which—the offered funds are to be spent and (2)
if the amount of money offered does not exceed the amount necessary to reimburse the

346. By regulations that Congress could “directly mandate” is simply meant regulations that
Congress could enact pursuant to the direct regulatory powers granted it by the Reconstruction
Amendments and the provisions of Article I other than the Spending Clause of Section 8, Clause
1. It does not include those regulations that Congress could currently enact pursuant to the
Spending Clause, of course, because the test seeks to redefine the scope of the spending power,
and must therefore start from the assumption that the limits of that power are undefined.
347. It should also be noted that the germaneness inquiry under the Dole test is but one of
five (mostly toothless) prongs that must be met if the legislation is to be sustained. The twopart germaneness inquiry under the proposed test, in contrast, is that test’s only prong.
348. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461
(1978) (plurality opinion)).
349. See id. (“[O]bjectives not thought to be within Article I’s ‘enumerated legislative fields,’
may nevertheless be attained through the use of the spending power and the conditional grant
of federal funds.” (citation omitted)).
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state for its expenditures for the specified purpose.350 The germaneness requirement
set out in Dole, in contrast, permits conditions that do much more than specify the
purpose for which the states are to spend the offered funds, and imposes no clear
limits
on
the
amount of money that may be made contingent on a state’s compliance with a given
condition.351
In order to understand why the proposed test seeks to distinguish between these
two forms of legislation, and would invalidate only the regulatory spending type,
consider the following pair of hypothetical enactments. In each case, if a state accepts
the offer, the statute would regulate it in ways that Congress could not directly
mandate.352
(A) Any state receiving federal Death Penalty funds (“Funds”) must have the
death penalty available for first-degree murder convictions; participating states
shall receive Funds in the amount of their demonstrated cost of executing those
sentenced to death for first-degree murder.
(B) Any state receiving federal Law Enforcement funds (“Funds”) must use the
Funds to provide “beat cops” who will daily patrol the state’s urban
neighborhoods on foot, and must demonstrate its depth of commitment to the
national fight against crime by having the death penalty available for first-degree
murder convictions; participating states shall receive Funds in the amount of $1.00
per resident according to the most recent federal census.353

350. Thus, the proposed test would require Congress to disaggregate offers of federal funds
for different purposes even if the offers are all reasonably related to a single, general federal
interest in eradicating poverty or drug abuse, for example. Congress would not need to enact
separate legislation for each offer of funds, however. It could include them as separate
provisions of the same statute, so long as it makes clear which condition(s) attach to each offer
of funds.
351. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 208-09. See also supra Part V.B.1.
352. In Lopez, the Court suggested that state and local “criminal law enforcement” was
beyond the regulatory powers granted Congress under the Commerce Clause. See United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
353. Cf. 42 U.S.C. §§ 13,701-13 (2000) (“Violent Offender Incarceration and Truth-inSentencing Incentive Grants”). This Act appropriates $8 billion over six years to be distributed
to states that, inter alia, demonstrate that their correctional policies and programs “provide
sufficiently severe punishment for violent offenders, including violent juvenile offenders,” id.
§ 13,703(a), and have in effect laws which require that persons convicted of violent crimes serve
not less than 85 percent of the sentence imposed, id. § 13,704(a).
The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. §§13,701-14,223
(2000), also includes the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent
Offender Registration Program, id. § 14,071, which stipulates that any state that, within three
years from the date of the Act’s enactment, does not have a federally approved registration
program for individuals who are convicted of sexually violent offenses or crimes in which the
victim was a minor, shall not receive ten percent of the federal funds that would otherwise be
allocated to it under §3756 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42
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Statute A is an example of reimbursement spending legislation. It simply specifies
the purpose for which the states are to spend the offered funds (here, executing those
sentenced to death for first-degree murder) and, critically, offers states an amount of
money no greater than that necessary to reimburse them for their expenditures for the
specified purpose. Statute B, in contrast, is regulatory spending legislation that has
both reimbursement and regulatory spending components. The reimbursement
spending component is the offer of Law Enforcement funds, whose purpose and
authorized use are limited to reimbursing the states for some portion of their (or their
localities’) cost of employing police to patrol the state’s urban neighborhoods daily on
foot.354 The regulatory spending component, which renders the entire statute
impermissible under the proposed test, is the statute’s additional requirement that
states receiving these Law Enforcement funds also have the death penalty available
for first- degree murder convictions.
Both Statute A and B provide states an incentive to make the death penalty
available for first-degree murder convictions. From the perspective of a state that, prior
to these federal enactments, preferred not to have the death penalty available for firstdegree murder convictions, however, Statute A is surely preferable. Under Statute A,
the cost to a state of not complying with the condition attached to the offered funds
is much lower than it is under Statute B. Although a noncomplying state foregoes
federal reimbursement for the costs of executing individuals it convicts of first-degree
murder and sentences to death, it incurs no such costs. Thus, the major cost of Statute
A to such a state is an opportunity cost:355 a portion of the federal fisc is being used
to subsidize a project—executing individuals that other states have convicted of first
degree murder and sentenced to death—from which the state will not directly benefit 356

U.S.C. § 3711-97 (2000). See 42 U.S.C. § 14,071(g)(2)(a) (2000). For examples of the formula
that the federal government currently uses to distribute “law enforcement” funds to the states,
see 42 U.S.C. §§ 13,706, 13,754 (2000).
354. Typically, municipal law enforcement is funded primarily by each locality and has
historically constituted approximately five percent of all local expenditures. See U.S. Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism, Revenues
and Expenditures, vol. 2, at 149 (tbl. 79) (1992) (local expenditures by function, 1948-1990);
id. at 119 (tbl. 61) (local revenue by source, 1948-1990); see also CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & LYNN
A. BAKER, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW : CASES AND M ATERIALS 225-373 (2d ed. 1999)
(discussing legal relationship between states and their subdivisions); OSBORNE M. R EYNOLDS,
JR., HANDBOOK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 76-137, 156-83 (2d ed. 2001).
355. See, e.g., PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 137 (17th ed.
2001) (emphasis omitted):
The immediate dollar cost of going to a movie instead of studying is the price of
a ticket, but the opportunity cost also includes the possibility of getting a higher
grade on the exam. The opportunity costs of a decision include all its
consequences, whether they reflect monetary transactions or not.
Decisions have opportunity costs because choosing one thing in a world of
scarcity means giving up something else. The opportunity cost is the value of the
most valuable good or service forgone.
356. Although a noncomplying state will not benefit directly insofar as it will not receive any
of the federal funds conditionally offered under the legislation, it may benefit indirectly if, for
example, the increase in the number of states in which the death penalty is available for firstdegree murder convictions has a deterrence effect which results in a decrease in the number of
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(and by which it will in fact be burdened)357 instead of a project that the state would
prefer. The cost of Statute B to a non-complying state, in contrast, is (a) the
opportunity cost represented by that portion of the federal fisc—including its own
contributions—which is being used to provide a benefit solely to other states, as well
as (b) foregone desired Law Enforcement funds for which the state would have been
eligible had it been willing to waive its Tenth Amendment right not to administer the
death penalty.
Of course, reimbursement-spending legislation such as Statute A will also impose
costs on noncomplying states. These opportunity costs, which all conditional offers
of federal funds impose, may give states some (likely small) incentive to conform with
the conditions imposed by reimbursement-spending legislation. But regulatory
spending enactments such as Statute B impose costs in addition to these opportunity
costs, and thus typically provide states a greater incentive to conform. This in turn
means that regulatory spending legislation is more likely than reimbursement spending
legislation to yield interstate homogeneity and a concomitant reduction in aggregate
social welfare. In the end, the normative distinction to be made between reimbursement
and regulatory spending is one of degree rather than kind.
Thus, the problem is to decide where, on the continuum of incentives to conform
that conditional offers of federal funds always provide the states, mere
“encouragement” ends and “coercion” begins. In Dole, the Court simply stated that
it would draw the line at the point where the “pressure” exerted by the financial
inducement “turns into compulsion.”358 The Court never defined “compulsion” or
“pressure,” explained how one should or could consistently distinguish between the
two, nor provided any example of an impermissibly “coercive” offer of federal funds to
the states.
The test proposed by Baker accepts the Dole Court’s sense of “coercion” as “too
much pressure,” and, seeks to capture the distinction between impermissible
“coercion” and permissible “encouragement” in its distinction between
“reimbursement spending” and “regulatory spending” legislation. The test would draw
a line between conditional offers of federal funds that impose opportunity costs on
noncomplying states (permissible reimbursement-spending legislation), and offers that
impose both opportunity costs and additional costs on noncomplying states
(impermissible regulatory spending legislation).359 Concededly, the line that Baker’s

murders committed even in the noncomplying state.
357. Such legislation may burden a noncomplying state in two ways. First, some portion of
the federal funds which the legislation distributes to states that comply with the attached
condition(s) will have been contributed by taxpayers who reside in the noncomplying state and
who will therefore receive no direct benefit from this use of their tax dollars. Second, a
substantial proportion of the residents of the noncomplying state are presumably opposed to
the availability of the death penalty (which is why the state has declined the offer of federal
funds), and may be displeased or even distressed that their tax dollars are being used to subsidize
an activity—the execution of individuals convicted by other states of first-degree murder—
which they consider unwise or immoral.
358. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590
(1937)).
359. It should be noted that there is an interesting relationship between the “germaneness”
and “coercion” inquiries under the proposed test: the central distinction between
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proposed test would draw between reimbursement spending and regulatory spending
legislation may not always comport with our intuitive or subjective notions of when
“coercion” begins: the “additional costs” that render a statute impermissible regulatory
spending legislation may sometimes seem insignificant in amount. Against this
imperfection, however, one must weigh the test’s substantial advantages: the line the
test would draw between “coercion” and “encouragement” is bright, straight, and
readily and consistently drawn, and the test will afford the states principled and
predictable protection from federal regulation to a greater extent than existing doctrine
does.360
4. Coercion of a Different Color
We observed earlier361 that Dole conceived of impermissible coercion by Congress
as a correlative of involuntariness or unfreedom by the states: Congress may not
coerce the states to comply with a spending condition where coercion means applying

“reimbursement spending” and “regulatory spending” legislation embodies both the second
portion of the proposed test’s germaneness inquiry and its entire coercion inquiry. Offers of
federal funds to the states that take the form of regulatory spending legislation signal both (1)
that noncomplying states will bear costs in addition to the opportunity costs that all federal
funding statutes impose (and the offer of funds is therefore, by stipulation, “coercive”); and (2)
that Congress is using its spending power to circumvent simultaneously the limitations of its
regulatory powers (under Article I and the Reconstruction Amendments) and the Article V
amendment process (thus the condition on federal funds is not sufficiently “germane”). Offers
of federal funds to the states which, if accepted, would regulate them in ways that Congress
could directly mandate, or which take the form of reimbursement spending legislation, involve
funding conditions that are always both “germane” and not “coercive” under the proposed test.
Under the Dole test, in contrast, the “germaneness” and “coercion” inquiries are completely
unrelated, and apparently are to serve as their own normative justifications. Compare Dole, 483
U.S. at 207-09 (discussing “germaneness” inquiry) with id. at 211-12 (discussing “coercion”
inquiry).
360. Perhaps the clearest evidence that Baker’s test will constrain Congress’s spending
power more than existing doctrine does is provided by a consideration of the federal legislation
at issue in Dole. Assuming arguendo, as the Dole Court did, see 483 U.S. at 206, that the 21st
Amendment precludes Congress from regulating drinking ages directly, the condition on funds
at issue in Dole is presumed to be invalid under Baker’s test: the test presumes invalid any
conditional spending legislation that seeks to regulate a state that accepts the proffered funds
in a way that Congress could not directly mandate. One then proceeds to determine whether the
statute constitutes “reimbursement spending” legislation and therefore rebuts the presumption
of invalidity. Under the challenged statute, the states receiving federal highway money must not
only spend that money on maintaining and improving the highways within their borders (the
“reimbursement spending” portion of the statute), they must also prohibit the purchase or
public possession of alcoholic beverages by anyone less than twenty-one years old. This
additional, regulatory component of the statute renders it regulatory rather than reimbursement
spending, and the conditional offer of federal funds would therefore be found unconstitutional
under Baker’s test. For further discussion of how various enactments would fare under Baker’s
test and under the Dole doctrine, see Baker, Conditional Federal Spending, supra note 16, at
1978-88.
361. See supra Part V.B.2.
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so much pressure—as measured by the disagreeableness to the states of doing
without the offered benefit—that the states have no choice but to accept. We
observed too that difficulties inherent in the notion of “no choice” make this approach
hard to operationalize. Because the states will never have no choice at all but to
accept, because it is almost unimaginable that a state will have no practical choice but
to accept, and because other conceptualizations of “no choice” seem unadministrable
or misguided, it is unclear what basis can exist upon which a court could conclude that
the pressure exerted by any given conditional spending offer was “too much.” One
lesson would be to abandon all inquiries into coercion.
As we have just seen, however, this conclusion is not inevitable. Adopting a
somewhat minimalist approach that denies any need to fully theorize the notion of “no
choice but to accept,”362 the Baker test accepts the core idea underlying the Dole
Court’s concern with “coercion”—namely, that the national government should not
be allowed to put “too much pressure” on a state to accept a condition attached to the
offer of federal funds—and then seeks to craft a doctrine that could effectuate this
intuition without having to rely upon ad hoc gestalt judgments by each reviewing
court. To that end, Baker proposes that courts conclusively presume that a spending
condition exerts too much pressure when that condition threatens to impose costs on
a non-accepting state beyond the opportunity costs that an offeree inescapably incurs
by declining an offer. Admittedly, this test can only imperfectly operationalize the
intuitive line between impermissible coercion and mere permissible encouragement, but
offers substantial benefits in terms of administrability.
There is yet another possibility, though. Appealing loosely to the Dworkinian
distinction between concepts and conceptions,363 we might say that Part V.B.2 brought
into question the Dole concept of coercion (an offeror—the federal government in
these cases—engages in impermissible coercion when it confronts its offeree—here,
the states—with a deal that the latter has “no choice” but to accept) by challenging the
usefulness of any one of its possible conceptions (no choice simpliciter, no practical
choice, no fair choice, no rational choice). If this is right, then before we give up on
coercion tout court (as many courts have seemingly done), 364 or embrace a potentially
very rough proxy (as the Baker test would do),365 we might consider whether there
exists any other concept of coercion (that is, a concept that does not turn upon the
freedom or voluntariness of the offeree’s choice) that could do appropriate normative
work.366

362. On judicial minimalism, see generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A T IME: JUDICIAL
M INIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999).
363. RONALD M. D WORKIN, T AKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-36 (1978). The appeal is loose
because we are agnostic regarding whether the two distinct senses of coercion that we will soon
invoke are better understood as distinct concepts or simply as different functions that coercion
talk serves.
364. See supra notes 53-59.
365. See supra Part V.C.3.
366. The classic theoretical discussion of the optimal precision of legal rules is Issac Ehrlich
& Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974);
see also Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual Rules, 3 S. CAL .
INTERDIS . L.J. 1 (1993); Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE
L.J. 65 (1983); Gillian K. Hadfield, Weighing the Value of Vagueness: An Economic Perspective
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Consider this scenario: Cain and Abel have agreed to write a law review article
together and have divided responsibilities between them. When Abel is out of town,
Cain calls him, threatening to enter Abel’s office and rearrange the books unless Abel
promises to write all Cain’s footnotes. Abel does not much care how his books are
organized but, being a generous soul, agrees nonetheless. It seems implausible to claim
that Abel accepted involuntarily. Nor does there seem to be a meaningful sense in
which Abel had no choice but to accept.367 Given the “too much pressure” concept of
coercion we have been working with, it would follow that no coercion is present here.
But this is mistaken. On a familiar account, coercion is the making of a conditional
threat to perform an act that would be wrongful to commit.368 Because it would be
wrongful for Cain to enter Abel’s office without permission and rearrange Abel’s
books (admittedly, not grievously wrongful), Cain has engaged in the moral wrong of
engaging in coercion notwithstanding that the prospect of the act threatened exerted
insufficient pressure upon Abel as to make his acquiescence involuntary or unfree. On
this view, what makes a proposal coercive is not that it puts “too much pressure” on
the offeree to accept but that, by threatening to inflict a wrong if the offeree does not
accept, it exerts a wrongful sort of pressure. To be sure, these two things will often
coincide—an offeree will often experience an offeror’s threat to do something wrongful
as exerting so much pressure as to make his compliance feel unfree. Nonetheless, the
measure of coercion on this account is the character of the pressure exerted, not its
magnitude.
This observation has suggested to one of us (Berman) a different way to analyze
unconstitutional conditions cases generally.369 Applying this distinct sense of
coercion—a conditional proposal is coercive (within a given normative system) if the
act conditionally threatened would be wrongful (within that given system) if carried
out—to the particular problem of conditional federal spending, it follows that a
conditional spending proposal by Congress should be deemed unconstitutionally
coercive if carrying out the act threatened—that is, withholding some or all of the
specified federal funds—would be unconstitutional. Strikingly, this is the sense of
coercion at work in New York.370 The take-title provision “has crossed the line
distinguishing encouragement from coercion,” the Court explains,371 because it
threatens to impose a consequence—requiring that the states legislate in a certain

on Precision in the Law, 82 CAL . L. REV. 541 (1994); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:
An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).
367. This is a slight overstatement, for Abel’s lack of choice would be consistent with
determinism. We can ignore this possibility, though, because the very inquiry into whether a
given individual had “no choice” in a particular circumstance presupposes either that
determinism is false or that the sense of choice on the table is not the one that determinism
denies.
368. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 287, at 53-55; Martin Gunderson, Threats and Coercion,
9 CAN . J. PHIL. 247 (1979); Vinit Haksar, Coercive Proposals (Rawls and Gandhi), 4 POL .
T HEORY 65, 68-70 (1976).
369. The theory is set forth in Berman, supra note 61. The discussion in text presents an
extremely simplified version of the full theory.
370. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
371. Id. at 175.

2003]

GETTING OFF THE DOLE

537

fashion—that would be unconstitutional as amounting to forbidden commandeering.372
Moving away from the federalism context altogether, this is also the sense of coercion
that the Court deployed in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,373 a takings case
decided just three days after Dole. In that case, the Court struck down a state offer to
grant a land-use variance on the condition that the landowner convey a public
easement. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, explained that the proposal was coercive
(a “plan of extortion” was his precise language) because it would have been
unconstitutional under these circumstances for the Coastal Commission to carry out
its threat not to grant the variance.374
One could accept that this rule—a conditional proposal is coercive (within a given
normative system) if the act conditionally threatened would be wrongful (within that
given system) if carried out—appeals to a coherent sense of coercion that is distinct
from the sense, or concept, intimated in Dole and embraced by the Baker test, and yet
suppose that it inescapably presents a slackening of Dole, not a tightening. Because
federal funds to the states are a gratuitous benefit, the argument goes, it cannot be
unconstitutional for Congress to withhold them. Under this test, then, conditional
spending plans would never be coercive.
Not so. To be sure, states have no constitutional right correlating with a federal
duty to disburse federal funds for local road construction or education or law
enforcement or for any other purpose. In this important sense, federal funds are indeed

372. In proceeding to observe that “[a] choice between two unconstitutionally coercive
regulatory techniques is no choice at all,” id. at 176, the New York Court seems to unite these
two senses of coercion: the states have “no choice” but to accept precisely because Congress
may not impose upon them the consequence it threatens. Yet “no choice at all” is unhelpful
hyperbole. If A gives B the bad news that he, A, is determined either to pinch B’s arm or to pull
B’s hair, and adds (the good news?) that A will allow B to select which unpleasantness she
prefers to suffer, it would be a mistake to observe that B is confronted with “no choice at all.”
B has a very clear and real choice: to suffer an arm-pinching or to suffer a hair-pulling. The same
is true of New York. So, in a more precise terminology, the Court may mean something like the
take-title provision gives the states “no fair choice.” But notice that unfairness in this picture
simply means unconstitutionality: What makes the choice unfair is only that, as a matter of
positive law, the act threatened would be unconstitutional. It is therefore the unconstitutionality
of the act threatened, and not any extraconstitutional sense of unfairness, that is doing all the
work in the analysis. This suggests a third possibility: the take-title provision gives the states
“no constitutionally acceptable choice.”
Now this formulation, finally, is precisely right (so long as we accept the Court’s nocommandeering rule as a constitutional given). But it is also woefully unartful. Speaking in terms
of the states’ choice situation adds nothing to the Court’s far more direct point:
Because an instruction to state governments to take title to waste, standing alone,
would be beyond the authority of Congress, and because a direct order to regulate,
standing alone, would also be beyond the authority of Congress, it follows that
Congress lacks the power to offer the States a choice between the two.
Id. And the conclusion follows as an application of the principle, put forth in text, that it is
unconstitutionally coercive to threaten what it would be unconstitutional to do.
373. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
374. Id. at 837. For development of this thumbnail sketch of Nollan and how its vision of
coercion compares to that advanced in Dole, see Berman, supra note 61, at 89-94; Berman,
supra note 129, at 733-35.
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a “benefit” as distinguished from an “entitlement.” But they are not a benefit in the
stronger sense of being a boon that Congress may withhold for any reason or no
reason at all. Nothing is a benefit in this very strong sense. In particular, so the claim
runs, government may not withhold a benefit (that is, make any entity worse off than
it otherwise would be) for the purpose of punishing or discouraging the exercise of a
right. Call it a “penalty” when government withholds a “benefit” for these improper
reasons. If this is correct, then some conditional spending offers would prove coercive,
hence unconstitutional,375 because they threaten to withhold a putative benefit under
circumstances in which what is being threatened is really imposition of a penalty.
Furthermore, the conditional spending offer at issue in Dole is probably an example of
just this sort of coercive proposal.
One may suspect that this approach proves too much because whenever the
national government withholds money from a state on noncompliance with a condition
it acts for the purpose of “punishing or discouraging” the state’s right not to comply.
However, a hypothetical contrasting case helps illustrate both that this suspicion
would be mistaken and that were the Court to adopt this different sense of coercion,
the actual statute at issue in Dole would probably prove unconstitutional.
Suppose that by 1984 every state had a minimum drinking age of twenty-one, save
South Dakota, whose drinking age was eighteen, and that every state had a minimum
driving age of eighteen, save North Dakota which limited driver’s licenses to persons
over fifty-five. Wishing to induce a change in both state policies, Congress provided
that a state would lose five percent of its otherwise allocable highway funds if it
maintained a minimum drinking age under twenty-one, and would lose all of its
highway funds for maintaining a minimum driving age over eighteen. In each case,
Congress is threatening to withhold a benefit. But that alone cannot make either
proposal coercive. On the account just sketched, the proposal is coercive if carrying
out the threat would be unconstitutional, and carrying out the threat would be
unconstitutional if Congress would be withholding the offered benefit for the purpose
of punishing the state for, or discouraging it from, standing on its (presumed)
sovereign right to set a drinking or driving age as it wishes.
Imagine, then, that the two Dakotas reject the condition. Now what interests justify
Congress in withholding highway funds (five percent of funds in the case of South
Dakota, 100 percent in the case of North Dakota)? With respect to North Dakota, the
story might go like this. An unusually high minimum driving age leads to an unusually
small number of cars on the roads, and to a correspondingly small number of accidents.
Improving road conditions, therefore, could generate only a very small net reduction
in accidents and thus of injuries and deaths. Every federal dollar spent on North
Dakota road improvements, as a consequence, produces a much smaller social welfare
benefit in North Dakota than it does in the other states. So if North Dakota (or any
other state for that matter) insists on maintaining an unusually high minimum driving
age, federal funds could produce a higher return in their next best use than in
improving highways in that state. Thus, even without denigrating a state’s decision
to maintain a very high driving age, Congress might reasonably conclude that because
the highways in such states will be so underused the national interest is not well

375. Actually, coercion is only a presumptive constitutional wrong—that is, an infringement,
not a violation. See Berman, supra note 61, at 21-22; Berman, supra note 287, at 49 n.14.

2003]

GETTING OFF THE DOLE

539

served by improving them. In short, withholding the funds on failure of the condition
need not serve any interest in punishing North Dakota or shaping state behavior—
withholding the funds does not, that is, “penalize” North Dakota—so the conditional
threat to withhold such funds is not coercive.376
This story is rather less plausible with respect to South Dakota, however.377 To be
sure, improving road conditions and raising the minimum drinking age (from eighteen
to twenty-one) might each increase net social welfare. But that is not the issue. The
issue is whether the extent to which improving road conditions increases net social
welfare is itself contingent upon the minimum drinking age. Or, put another way, the
issue is whether the increase in highway safety that Congress would buy by giving
a state funds with which to improve its highways varies depending upon that state’s
minimum drinking age, such that the higher a state’s minimum drinking age (within the
relevant range), the greater is the increase in highway safety that federal highway
dollars purchase. Because if this is not the case, then withholding federal highway
funds on failure of the condition does not serve a legitimate federal interest except as
mediated by the forbidden purpose of punishing a state for its recalcitrance or (more
likely) of discouraging the recalcitrant state and others from refusing the federal
demand. That is, if $x spent on highway maintenance and construction would reduce
highway accidents (or injuries or accident costs) y amount if the state has a minimum
drinking age of eighteen and would reduce highway accidents (or injuries or accident
costs) by the same y amount (albeit from a presumably lower baseline) if the state had
a minimum drinking age of twenty-one, then Congress’s withholding of any part of the
$x upon the state’s refusal to raise its drinking age could only be explained by a federal
interest in punishing the recalcitrant state or in discouraging other states from similarly
refusing the federal condition.
All of this is put conditionally. So, we must ask, what are the facts? Is the
incremental value of road improvements smaller in states with lower drinking ages, all
else being equal? A fully adequate analysis will be complex. But, we think, it is more

376. Note that whether the conditional spending proposal threatens a “penalty,” hence is
“coercive,” depends upon the purposes that the national government would have when carrying
out its threat not to provide the offered funds. It does not depend upon the purposes that the
national government has in extending the proposal. Naturally extending the proposal will be
animated, at least in part, by a purpose of inducing the offeree states to waive their (presumed)
sovereign right to legislate in a particular way. But it does not follow that carrying out the threat
would likewise be animated by that purpose. And the North Dakota hypothetical is intended
to be a case in point.
377. In the real world, of course, this story is not very plausible with respect to North
Dakota either. For one thing, Congress could incorporate annual highway miles driven into the
ordinary formula for allocating highway funds, in which case introducing driving age as a
separate factor would be redundant. In fact it does. See 23 U.S.C. § 104(b) (2000). But this
driving age hypothetical is designed merely to show that not all conditional spending proposals
involve threats to withhold federal funds under circumstances in which such withholding would
be undertaken for an improper reason. It illustrates that proposition by showing what form a
counterexample would take even if that counterexample could be challenged on other grounds.
In any event, any objection to the example could be met by tweaking the hypothetical. So, for
example, we could ask you to imagine that the technology necessary to measure annual highway
miles driven does not exist or is prohibitively expensive to employ.
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than incidental that nothing in Dole or the relevant legislative history suggests even
remotely that the answer is yes. And there is good reason to doubt it.378 Assuming,
then, that federal highway funds would produce as great an increase in social welfare
when spent in South Dakota as when spent in a similarly situated state that differed
only in the respect that it had a higher minimum drinking age, for Congress to carry out
its threat not to provide South Dakota with its full allotment of funds would indeed be
constitutionally impermissible for serving an impermissible purpose, thus rendering the
conditional threat coercive.
The upshot is that conditional spending programs could be distinguished from each
other on grounds of whether they are coercive if we adopt a different sense of coercion
than that featured in Dole—a sense that turns not on how onerous it would be for
state offerees if Congress carried out its threat to withhold federal funds but on
whether carrying out the threat would be wrongful in character because animated by
the wrong sorts of reasons. That the spending program upheld in Dole would most
probably fail this inquiry is strong evidence that a doctrine of this sort would constrain
congressional spending power more than existing doctrine does.379
Of course, precisely because this approach inquires into congressional purposes

378. For a somewhat cursory discussion, see Berman, supra note 61, at 37-40. To be sure,
we do not doubt that clever readers can hypothesize facts under which the increase in social
welfare that federal expenditures on highway construction and improvement purchase does vary
in inverse proportion to the minimum drinking age. Given such facts, the conditional funding
proposal at issue in Dole would not threaten a penalty, hence would not be coercive. But such
readers will also understand that the discussion in text is designed merely to illustrate how
conditional spending doctrine could operate upon a very different sense of coercion than Dole
adopted, and that the cogency of this different approach does not depend upon whether the
statute upheld in Dole was or was not coercive under this alternative conception of that concept.
379. It warrants mention, if not demonstration, that Statute B hypothesized in the previous
subsection, see supra text accompanying note 353, would probably be unconstitutionally
coercive under this approach, as would the condition imposed by the Jacob Wetterling Crimes
Against Children and Sexual Violent Offender Registration Program, see supra note 353. To
understand why the Violent Offender Incarceration and Truth-in-Sentencing Incentive Grants,
see id., in contrast, are probably not coercive, a little background is in order.
All federal spending is conditional: Congress offers $x on the condition that it be spent in a
particular way (e.g., to build roads) or in exchange for a particular good or service. Call the
condition, whatever it may be, y. But perhaps because the very notion of “spending” implies
at least some conditionality, the phrase “conditional spending” is ordinarily reserved for those
situations in which an additional condition is imposed, call it z. The conditional spending offer,
then, can be represented as “$x if and only if y + z.” The statute at issue in Dole is the paradigm:
Congress offers $x if and only if y (the state uses that money for specified road improvements)
and z (the state establishes or maintains a minimum legal drinking age of 21 or higher). The
Violent Offender Incarceration and Truth-in-Sentencing Incentive Grants seem to be different.
Here Congress appears to be offering $x simply for y (juvenile sentencing policies that Congress
happens to favor). This is not “conditional spending” as that term is generally used and,
therefore, is not coercive because Congress will probably always genuinely prefer not to give
out money with the requested quid pro quo. If that is Congress’s true preference, then in
withholding the offered benefit Congress is not acting with a purpose of punishing or
discouraging the state offeree’s presumed right not to comply with the congressional request.
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and preferences its resolution will often be contestable.380 Indeed, whether this inquiry
is sufficiently determinate in practice as to itself constitute an adequately administrable
judicial doctrine and, if not, whether an adequately administrable judicial doctrine can
be crafted to satisfactorily (albeit imperfectly) implement the understandings of
coercion and penalty just put forth, are important questions that the Court would have
to confront were it attracted to this alternative conceptualization.
D. Summary
Whereas Part IV examined how Congress might employ the spending power to
circumvent the Rehnquist Court’s curtailments of congressional power, this Part has
explored what sort of parry such a thrust might provoke. We argued that no Court,
least of all the Rehnquist Court, should be expected to tolerate such circumvention.381
Anticipating the possible objection that the Court could have no qualms about
Congress using the Court’s spending doctrine as a blueprint from which to construct
legislation, we explained that, stated so categorically, this view errs by ignoring the
well-understood notion of a loophole, the related but not identical notion of exploiting
a loophole, and the widely shared normative principle that exploiting a loophole is
(frequently, at least) dirty pool.
We then argued that if the Court wants to strike down an exploitative spending
statute designed to circumvent one of the Court’s federalism rulings, it would have a
variety of means at its disposal. First, the Court could very probably give Dole
significantly greater bite without ostensibly changing the test at all. The relatedness
and coercion prongs could each be tightened, but we think that such tightening is
more likely with the former. Relatedness could be tightened in a way that is articulable,
administrable and would prove fatal to most or all conceivable circumventions. Second,
if tightening relatedness were found unattractive or inadequate for whatever reasons,
the Court could replace or supplement the Dole test in any number of ways that would
constrain conditional spending much more than Dole does.
So Parts V.B and V.C reveal, in short, that conditional spending jurisprudence could
be much more restrictive of congressional power than it is at present. But they reveal
something much more important too. It is critical to recall that we reached this
consideration of alternatives by imagining that the Court (or, more precisely, a majority
thereof) was provoked to action by what it considered an affront to its authority. An
exploitation of the Dole loophole to circumvent an already announced judicial decision
throws down the gauntlet in a way unlikely to be ignored. A circumventionist statute,
therefore, is likely to provoke the Court to extend its states’ rights revolution to the
spending power even when it might not otherwise have done so, or at least to provoke
an extension different in content than might otherwise have come to pass.382

380. Some critics will go farther, contending that the inquiry is incoherent. We think this is
wrong, but cannot hope to develop the argument in this space.
381. The claim, it bears emphasis, is not that the Court should not tolerate such statutes as
we have imagined, but only that it would be mistaken to expect the Court to do so.
382. See e.g., Conkle supra note 130, at 680 (noting “a distinct possibility” that the Court
might adopt new limits on the spending power “especially in the context of legislation that the
Court might regard as a congressional attempt to circumvent its decision in Boerne”).
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This is not fanciful. For surely it is plausible that in other areas where this Court has
cut back on congressional power, it was provoked to do so by what it perceived as
particularly galling congressional effrontery. Garrett, for example, is arguably 383 a
straightforward application of Boerne, yet without RFRA’s challenge to Smith, this
Court might have found a way to uphold the ADA under Section 5.384 Morrison is
arguably a straightforward application of Lopez, but had it not been for the GFSZA,
this Court—at least Kennedy or O’Connor, either of whom would have been enough—
might have applied the pre-Lopez rational basis aggregation test to uphold VAWA. If
our prediction that Dole is secure at least through the very near term proves right, then
adoption of a circumventionist spending statute by the proponents of strong national
power could be such advocates’ biggest mistake.
CONCLUSION
Whenever talk turns to what Congress could or should do in response to the
Rehnquist Court’s cutting back of congressional power, the possibility of recourse to
the spending power comes quickly to everyone’s minds, for the reigning precedent,
South Dakota v. Dole, has yet to be trimmed. Of course, Dole could be trimmed soon,
perhaps substantially curbing the appeal of any possible spending-based “fixes” to
recent federalism decisions. Yet the Court passed on an opportunity to revisit Dole this
very term in Guillen385 and, we think, is extremely unlikely to tinker with Dole either
later this Term when resolving the pending challenge to the Children’s Internet
Protection Act,386 or some distance down the road when considering RLUIPA.387 If this
prediction proves correct, then proposals to exploit Congress’s substantial power of
conditional spending to get around some of the recent limits imposed under the
Commerce Clause and Tenth, Eleventh, and Fourteenth Amendments will, if anything,
gain steam.
Accordingly, we then examined how spending power circumventions of various of
the Court’s recent federalism decisions might work and argued that this is a risky
strategy. The risk is not simply that particular spending legislation may be struck
down. That its enactments might be invalidated is a risk Congress always takes. The
risk that ought to give Congress pause is that in striking down the circumventionist

383. Also arguably not a straightforward application, essentially for reasons put forth by
Justice Breyer in dissent. For further development of this view, see, for example, Kramer, supra
note 240, at 145-53; Post & Siegel, supra note 240.
384. See Mark Tushnet, What Is the Supreme Court’s New Federalism?, 25 OKLA. CITY U.
L. REV. 927, 935 (2000):
I believe that the best account of Boerne is that the Court saw Congress’s action
in rejecting the Court’s interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause as a direct
challenge to the Court’s authority—akin to a separation of powers concern—and
used available federalism doctrine as the hook on which to hang its distaste for
what Congress had done. Still, doctrine once articulated can take on a life of its
own.
385. Pierce County v. Guillen, 123 S. Ct. 720 (2003).
386. Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 406-07 (E.D. Pa. 2002),
probable jurisdiction noted, 123 S. Ct. 551 (2002).
387. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000); see also supra Part III.B.
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legislation, the Court could invigorate Dole, or replace it, in ways that would prove
fatal to noncircumventionist uses of the spending power that would have sailed
through in the absence of any such change in judicial doctrine.
This cautionary note may seem to be against interest. Given our view that Dole is
a misguided and potentially harmful doctrine, we could be expected to stand among the
first to applaud its demise. Yet all depends upon what replaces Dole. And ill-conceived
congressional provocation is apt to engender just the sort of ill-conceived judicial
reaction from which sound constitutional doctrine is particularly unlikely to issue.

